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1971 PLC 341

MUHAMMAD RAFIQ MALIK vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE

Citation1971 PLC 341
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Appeal No. 159 of 1970
Date1971-01-28
Judge(s)Muhammad Jamil Asghar
ResultN/A

ORDER

This is an appeal directed against the order of the learned Chairman, Labour Court, Central Zone, Lahore dated 7-4-1970 in an application under section 38 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968. The learned Court rejected the application on the ground that Muhammad Rafiq Malik, appellant, was a foreman when he was dismissed and not a work man as defined in section 2 (u) of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968.

2. Mr. Hafiz Muhammad Qureshi, Advocate, for the applicant contended that mere designation could not decide the functions of a person.

3. Mr. Muhammad Zaman Qureshi, Advocate for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the appellant on his own showing was a foreman and his functions were purely of supervisory nature and as such did not fall within the definition' of a workman as given in the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968.

4. Mr. Hafiz Muhammad Qureshi in support of his con--tention relied on a ruling of the Dacca High Court in case Glaxo Laboratories (Pak) Ltd., Dacca v. Glaxo Employees' Union. (1969 PLC 326), in which it was observed, "it is true designation by itself would not conclusively determine the nature and function of an employee. But it is also true that it is an important element to be considered.

There is nothing in this letter to show that Mr. Zamir is a person concerned with management or is a person employed mainly. in managerial or administrative capacity. The word 'mainly' is significant and clarifies the position". At this stage it would be appropriate to reproduce the definition of a workman as given in section 2 (u) of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968. It reads as follows :- "Workman' means any person, including an apprentice, employed in any industry to do any skilled, unskilled, manual, technical or clerical work, for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceedings under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or in consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any, such person :-

(i) who is employed in the Police or the Armed Forces of Pakistan;

(ii) who is employed in the service of a prison, or of a hospital for the treatment of human patients;

(iii) who is a chowkidar (guards-man) or is employed in service, declared by Government to be watch and ward or security service;

(iv) who is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity or;

(v) who is a public servant engaged in the administration of State, not being employed in a factory or in the railways, or in any other establishment, undertaking, department, profession or service declared by Government to be an Industrial establishment or service for the purposes of this Ordinance."

Mr. Hafiz Muhammad Qureshi argued that the designation of the appellant was a foreman but he was performing the func--tions of a workman and as such he comes within the aforemen--tioned definition of a workman. He also added that the lower Court did not afford him any opportunity to adduce evidence in order to prove that he was performing the functions of a workman. This contention raised by Mr. Hafiz Muhammad Qureshi has no force because in application under section 38 filed by the appellant, he has nowhere mentioned that he was performing the functions of a workman. On the other hand he clearly stated that he was employed as a mechanic on 20-4- 1961 and was promoted as a foreman on 20-4-1964 because of the good work put in by him. In view of this admission, it was not necessary for the lower Court to have given any opportunity to the appellant to produce evidence to show that he was performing the duties of a workman.

5. A foreman is neither a clerk nor a skilled or unskilled manual worker. His functions are purely supervisory in nature. Therefore, it is obvious that the appellant was employed in a managerial or administrative capacity and as such he cannot be treated a workman as defined under section 2(u)(iv) of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968. I am fortified in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in case The Workers of Bata Shoe Co., Lahore v. Bata Shoe Co., Ltd. and another (1971 PLC 1), in which it was observed, "So far as the Foreman is concerned, he is a person holding supervision and Management in a factory. He cannot, therefore, be held to be a work--man. The case of a C. W. Raymond v. Ford Motor Co. of India Ltd. ((1950) 2 F J R 100). The person concerned was employed as a General Assembly Foreman and according to the instructions given to him by his employers, it was his duty to get the work of repair done by his staff and to complete the repairs or adjustments found necessary after inspection. It was contended on his behalf that he was a "workman" as defined in the Act as he had to do skilled manual work in checking brakes and traffic indicators and focussing of lights of motor cars. He was described in the factory pass as "Supervisor of inspection and repair operations". It was held by the Appellate Tribunal that he was not a workman as he was not employed to do any manual or clerical work for hire or reward. The mere fact that he had to do something by his own bands by way of checking or testing work done by other workmen did not make his work manual work within the meaning of this clause. In the case of Crushing (Pakistan) Limited Workers Union, Lahore v. Messrs Crushing (Pakistan) Limited, Lahore (1962 PLC 1275), ft was observed as under "Workman. -Foreman with functions of supervisor in character not a workman. Not covered by expression 'any person' in section 2 (h)."

In view of the above, I find no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed.

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