The respondent joined service as officer Grade-III was appointed by the Controller confirmed on 13th May, 1966 by the Executive ground that his services were no longer required, terminated on 2nd February, 1976, by the Senior Vice-President/Zonal Chief. The respondent made representation on 21st April, 1976 which was rejected on 14th May, 1976, On 9th June, 1977 the respondent filed appeal before the Services Tribunal which was dismissed in default on 4th November, 1978. . The petition for restoration was moved but that too was dismissed in default on 17th Decem--ber, 1978. On 21st January, 1980 the respondent is alleged to have given the grievance notice and, thereafter, within two months and fifteen days brought grievance petition with an application for condonation of delay. The order of termination was challenged on the ground that the Senior Vice-Presi--dent was not competent to terminate his services. The petition was contested by the appellant bank and several preliminary objections were raised. It was contended that the grievance petition was time- barred, that the Senior Vice---President was competent to pass the order of termination, that the respondent was not a workman and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction.
3. The learned lower Court proposed to decide the point of limitation first and invited evidence on the point. Thereafter, the learned lower Court proposed to decide this point also whether the Senior Vice-President was or was not competent to pass the; order of termination and invited evidence of the parties on this point also. After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties the learned trial Judge not only gave decision on the points on which he bad invited evidence and heard arguments, but also on the points such as the respondent was covered by the definition of workman and the Labour Court had jurisdiction.
4. The grievance petition was-made after the delay of about four years. Needless to say that delay of every day is to be specifically explained. I argued by the learned counsel- for the respondent that after the rejection of the first representation, the respondent had made another representation to the higher authorities i. e. The President, which has not been answered uptil now. No copy of the second representation, however, has been pointed out from the record. In the grievance notice, no doubt, it is mentioned that second representation was made, but no evidence was pro--duced on this point. The. Making of second representation, therefore, does not stand proved. After a delay of more than one year of the dismissal of the representation, the appeal to the Services Tribunal was made and there is no explanation to it. The affidavit of Dr. Khalid Ranjha, Advocate, is ,only to this effect that he had given advice to the respondent to challenge the order of termination before the Services Tribunal. This affidavit, does not explain the delay which occurred from the date of rejection of the representa--tion to the date on which the appeal to the Services Tribunal was made. Again the application for restoration of the appeal was dismissed in default on .7th December, 1978, but the grievance notice is alleged to have been given-on 21st January, 1980 and the grievance petition made thereafter. No ground is given to explain this. Delay of more than one year, The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that since the order of termination was without jurisdiction, it was a nullity and, therefore, no question of limitation arises. This argument was advanced before the learned lower Court also and it found favour with the learned Presiding Officer.
5. Since evidence was invited only on two points i.e. Limitation and whether the order of termination was without jurisdiction the remaining points could not be decided by the learned lower Court. On the point of limitation the learned counsel for the respondent has not said that the peti--tion was within time. He has said that since the order of termination was void ab initio, having been passed by an officer who had no jurisdiction, no question of limitation would arise. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that even if the order was void, the period of limitation started-from the date on which the respondent came to know of it. He relies upon 1978 SCMR 3'671 and PLD 1969 SC 5$2. It has not been observed in the first mentioned authority that no period of limitation runs against a void order and an order without jurisdiction, It has been observed in PLD 1969 SC 582 that the period of limitation would run from the date of knowledge for exercising power of review. In the present case no such question is ;involved that the period of limitation started from the date of knowledge.' The respondent knew the passed against him, but he slept over the matter after his representation was dismissed and Went to they Services Tribunal after lapse of more than one year Even if the period spent in the Services Tribunal is condoned in view of the fact that counsel for the respondent namely, Dr. Khalid Raniha, Advocate, has given an affi--davit that he had advised the respondent tai go to the Services Tribunal, the period wasted prior to that between the date of the rejection of the repre--sentation and the date of the institution of the appeal to the Services Tribu--nal could not be condoned as no reasonable ground had been given. Dr. Khalid Ranjha may have advised the respondent to appeal to the Services Tribunal, but he cannot be said to have assured the respondent that he may bring the appeal wasting time and that the delay would be condoned. Even after the dismissal of the petition for restoration of the appeal in the Services Tribunal, sufficient time was lost by not coming to the Labour Court forth--with. On 17th December, 1978 the application for restoration was rejected, but on 21st January, 1980 grievance notice is alleged to have been given. No cogent ground has `been given in the application for condonation of delay to condone the delay in given grievance notice.
6. The ground given in the application for condonation of delay is that the respondent learnt from Ghulam Muhammad Bhatti that the Labour Court was entertaining such grievance petitions. Firstly, this could not be a ground for condonation of delay that the respondent learnt from someone that the Labour Court was entertaining such petitions. It was the duty of the respondent to find out which was the correct forum Since the question of jurisdiction had been raised before the Services Tribunal, the respondent should have been vigilent enough to consider which was the forum. But he did not care even after his application for restoration of appeal was dismissed. Moreover, Ghulam Muhammad Bhatti was also not examined, as witness to support the plea that the said person had informed the respondent that the Labour Court wasonly that Ghulam Muhammad Bhatti even the respondent himself did not valuable right had accrued to the, defeated without any good.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that the delay in giving grievance notice cannot be condoned under section 65-B of the Indus trial Relations Ordinance, 1969. He has cited PLJ 1979 Tr. C (Labour) 243, PLJ 1979 Tr. C (Labour) 255, PLJ 1980 Tr. C. (Labour) 14, 19811 PLC 516, 1980 PLC 1151 and NLR 1980 Labour 32. No doubt in PLJ 1979 Tr. C (Labour) 243 and PLJ 1979 Tr. C.
(Labour) 255 it ha 1s been observed that section 65-B does not apply to the delay in serving the grievance notice but I do not find myself in agreement with the view taken or the reasons which will be presently discussed. No such point is involved in PLJ 1980 Tr. C (Labour) 14, 1981 PLC 516 and 1980 PLC 1151, therefore, these authorities are not relevant. In NLR 1980 Labour 32 it ha not been observed that section 65-B is not applicable to condone the delay in giving grievance notice. The words "or any other thing is to be done under this Ordinance" escaped the notice of my learned predecessor Mr. Justice M. Jamil Asghar. If these words are deleted from the section, still section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to delayed appli--cations given under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Since it cannot be presumed that the Legislature used superfluous words, therefore, the words quoted above are not meaningless and were used to include any other thing which is to be done under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Needless to say that the grievance notice is served under section 25-A 9f the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, therefore, in cases where the notice is delayed on account of the insertion of the above mentioned words in section 65-B, the said section is applicable and theLabour Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay. If a good cause ton condonation has been made up. But no such question arises in this case,' because no good ground was made out and the learned lower court was not justified in condoning the delay.
8. Since the very grievance petition was time-barred, there is no need to discuss the remaining questions. I accept the appeal and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned lower Court, dismiss the grievance petition of the respondent being time-barred as well ,as incompetent, since the grie--vance notice was time-barred.