This appeal arises from the decision dated 26th March, 1981 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 7, Gujranwala. Whereby the order of suspension passed against the respondent was set aside and he was directed to be re-instated in service. Back benefits have been allowed with effect from 1st February, 1980
2. The respondent is Assistant Lineman. He was suspended vide order dated 3rd January, 1980. The respondent challenged the order on the ground that it continued beyond 28 days. Two points as usual have been raised which are that the respondent is a civil servant and that Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable.
3. I have already answered those questions in many cases holding that the employees of WAPDA who come within the exceptions of the definition of `civil servant' contained in section 2 of the Civil Servants Act are not civil servants. Since the respondent is a lineman in electricity, he is employed in the distribution of electricity and thus by virtue of clause (xix) of Schedule 11 appended to section 2 (n) of the Workmen's Compen--sation Act, is a workman. The relevant exceptions given in section 2 of the Civil Servants Act are that the persons covered by the definition of workman given in section 2 (n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and section 2 (h) of Factories Act are not civil servants. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited PLD 1982 Lab. 1 but I have already in many cases where this ruling was cited, disagreed with great respect with my learned brother. Section 17 (1-B) has not defined the term `civil servant'. It says that except deputationists all other WAPDA employees will be deemed as civil servants. It is thus clear that the term has not been defined. This is true that section 17 (1-B) has not borrowed the definition of civil servant but at the same time it has not itself defined the term. This being so, the definition of the term given in the Civil Servants Act shall have to be considered. WAPDA employees have been deemed as civil servants for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act so that the forum for the Dispute of WAPDA employees should be the said Tribunal, but Service Tribunals have jurisdiction to hear the cases of those persons only who are covered by the definition of civil servant as defined by the Civil Servants Act, 1973. Neither WAPDA Act, nor the Service Tribunals Act says that the cases of WAPDA employees, irrespective of the fact whether or not they are covered by. The definition of civil servants will be heard by A the Service Tribunals, so in order to see if Service Tribunals has jurisdic--tion, we shall have to consider the definition of the civil serv4nt given in the Civil Servants Act. The matter boils down to this that all those W APDA employees are civil servants who are covered by the definition of the term given to the Civil Servants Act. I am supported in m view by PLD 1978 Lab. 781.
For the exclusion of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 two conditions were given in its section 1 (4)
(c), proviso 11. They are that the establish--ment should be running by or under the authority of any Government and such an establishment should have its own statutory rules. Both the conditions are wanting in this case. WAPDA is a statutory and independent body running under the authority of WAPDA Act. I, therefore, hold that Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 applies and since the suspension con--tinued for more than 28 days, it was in violation of Standing Order 15 (5 and was rightly set aside by the learned lower court.
5. As upshot of the observations made above, I do not find any force in this appeal and dismiss it.