' This writ petition challenging the validity of the order of the learned DistrictJudge, Dera Ghazi Khan, dated the 27th July, 1978 whereby the repondent l's revision petition against the order of the learned Civil Judge, Jampur, dated the 4th June, 1978 allowing the petitioners leave to amend their written statement was accepted and the said order was set aside, arises out of the following circumstances. Respondent No, 1 brought a suit for possession by pre-emption of the land in dispute pleasuring 606 Kanals 19 Marlas against the petitioners in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Jampur. The suit was decreed conditional on payment of Rs, 78,300 on the 14th December, 1976. The learned District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan by his judgment, dated the 26th February, 1978 accepted the petitioner's appeal, set aside the decree granted by the learned trial Court and remanded the case to it for fresh decision.
2. After remand the petitioners sought amendment of the written statement so as to introduce therein the plea of bar of limitation for the reason that the bargain of sale of the land in question had been struck and possession of the land had been transferred to them about two months before attestation of mutation of sale and since then they had been openly in its possession which fact had been in the knowledge of respondent No,
1. Though the petitioner's move to secure leave to amend the written statement was opposed by respondent No, 1 yet the learned Civil Judge granted the petitioners permission to amend their written statement. Respondent No, 1 challenged the legality of the order of the learned trial Civil Judge in revision before the learned District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan, who, by his impugned order of the 27th July, 1978, set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge allowing amendment of written statement. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to dispute the validity of the order of the learned District Judge.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the plea of limitation being one of law could have been raised by the petitioners at any time during the trial of the suit and even in appeal and, therefore, the learned District Judge was not right in setting aside the order of the learned Civil Judge allowing the petitioners to take objection that the suit was time-barred. If the petitioners bad confined themselves to raising pure question of law touching limitation they might have been allowed to do so but what they did was that they came out with new set of facts which they could very well plead in their written statement as these facts were certainly in their knowledge when they filed the written statement. The question that they raised was not of pure law but a mixed one of law and facts. By introducing these facts they were in a way setting up a new case regarding question of limitation which they could not have been permitted to do. The learned District Judge was quite right in setting aside the order of the learned Civil Judge allowing the amendment which could be described as no more than an afterthought and amounted to manufacturing a new case.
4. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Bashir Ahmad Khan v. Qaiser Ali Khan the order of the learned Civil Judge can very well be said to be case decided within the purview section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as such could have been reviewed in revision. The case reported as Ahmad Din v. The Australasi Bank Ltd. Bhalwal referred to by the learned counsel in support of his contention that the impugned order of the learned Civil Judge did not constitute a case decided as contemplated by section 115 of the Code and as such was not amenable to revision, does not contain fuller discussion of the subject. Therefore, the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Bashir Ahmad Khan's case is to be preferred. The order of the learned Civil Judge could have been revised by the learned District Judge.
5. Lastly, the learned counsel questioned the jurisdiction of the learned District Judge to entertain and decide the revision petition against the order of the learned Civil Judge because the matter was beyond the limits of his pecuniary jurisdiction. The learned counsel maintained that the value of the suit for purpose of jurisdiction was Rs, 33,495 and that the learned District Judge possessed jurisdiction to hear revision petitions in cases where the value of the cause was not more than Rs, 25,000. However, no objection to the jurisdiction of the learned District Judge was ever raised when he decided appeal as well as the revision petition and the same cannot be allowed to be raised at this late stage. Objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction ought to have been taken at the earliest opportunity. The principle of incompetency of a tribunal to decide a cause for lack of inherent jurisdiction stated in Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue West Pakistan adverted to by the learned counsel, is hardly applicable to the facts of the instant case. The learned District Judge had the jurisdiction to decide revision petition. The objection in respect of his pecuniary jurisdiction having not been set up by the petitioners before him could be deemed to have been waived and can hardly be adjudicated in writ petition by this. Court for the purpose of striking down his order.
6. In view of what has been stated above this petition is without any force and is dismissed with costs. PLD 1973 SC 507 1971 S C_M R 507 PLD 1967 SC 314 revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.