' The plaintiffs have filed this suit for recovery of Rs, 1,54,593.69. The defendant No, 1 is a firm of which defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the partners. The defendant No 1 opened a current account with the plaintiffs on or about 30th November, 1960 and at the request of the defendants the plaintiffs granted a cash credit limit of Rs, 1,50,00 which was fully utilised in the said account from time to time. The defendants also deposited various amounts in the said account from time to time to wards repayment of the plaintiffs' dues. On 10-11-1962 the aforesaid limit was renewed and at the request of the defendants was enhanced to Rs, 3,50,000 which was utilised by the defendants. As a security for the repayment for the cash credit advanced or any balance which might at any time become due a promissory note was executed on 10-11-1962 under the signatures of defendants No, 2 and 3 and on behalf of the firm for Rs, 3,50,000. On the same day the defendants also executed an agreement of cash credit and another agreement of hypothecation. An agreement of pledge was also executed by the defendants. The balance was confirmed from time to time by the defendants. On 1-1-1969 the defendants confirmed the balance at Rs, 1,16,127.35 by means of balance confirmation letter. It is further alleged that the defendants by various letters acknowledged their liability. On 29-2-1968, Rs, 1,19,841.82 was due and payable. In acknowledgment of this liability on 29-2-1968 the defendants Nos. 2 & 3 executed a promissory note. Again in similar manner a promissory note for Rs, 1,16,127.35, was executed on 1-1-1969. The defendants have pledged goods worth Rs, 1,96,367 as declared by them and the plaintiffs have stated that in spite of best efforts they were unable to sell it at beneficial rate, At the time of filing of suit a sum of Rs, 1,54,539,69 was due which has been claimed in it. The defendants Nos. 1 & 3 did not file any written statement. However, the defendant No, 2 has filed his written statement in which he inter alia raised objection that the suit was time-barred and that it was bad for non-joinder of other partners of defendant No,
1. On merits the defendant No, 2 denied that there is any partnership between defendants Nos. 2 & 3 and others. He has pleaded that defendants Nos. 2 & 3 were doing business in partnership since 1-4-1951 but subsequently other partners were admitted in terms of partnership dated 1-4-1960 which was registered with the registrar of firms. This partnership terminated on 15-2-1967 and intimation was sent to the .Registrar. This dissolution was also notified in Daily News dated 14-11-1968 and the plaintiffs were also informed on 16-2-1967. It has also been pleaded that on account of ill-health of defendant No, 2, the defendant No, 3 conducted the whole business of the partnership and the defendant No, 2 never participated in the business actively which was dissolved on 15-2-1967. The defendant No, 2 is no longer a partner of defendant No, 1 after the dissolution of the firm as the firm devolved upon defendant No, 3 with all assets, debts and liabilities alongwith the name of the firm up to that the defendant No, 2 has no concern whatsoever. It has further been pleaded that none of the documents filed with the plaint were signed by defendant No, 2 and they are forged and not binding upon defendant No,
2. It has been denied that the pledged goods were of lesser value than the value declared by the defendants. In any event the plaintiffs should have checked it and verified it before accepting the pledge. All other allegations of the plaint have been denied. On the basis of these pleadings the following consent issues were framed :-
(1) Whether the suit is time-barred?
(2) Is the suit bad for non-joinder of all the partners of defendant No, 1 or misjoinder of defendant No, 2?
(3) Whether the partnership was dissolved on 15-2-1967, if so to what effect?
(4) Which of the defendants have signed documents with the plaintiff and to what effect?
(5) Who were partners of defendant No, 1 and when they entered the partnership and which of the defendents is liable?
(6) Whether the signatures of defendant No, 2 on any documents were forged?
(7) Is the statement of account and interest calculated thereon correct?
(8) Whether the plaintiff was responsible for the shortfall of the value of the pledged stock, if so to what effect?
Issues Nos. I, 3 and 6.-The question of limitation depends upon proof of the execution of the pronotes, and other documents by the defendants and whether the entries made in the statement of account are correct and binding. It would, therefore, be convenient to take these issues together.
