' This second appeal arises from a declaratory suit. The value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction as disclosed in the appellate decree is Rs, 200, but in the appeal form it is given as Rs, 7,94,000.
Obviously the value given in the form is not correct, for otherwise the appellant could not have filed his first appeal in the District Court. The appellant cannot value the suit for purposes of first appeal and second appeal at different amounts. The value as given in the decree is correct, and since it is less than Rs, 2,000 no second appeal can be filed on account of the prohibition contained in section 102, C.P.C.
2. It is contended that although the forum for first appeal is determined by the notional jurisdictional value as given in the plaint, but for purposes of deciding whether the bar contained in section 102, C.P.C. Is attracted or not, the actual market value of the subject-matter of the suit is to be seen. If the actual value be more than Rs, 2,000 then prohibitive clause is not attracted.
3. There is no merit in this submission. The forum for first appeal is determined by the provisions of section 18 of the West Pakistan Courts Ordinance. Section 18, read with section 2 (b) of the Ordinance, lays down that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit determines the forum for appeal. The value of the subject-matter of .a declaratory suit is to be calculated in accordance with the rules framed by the High Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, which fix a notional value. This notional value is taken as the value of the subject-matter of the suit for purposes of section 18 of the Ordinance. The same notional value must also be taken as the value for purposes of section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no reason to suppose that the same words used in section 102, C.P.C. And section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance refer to different values. This appeal is therefore barred by section 102, C.P.C.
4. Learned counsel submits that the appeal may be treated as being revision. The case of the applicant is that the land dispute was temporarily allotted to him in the year 1947, and this allotment was confirmed on 11th June, 1965, by the Chairman of the Allotment Committee. Before the confirmation, the same land had been proposed in the name of one Idris on 26th February, 1965. However, respondent No, 1 Mst. Hasso filed an appeal against the said proposal, which was accepted by the Settlement Commissioner on 8th April, 1966 and as a result the land was at first allotted to the respondents on 3rd August, 1966 and latter on mutation No, 287 conferring proprietary rights on the respondents was sanctioned on 13th June, 1976, While passing the order dated 8th April, .1966 the Settlement Commissioner had not given any notice to the appellant. The appellant therefore challenged the order as being void and ineffective as against him, and he prayed that he be declared to be the owner in possession of the suit land.
5. The learned District Judge found that the order dated 8th April, 1966 of the Settlement Commissioner had really been passed in revision against an appellate order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner dated 20th January, 1965. The lower appellate Court has observed that the appellant had not placed on record any copy of order dated 26th February, 1965 whereby the land was proposed in the name of the said Idris, or a copy of the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner dated 20th January, 1965 with the result that the circumstances under which property was proposed to Idris in preference to the appellant are not clarified, and it is also not understood how, despite this litigation between Idris and the respondents, the District Allotment Committee had confirmed the land in favour of the appellant.
6. The Court also found that the land having been proposed in the name of Idris, the appellant could not be regarded as being a necessary party in the dispute between Idris and these respondents, and that he did not have to be impleaded as such and therefore he could not take any exception to the order of the Settlement Commissioner dated 8th April, 1966.
7. Learned counsel submits that the land having been confirmed to him by the Chairman of the Allotment Committee on 11th June, 1965 it could not be allotted to any one before setting aside his allotment. In this connection he has referred to Sh. Barkat All v. M. S. Zaman, Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and 2 others The lower appellate Court found that the land having been proposed to Muhammad Idris on 26th February, 1965 the Chairman Allotment Committee could not have confirmed the allotment to the appellant on 11th June, 1965 and as such the confirmation was not valid. There is no procedural or jurisdictional error in this finding the judgment of the lower appellate Court cannot therefore be challenged in revision, and as such no useful purpose would be served by treating this appeal as a revision. In any case only the Settlement Authorities could have conferred proprietary rights in the land and as such Civil Courts could not grant the appellant's prayer that he be declared to be the owner in possession of the disputed land. The appeal is therefore dismissed in limine as being incompetent. PLD 1968 Lah. 770