1. This appeal arises from the decision dated 3rd May, 1981 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 3, Lahore at Ferozewala whereby the grievance petition of the respondent was accepted and he was directed to be re-instated . With full back benefits. The reason given for the termination is that, his services were no more required. The respondent instead of serving a grievance notice within time and bringing grievance petition, approached the Martial Law Authorities where--upon some correspondence occurred between the management and D.M.L.A.
2. The appellant was asked to re-instate the respondent but to no purpose. The respondent gave grievance notice on 25th of July, 1979 and brought the grievance petition on 11th of October, 1979.
3. The only point argued before me by the learned counsel for the appel--lant is of limitation.
4. According to the appellant the grievance notice was time barred and no application for condonation of delay was made. The order of termination was passed on 21st of September, 1978.
5. The case of the appellant is that the termination order was attempted to be served upon the respondent through R.W-2 but he refused to receive the same. The order of termination was not published in Pakistan Times also. The respondent made application to the D.M L.A. On 1st October, 1978, whereupon the D.M.L.A. Inquired from the appellant if the respondent had been re-instated or not, It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the res--pondent stated in his statement that he had got information of the termination of his service from the D.M.L.A. On 1st October, 1978, therefore, from the said date, the grievance notice was time-barred. I have been gone through the statement of the respondent recorded by the learned tower Court as well as the one made by .Him during the enquiry but I have not been able to find any such statement of the respondent that he had learnt about the termination of his service from the D.M.L.A. 'on 1st October, 1978. However, the respon--dent in his statement recorded during the enquiry said that when he met the Managing Director on 21st September, 1978, he informed him that his services had been terminated. The learned counsel for the respondent as on the other hand argued that the statement of R.W.-2 is not believable that he had delivered the order of termination of services to the respondent and that the latter had refused to receive the same. He says that respondent had worked during the day time in the office, therefore, termination order could be served upon him there and there was no necessity of serving the order of termination by RW-2 upon the respondent at 12 night. R.W.-2 stated that at 8.00 p. m. On 20th November, 1978, Mukhtar Peon had brought the letter and the register to him asking him to deliver the letter to the respondent when he came to him, and that at 12 midnight the respondent came to him and he offered the letter to him but he refused to receive it. R.W -2 was subjected to lengthy cross-examination but it was not enquired from him why the termination letter had not been offered to the respondent during day time on 20th of September, at his working place. Without giving opportunity to explain why letter of termination was not attempted to be delivered during day time. The evidence produced by the appellant could not about the service of limitation for giving grievance notice ended on 22nd December, 1978. The respondent instead of giving grievance notice in time and coming to the Labour Court direct moved the Martial Law Autho--rities hoping that he would be got re-instated through their good wishes but he was not justified in adopting that course. The Martial Law Authorities had no jurisdiction to direct the re-instatement of the respondent, therefore 'A period wasted by the respondent in going to the Martial Law Authorities cannot be condoned.
6. However, the finding of the learned lower Court that the respondent is covered by the definition of workman' is correct. No doubt, the duty of the respondent was supervisory but his pay was not more than Rs. 800, therefore. He does not come in exception (b) of section 2 (xxviii) of the I. R. O.
7. As a result' of the observations made above I accept the appeal and setting aside the order of the learned lower Court dismiss the grievance e petition of the respondent for reason that the grievance notice and grievance petition were time-barred.