2. In order to establish that the suit had been filed within time the plaintiffs have relied on Exhs. 5/1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and Exh. 5/296. Firstly it is to be established that these documents were executed by defendants Nos. 2 & 3 on behalf of the firm. In these documents only Exh. 5/11 is the relevant document for purposes of determining whether the suit is within time. However, as I am dealing with issues Nos. 3 & 6 together all other documents will also be taken into consideration at this stage, Exh. 5/1 is the promissory note dated 10-11-1962, Exh. 5/2 is the deed of pledge of goods, Exh. 50 is the agreement for cash credit, Exh. 5/4 is the letter of continuity, Exh. 5/5 is the letter of waiver, Exh. 5/6 dated 31st December, 1962 is a letter confirming the balance on 31st December, 1962, Exh. 5/7 is a similar document dated 30th June, 1964, Exhs. 5/8, 9 and 10 are balance confirmation slips which have been signed by defendant No, 3 on behalf of defendant No,
1. Exhibit 5/11 is a promissory note dated 1-1-1969 executed by defendants Nos. 2 & 3. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs has pointed out that if these documents are proved to have been executed by the defendants the suit will be within time. The defendant No, 2 has taken up the plea that all the documents produced with the plaint are forged and have not been signed by him. Copies of all these documents were filed alongwith the plaint. P. W. 1 has not witnessed any one of the documents nor they were executed in his presence. However, P. W. 2 has stated that Exhs. 5/1 to 5/5 were executed in his presence. These documents bear the signature of the defendant No, 2 also.
The learned counsel for the defendants has contended that the burden is entirely upon the plaintiffs to establish that the suit is within time. He has stated that Exh. 5/296 is the account opening form which is dated 28-4-1968. The learned counsel has contended that although this account opening form was signed on 28-4-1960, according to P. W. 1 the account was opened on 30th November, 1960. On this basis the learned counsel has contended that it is not a genuine document. It is true that the form is dated 28-4-1960 and the first entry in the statement of account Exh. 5/39 is dated 30th November, 1960 showing a debit entry of Rs, 1,50,000. The statement of account bears C/A. No, 904. It is also to be noted that in Exhs. 5/6 7, 8, 9 and 5/10 by which the earlier balances have been confirmed, number of account has not been given. In Exh. 5/296 the endorsement shows that the account number allotted to the defendants was Credit Account No,
879. However, the suit has been filed on the basis of Current Account No, 904. The plaintiffs haNe not been able to explain this discrepancy. Although it cannot be denied that the defendants had an account with the 'plaintiffs the document Exh. 5/296 has not been proved to relate to this account. In the correspondence throughout reference is to cash credit limit or cash credit account without mentioning the account number. Mr. Mansoorul Arfin the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has stated that there has been an amalgamation of accounts but nothing has been brought on record to explain it. Mr. Qureshi the learned counsel for the defendant No, 2 has stated that signatures of defendant No, 2 on Exhs. 5/1 to 5/5 have not been proved and it has also not been proved that defendant No, 2 had opened an account in respect of which the suit has been filed. In support of his contention he has referred to the copies of pronotes and agreement filed with the plaint. He has contended that from these copies of the documents which are endorsed as true copies it is clear that they were not signed by the defendant No,
2. However as the original documents bear his signature the learned counsel has contended that they are forged otherwise the true copies would have also borne similar endorsement. No doubt these documents are said to be true copies but it seems that in the copies of pronote and letter of waiver the plaintiffs have not correctly typed that they have been signed by defendant No, 2 also. This discrepancy will not invalidate the original documents when produced at the time of evidence. No doubt in such circumstances heavy burden will lie upon the plaintiffs to establish that the original documents were executed by defendant No,
2. This has been established through P. W. 2 who has stated that they were executed in his presence. Annexures "D", "E", "F" to the plaint show that these documents were signed by two persons for and on behalf of the defendant No,
1. This is also borne out by the original documents which have been signed by two persons. The discrepancy pointed out by the ,learned counsel for the defendants in the original documents and its true copies is fully explained.
' Heavy reliance has been placed by the plaintiffs on demand promissory note dated 1-1-1969 Exh.
