' The two appeals captioned above emanate from the decisions dated 16th June, 1982 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 4, Faisalabad, whereby the grievance petitions of the appellants for their reinstatement in service were dismissed.
2. The appellants had been terminated in 1978 on the ground that on account of non-availability of wheat second shift had been discontinued. The grievance petitions of the appellants were accepted on 15th July, 1978 and they were directed to be reinstated in service. On appeal by the respondent the cases were remanded on 21st July, 1979 with a direction that the cases after being bifurcated be decided again. In the meantime the respondent had, in compliance with the order of the learned lower Court, given duty to the appellants but did not pay back benefits. The appellants were again terminated and they challenged the second termination but the grievance petitions were withdrawn on the ground that previous petitions for reinstatement were pending. The learned lower Court after bifurcation redefined the cases allowing back benefits only as the appellants had withdrawn their petitions lodged against the second termination order. The cases were again remanded on the ground that without reinstatement back benefits could not be allowed. This is true that the petitions have been dismissed on the ground that retrenchment was legal and proper. As common questions of fact and law are involved, both the appeals are being decided together through this single judgment.
3. Admittedly, no one month's notice was given rather 24 hours notice was served. No pay of one month in lieu of notice was ordered to be offered. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that since the appellants were asked to collect dues, it cannot be said that one month's pay in lieu of notice was not allowed. I do not find any force in this argument. If offer of one month's pay had been made in lieu of notice, it would have been mentioned in the order of termination. So the order of termination was not legal. The learned counsel has also argued that at the most one month's pay can be tendered but the orders of termination cannot be set aside. This argument too is devoid of force. Provision of Standing Order 12(1) is mandatory that the services of a permanent workman can be terminated on one month's notice or payment of one month's pay. The words are "shall be paid". Offer of payment of one month's pay in lieu of notice is to be made in the order of termination and not afterwards. After a party has challenged, the order of termination by giving grievance notice or lodging of grievance petition, no offer can be made. However, the employer may withdraw the order of termination and pass another order of termination with an offer of the payment of one month's pay or to serve one month's notice but once an illegal order has been passed, it cannot be mended by subsequent offer of one month' pay. Very alarming results would follow if it is held that in the case of order of termination without offer of payment of one month's pay, only one month's pay can be delivered, because the employer after contesting the case for several years may ask the Court to order for the payment of one month's pay only. Since no offer of payment of one month's pay in lieu of notice was made in the termination order, the termination is illegal being in violation of Standing Order 12(1). PLD 1978 Kar. 302 is not germane to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as the point involved in the said case was whether besides the service of one month's notice, the employee would be entitled to one month's pay also or not. It has been held that one month's pay being in lieu of notice can be claimed in the cases where on month's notice has not been given. At the same time the appellants were not justified in withdrawing their applications whereby they had challenged the second order of termination. After being reinstated in compliance with the previous order of the Labour Court, they had been again terminated, so it was distinct cause of grievance and had no connection with the previous termination. Since the appellants now stand terminated on account of the second orders of termination which have become, on account of the withdrawal of second grievance petitions, final, they cannot be directed to be reinstated in service. They are, however, entitled to back benefits from the date of first termination upto the date they were reinstated by the respondent and the appeals are accepted to this extent, setting aside the impugned decisions of the learned lower Court recorded separately in respect of the petitions of the appellants.