1. ' On 22-2-1982 when this appeal came up for regular hearing before me a preliminary objection was taken by the respondent that the appeal is beyond time. However, on the same date by detailed order passed, it was agreed by counsel of the parties that while considering the question of limitation the date of estimation of the fees in the certified copy of the order may be read as 18- 12-1978 instead of 12-12-1979. I have heard the learned counsel on point of limitation first and with their assistance I calculated the period of limitation after excluding the time spent by the appellant in obtaining certified copy of the order and found that the appeal is within time. This order was passed on 9-12-1979, copy, was applied for on 11-12-1979. Fee was estimated on 18-12-1979 and it was deposited on 20-12-1979. The copy was made ready on 20-12-1979 and stamps were supplied on 2-1-1980. It was certified on the same date and was delivered to appellant on 20-1-1980. The appeal has been filed on 26-1-1980. It is contended by the respondent that there was negligence on the part of the appellant in supplying the stamp and collecting the copy after it was ready. Even if this contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted the total period lost in this way was 21 days and, therefore, appellant had still 9 days. For filing the appeal whereas it was filed within 6 days and as such the appeal is within time.
2. ' On merits the ejectment order against the appellant has been passed by the Rent Controller on the ground of subletting. The appellant in his written statement before the Rent Controller raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of ejectment application on the ground of non- service of statutory notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Comp. & Rehab.) Act, 1958.
3. The Rent Controller found the following issues :- "(1) Whether the Opponent No, 2 is the statutory tenant of the applicant ? If so . Whether he has been served with notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons Act ?
(2) What should the order be ?"
4. ' After recording evidence of the parties the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the appellant was not the recorded tenant of the premises and, therefore, he was not the statutory tenant and as such it was not necessary to serve the notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Comp. & Rehb.) Act, 1958 on him before institution of ejectment case. The contention of the appellants that he was in occupation of premises since 1956 was not accepted on the ground that he failed to establish that he was the recorded tenant of the premises. The approach of Rent Controller to the preliminary issue was wholly misconceived. The law does not require that in order to treat a person as a statutory tenant under section 30 of the D. P. Act he should be a recorded tenant of the premises. If A a person is in occupation of the evacuee property on or before 20th December, 1958 he is to be treated as a statutory tenant of the property upon transfer of such a property to any other person. The Rent Controller while considering the preliminary issue did not advert to this aspect of the case. In so far the findings of Rent Controller on the issue of subletting is concerned, the same is equally erroneous. The Rent Controller proceeded on the assumption that since Chiraguddin was the recorded tenant of the custodian, therefore, it follows that the appellant has been sublet the premises by Chairguddin. The finding is purely conjectural and is not based on any evidence. The fact that Chiraguddin was shown as a recorded tenant of the premises in question does not necessarily mean that the other person who was in possession of the premises at the time of its transfer was sublet the same by the recorded tenant. The Rent Controller while dealing with the issue of subletting neither considered the evidence on record properly nor applied his mind to.It. I, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the order of Rent Controller and remand the case to him for decision afresh on all the issues involved in the case in accordance with the law.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent complained that the respondent had also alleged default against the appellant but this issue was not decided by the Rent Controller. As the case is being remanded back to the Rent Controller it will be open to the respondent to press the issue of default before the Rent Controller. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.