5/11 which according to them has been signed by the defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The learned counsel for the defendant No, 2 has contended that no witness has been produced to establish that this document was signed in his presence. The learned counsel has further contended that the partnership between the defendants had been dissolved on 15-2-1967, necessary entries were made in the register of firms on 4-9-1967 and a notice dated 16-2-1967 was sent under postal certificate to the plaintiffs notifying the dissolution of the firm with effect from 15-2-1967. It was also stated by the defendant No, 2 in this letter that all liabilities, loans and assets of the firm have devolved on defendant No, 2 who will be responsible for its payment. The learned counsel has contended that in these circumstances how can it be possible for the defendant No, 2 to execute a promissory note on 1-1-1969. The learned counsel has also referred to Exh. 5/19 dated 1-1-1969 a letter written by defendant No, 3 to the plaintiffs in which reference has been made to a letter of 27th December, 1968 when the said defendant had asked the plaintiffs to furnish details of the statement of account, interest and delivery charges to enable him to adjust the credit facility. The learned counsel has contended that if Exh. 5/19 would have been signed on 1-1-1969 there was no occasion on the part of the defendants to have written this letter. The defendant No, 3 has not appeared to deny these facts and documents. It is the defendant No, 2 who has denied his signatures on this document. He has stated that these signatures are forged and have not been made by him. A visual comparison of this signature with the other signatures on documents 5/1 to 5/6 makes it clear that they have been signed by on and the same person. The question then arises whether this signature has been made by the defendant No, 2 or not. The defendant No, 2 has only denied his signature on Exh. 5/11 but has never asked for sending this document to any handwriting expert to ascertain the correctness of his statement. The plaintiffs have also not adopted this course which was available to them. So the only course open to the Court in such circumstances is to compare this signature with the admitted signatures of the defendant No, 2 and then draw its own conclusion. This procedure is permissible under section 73 of the Evidence Act. It is a risky procedure but in the circumstances of the case there is no other option left but to adopt it. In this regard the admitted signatures of the defendant No, 2 are available on the written statement which was signed on 12-12-1973, affidavit of documents dated 26-9-1974, Deed of Dissolution dated 15-2-1967 and Vakalatnama dated 28-3-1973. The earliest of these admitted documents in point of time is the deed of dissolution which has been filed by the defendant No, 2 himself. A comparison between the signatures on this document and Exh. 5/11 gives a clear impression that the signatures on both these documents are similar. The tenor of the signature particularly the word `Syeds and 'Hasan' which has been similarly connected with the alphabet 'dal' of Mahmood gives a clear impression that both the signatures were made by the same person.
There seems to be some difference in the signatures made on the written statement, affidavit and Vakalatnama. This fact has been explained by the defendant No, 2 in his own evidence. In the cross-examination while admitting his signatures on the affidavit of documents, Vakalatnama and another affidavit dated 2-9-1980 he has stated as follows :- "I had intentionally changed my signatures on account of the fact that my brother Akbar Hassan bad been forging earlier signatures."
' This plea he has taken on the basis of the information which he had received from an employee of Akbar Hassan, but was unable to give the name of that employee or point out to any document on the basis of which he had reached this conclusion. In cross-examination the defendant No, 2 was confronted with Exhs. 5/1 to 5/11 and he stated as follows :- "None of these documents bears my signature, however, the signatures which appear on these documents are similar to the signature that I used to make at that time."
' It seems that the defendant No, 2 himself admits that the signatures appear to be similar. In his evidence the defendant No, 2 has stated that the signatures on partnership deed were obtained by fraud perpetrated by the defendant No, 3 but such a plea does not find place in the written statement. In the written statement this defendant has admitted that defendants Nos. 2 & 3 were doing business in partnership since 1-4-1951 but subsequently other partners were admitted in terms of partnership dated 1-4-1960 which was registered with the Registrar of Firms and was dissolved on 15-2-1967. The defendant No, 2, therefore, has admitted the existence of partnership firm in the name and style of defendant No, 1 of which he was partner at the relevant time and is said to have been dissolved on 15-2-1967. The dissolution of partnership according to the written statement was notified to the plaintiff and in the Press. He has taken the plea in the written statement that on account of ill-health of defendant No, 2 the defendant No, 3 was conducting the business and the defendant No, 2 never participated in the business activity. But the evidence produced by the defendant No, 2 gives a completely different story. In his cross-examination he admitted that the statements made in the written statement are correct. However, he further stated that the fact that the signature on partnership deed was obtained by fraud and coercion is also correct. It is well-settled that a party cannot be allowed to vary the proof from the plea taken in the written statement. Variance in pleading and proof is not permitted. The defendant having taken a plea and admitting the existence of the partnership deed cannot be permitted to put up a different plea that his signature was obtained by fraud. The evidence of the defendant gives an impression that he has been at pains to avoid all the documents which were executed by him including the promissory notes and the documents executed in favour of the bank. The fact that he has changed his signature proves that he was trying to avoid his signature made earlier. In order to establish that he had not signed those documents he has changed his signature subsequently but the reason for such change given by him seems to be completely false and fictitious. I, therefore, hold that Exh. 5/11 was signed by defendant No, 2.
