S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Wajahat Hussain, Miss Rehana Wahid, Mr. Ali Raza Safi, Mr. Khalid Naseer, Mr. Umer Hayat, Mr. Manzoor Ahmad, Mrs. Aasia Bashir and Ch. Muhammad Islam have filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974 whereby they have challenged the seniority list of 1-1-1981 as illegal, ultra vires and ineffective and have impleaded Messrs Nazir Ahmad and 79 others as respondents. They have also impleaded Province of the Punjab through Secretary, Zakat and Social Welfare Department, Lahore and Directorate-General, Social Welfare as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal it has been prayed that seniority list prepared on 20-2-1974 may be declared as the seniority list in the field.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and learned District Attorney assisted by the representative of the respondent No. 1 and 2 ; it has been urged on behalf of the appellants that they were regularly appointed on different dates in the year 1968-69 as Medical Social Officers under the Wealth Department, while the respondents Nos. 3 to 82 were appointed on ad hoc basis as Social Welfare Officers under the West Pakistan Social Welfare Department (Gazetted Posts)
Recruitment Rules, 1964 during the years 1963 to 1969. The learned counsel has relied on Notification No. SOR-III-I-40/69, dated 28-2-1970, issued by the Services and General Administration Department of the Provincial Govern--ment which according to him entitles the appellants to be treated as regularly appointed persons w.e.f. 1st January, 1970. It has been argued that the list issued on 1-1-19131 has shown the appellants juniors to the respondents which has changed the seniority list issued in 1974 and thus their rights have been badly affected. The learned counsel has assailed the advice of the Services and General Administration Department dated 11-1-1978 as without any basis and violative of the earlier notification and thus ultra vires. The nature of the ad hoc appointment of the respondents has also been assailed which according to the learned counsel did not confer any right on the respondents according to the rule 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974.
4. On the other hand the learned District Attorney as well as the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 3 to 82 Mr. Mushtaq Masood, Advocate have repelled these contentions as being devoid of any merits. They have also raised the preliminary objection to the maintainability of this appeal as being time-barred. It has been submitted on their behalf that the merits of this appeal cannot be looked into by this Tribunal as this point in issue came before this very Tribunal, i.e. Case No. 7j 17 of 1974 titled "M. Shafi Arshad v. The Director, Social ,Welfare and others" which was decided on 8-10-1974 wherein this Tribunal quashed the seniority list of 1974 and upheld the plea of the respondents who were appellants in this case. In this way it has been urged that the present appeal is hit by principles of res judicata and therefore the same cannot be re-opened.
5. We have given our anxious thoughts to the contention so raised by the parties and found the plea regarding the maintainability of this appeal as time-barred is not impressive. The appellants came before this Tribunal when ultimately their objection filed against the list of 1981 were rejected.
The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 also in the written statement before this Tribunal have not taken the plea of time limit and have only stressed to the merits of this case which shows that the Government respondents considered the point of limitation so raised by the respondents Nos, 3 to 82 without any force.
6. With regard to the merits of the case we have perused the judg--ment of this Tribunal carefully and found that the present appellants as well as many of the respondents raised this very issue before this Tribunal that the seniority list of 1974 which according to the representative of the Government was prepared in accordance with paragraph (a) of sub-rule (1) of rule 8 ibid i. e. On the principles of earlier selection was not consider--ed as correct. It was observed as under - "We do not think that the provision of paragraph (a) of sub-rule.(1). Ibid, could in terms be applied here. The said paragraph regulates the seniority of officers appointed to the, service by initial recruitment only. The expression `initial recruitment' has been defined to clause (f) of rule 2 as meaning an appointment made otherwise than by promotion or transfer from another service, department or post. The contesting respondents were already holding offices as Social Welfare Officers under the Health Department when their services were placed at the disposal of the Social Welfare Department, thu3 their appointments as Social Welfare Officers under the Social Welfare Department was through transfer from another service and a department, and not by way of initial recruitment within the meaning of clause (f) ibid. The Administrative Department was therefore, clearly in error in applying paragraph (a). Of sub-rule (1) in fixing the inter ,.Se seniority of the appellants and the contesting respondents.
7. The Tribunal further elaborated this point by observing that the principle of earlier selection could not furnish a satisfactory' and just basis for determining the inter se seniority of the two sets of officers 'as the incidents of service in the Health Department and in the Social Welfare Department were separate. It was also found by this Tribunal in its earlier judgment that instead of referring the case of the present respondents who were appellants that time it was referred to the Selection Board duly constituted by the Government to regularise the appointment of these ad hoc officers. It was only when the Board approved these appointments, only then they Were given seniority from the date they started officiating on ad hoc basis. It was concluded that the principles of earlier selection which pre--supposes similar method of initial recruitments could have no application here. The Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the principles of seniority of the present respondent vis-a-vis .The present appellants was incorporated in sub-rule (2) of rule 8. The ultimate result arrived at by this Tribunal was that the seniority list of 1974 was set aside.
8. It is a settled principle of law that the issue once determined by this Tribunal cannot be reviewed or re-opened by the same Tribunal under any ground whatsoever, what the present appellant require us to do is, to take a divergent view, from the view already held and to restore the seniority list of 1974 which was positively set aside on 8-10-1974 by a Full Bench headed by Justice S. S. Jan (Chairman). We are afraid we cannot accept this proposition so propounded before us by the appellant. As discussed by us earlier we find ourselves in agreement with the view of this Tribunal that rule 8 (1) (a) would not be applicable to the parties. The respondent although ad hoc were regularised were. f. The dates of the continuous appointment and thus no exception can be take to this prerogative of this Government which in fact was exercised on the recommendations of this Tribunal so made in its well-considered judgment of 8-10-1974. We have also carefully perused the advice of the Services and General Administration Department issued vide U. O. No. SOR-II (T & GAD) 3-6/76, dated 11-1-1978 and found the same is based on sound principles as well as in accordance with the notification. They have correctly interpreted the word `since' which mentions in clause (a) of the said notifica--tion to the context as under :- "Such person has continuously served in such service or post as the case may be since 1-1-1966."
We have no hesitation to conclude that the word 'since' only related to the appointment of 1-1-1966 and not to those which occurred on the later dates.
9. In the light of the above discussion we are of the considered opinion that the impugned seniority list of 1981 which has been notified on 1-1-1981 is in accordance with the law and in pursuance of the earlier judgment of this Tribunal and no' exception can be taken to it. We, therefore, proceed to dismiss the present appeal on the principles of the res judicata as well as being without any merits.
There will be no order as to costs.