The two appeals captioned above arise from the decision dated 28-4-1981 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore, whereby Sajjad Haider was directed to be re- instated in service without back benefits. Since both the appeals arise from the same decision, they are being disposed of together through this single judgment, in which United Bank Limited will be described as the appellant and Sajjad Haider as the respondent.
2. The respondent was Officer grade-II. He was dismissed from service on the allegation that he had embezzled Rs. 50,000, that he advanced a loan of Rs. 20,015 without any authority and that he obtained personal loans for house building, purchasing a scooter and furniture but utilized them for purposes other than for which they were taken. He was charge-sheeted to which he replied. No enquiry was started for considerable period. Thereafter the respondent gave some statement in writing admitting the charges. He was dismissed on the basis of the admissions. He appealed against the dismissal depart--mentally on 12-1-1980 but it was rejected on 23-2-1980. Grievance notice was sent by him on 3-3-1980 and receiving no reply lodged the grievance petition on 22-5- 1980
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the- grievance notice and the grievance petition both are time-barred. But this is wrong.~ In case where a dismissed person has sought departmental remedy by way1A of appeal, the cause of grievance arises to him on the rejection of the appeal. ~. In the present case appeal from the dismissal order was preferred on 12-1-1930. Its rejection was intimated by reply Exh P-5 dated 23-2-1980. Grievance notice dated 3-3-1980, therefore, was from the date of 24-2-1980 within time. Grievance petition was lodged just on the last day of limi--tation. Since reply to the grievance notice was received 'on 22-3-1980, the grievance petition presented on 22-5-1980 was within timer
4. It has been argued that the respondent is not a workman. Since nationalised banks are being run by the Government and Wage Commission Award is akin to statutory rules, both the conditions for the exclusion o Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 given in provision, of section 1(4) (c) o the said Ordinance stood fulfilled. Since Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable, the definition of workman given in its section 2(i) is not to be looked into. There is no evidence about the wages of the respondent. Unless it ha4 proved that the pay of the respondent was I excess of Rs. 800 per month, exception (vi) of section 2 (xxviii) o the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 would not apply even if it b said that the duties of the respondent were supervisory. Admittedly, h had no managerial powers. So he is covered by the definition of workman.
5. The learned lower Court has rightly held that the respondent was charge-sheeted and dismissed by an incompetent authority. The dismissal order was passed by the Executive Vice-President, whereas according to resolution of the Board, Circle Executive jointly with Senior Executive Vice--- President could legally dismiss the respondent. No doubt, the two officers who approved the dismissal order are mentioned as members of the Executive Board, but there is no evidence if any one of them was Senior Executive Vice-President. It, therefore, does not stand proved that the dismissal order was passed by the competent authorities. The -respondent therefore, was rightly directed to be re-instated in service. The respondent is not entitled to back benefits since from his admission the offence stood established and he has succeeded only on technical grounds.
6. As upshot of the observations made above, I do not find any force in the appeals and dismiss them.