4. The next question now arises is whether this document is binding upon the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as the partnership had been dissolved on 15-2-1967.
' Mr. Arfin the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has referred to section 45 of the Partnership Act and contended that the defendants Nos. 2& 3 are personally liable. He has further contended that as no public notice of dissolution of partnership was issued, the partners continue to be liable until public notice is given of the dissolution. Section 72 of the Partnership Act, provides that public notice of retirement, expulsion or dissolution of a registered firm is given by notice to the Registrar of Firms under section 63 and by publication in the Local Official Gazette and in at least one vernacular newspaper circulating in the district where the firm has its place or principal place of business. The defendant No, 2 has produced evidence to show that the notice of dissolution was published in the Daily News dated 1-1-1968 (Exh. 7/6). Prior to that the defendant No, 2 had served a notice dated 16- 2-1967 (Exh. 7/4) on the plaintiffs under postal certificate (Exh. 7/5). Mr. Arfin has contended that this notice Exh. 7/4 was not served on the plaintiffs. The defendant No, 2 has produced a copy of the notice dated 16-2-1967 and also a certificate of posting Exh. 7/5 showing that the notice was sent to the plaintiffs and defendant No, 3 under postal certificate. The certificate bears the seal dated 16-2-1967. The address of the plaintiffs is not alleged to be incorrect. The plaintiffs have not produced any evidence to show that this notice was not received by them. Usually all banks maintain inward registers which could have been produced to rebut the presumption of delivery of notice arising from these facts. As the defendant No, 2 has established the posting of the notice, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary presumption is that it was delivered to the plaintiffs.
' The important question that arises is what is the force, for the purposes of limitation, of the pronote signed by a partner after dissolution of the firm, but in respect of an obligation existing prior to that date.
Every partner is the general and accredited agent of the partnership and any act done within the scope of and object of the partnership binds the other partners. A firm will be bound if such act is done in the firm name or on behalf of the firm or in a manner which expressly or impliedly shows an intention to bind the firm. If an ex-partner acknowledges liability after the dissolution of the firm and the creditor had notice of dissolution then unless the ex-partner has express authority to do so it will not bind the firm. Reference can be made to Ganda Singh v. Bhag Singh (1); Pehumal Nathumul v. Chunilal (2); In Ratanji v. Prem Shankar (3); while considering the effect of sections 19 and 45 of the Partnership Act it was observed that an acknowledgment of liability by a partner who had power to borrow would be binding on other partners though made after the dissolution of firm if proper notice of dissolution was not given. Same view seems to have been taken in Gordhandas v. Bhalabhai (4). To this rule exception has been provided by the Proviso to section 45 of the Partnership Act. It provides that the estate of a partner who is not known to the creditor to be a partner retires from the firm, is not liable for the acts done after the date on which he ceases to be a partner. The underlying principle is that an ex-partner can bind the firm only if he has express authority to do any act after the dissolution. Further in cases where thee creditor has not been given notice of dissolution, any acknowledgement made by ex-partner shall be binding on the firm and its partners. Applying the principle in the present case it seems that the plaintiffs had the notice of I dissolution and therefore the pronote (Exh. 5/11) executed by the defendant I No, 2 will not bind the defendant No,
1. However, as it has been jointly executed by the defendant No, 3 who was the sole owner of the from on the date of execution the defendants Nos. 1 and 3 are bound by it.
' Mr. Arfin the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has contended that as public notice in terms of the Partnership Act has not been given the plaintiffs cannot be deemed to have notice of dissolution.
As discussed above section 72 provides mode of issuing public notice. Admittedly the notice has not been published in the Gazette or in any vernacular newspaper of the district but as actual notice has been given to the plaintiffs this objection {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) AIR 1926 Lah. 616 (2) AIR 1929 Lab. 266
(3) AIR 1938 All. 619 (4) AIR 1932 Bom. 316 {{FOOT NOTE}} cannot be sustained. Similar question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Tariq Mohsin v. Province of Sind (1) and following observation was made :- "Although no public notice of dissolution of firm has been given in this case, counsel's submission is that actual and individual notice is on a better footing and affords higher protection to the petitioner. I am inclined to agree."
It, therefore, follows that when any person has actual and individual notice that the firm has been dissolved, it is not open to him to plead that there was no public notice.
' Now reverting back to the pronote it is to be examined whether it binds the defendant No, 2 and is he liable under it. To appreciate the points involved it is necessary to reproduce the promissory note (Exh. 5/11) :- "Demand Promissory Note Rs, 1,16,127.35.
On demand we jointly and severally promise to pay the Australasia Bank Ltd. Or order the sum of rupees one lac sixteen thousand one hundred twenty-seven and paisas thirty only, together with interest on such sum from this date at 50% per cent above State Bank of Pakistan rate, subject to a minimum rate of 10 per cent. Per annum with monthly rests for value received. {{TABLE}} STAMP Sd/- in Urdu.
Syed Mabmood Hassan. For H. S. Mahmood Hassan AkbarHassan & Sons.Sd/- Mahmood Hassan.
Sd/- Syed Akbar Hassan.For H. S. Mabmood Hassan AkhtarHassan & Sons.Sd/-Syed Akhtar Hassau." {{TABLE}} ' This pronote is therefore jointly signed by defendants Nos. 2 and 3 for and on behalf of the firm as well as in their individual capacity. The defendant No, 1 may not be bound by the signature of the defendant No, 2 but certainly defendant No, 3's signature will bind it. The execution of the pronote by defendants 2 & 3 in their individual capacity bind them individually, jointly and severally. On 1-1- 1969 the defendant No, 2 has severed all connections with the firm but as the loan is in respect of a period when the defendant No, 2 was a partner, this pronote will be valid having been executed for past consideration.
' In view of this discussion my finding is as follows :Issue No, 1.-In the negative. Issue No, 3.-In the affirmative and as discussed above. Issue No, 6.-In the negative. Issue No, 2.-From the partnership deed Exh. 7/1 the certificate of registration and the deed of dissolution Exh. 7/2 it seems that besides defendants Nos. 2 & 3 there were two more partners. Mr. Qureshi the learned counsel for the defendants has contended that as all the partners have not {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1976 Kar. 72$ {{FOOT NOTE}} been joined in the suit, it is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Without discussing in detail suffice to say that Order XXX, rule 1, C. P. C. Provides a complete answer to it. It provides that the partners may sue or be sued in the name of the firm. If a suit has been filed against the firm it is not necessary to implead all its partners as defendants. (AIR 1940 Sind 19 and AIR 1930 Pat. 239). My finding is in the negative.
Issue No, 5.-From the certificate of registration it is clear that defendant No, 1 was constituted on 1- 4-1960 with four partners viz, the defendants Nos. 2, 3, Syed Mahboob Hasan and Syed Hafiz Maqbool. This firm was dissolved on 15-2-1967. In view of finding on Issues Nos. 1, 3 & 6 all the defendants are jointly and severally liable. Issue No, 7.-Exhibit 5/39 is the statement of account. To support this statement the plaintiffs have filed vouchers and cheques which are 254 in number. P.
W. 1 who has produced these documents stated that he has certified the statement of account Exh.
5/39 and that the cheques and vouchers filed in Court confirm various entries in the statement of account.
' In Exh. 5/39 the first debit entry is for Rs, 1,50,000, stated to have been withdrawn on 30-11-1960. The first voucher dated 30-11-19e0 (Exh. 5/40) states that this amount was transferred to account H. S. Mahmood Hassan Akbar Hassan and Sons. It has not been signed by the defendants. This voucher does not clearly explain how and under whose authority Rs, 1,50,000 was transferred. The plaintiffs have not established which is that account of the defendant No, 1 in which this amount has been transferred. Exhibit 5/41 a credit voucher shows that Rs, 5,777-1-6, were credited to the account of defendants No, 1 on 30-11-1960. No such credit entry has been entered in the statement of account.
There are several debit and credit entries during the year 1968 but only one debit voucher dated 16-12-1968 for Rs, 560 has been filed. The voucher recites as follows :- "To amount of four years commission on guarantee No, LG/1 D P 15, in Suit No.................. Of High Court of West Pakistan.................. Rs, 560."
' No such amount has been debited in the statement of account on 16-12-1468. There is an entry of Rs, 560 on 15-12-1968 showing as "Dr. For commission of Gur." However there is no debit voucher for this entry of 15-12-1968. There are two possibilities that either the entry is incorrect or the entry has purposely been misstated to avoid any objection from the defendants. Unfortunately, the defendants have not scrutinized each entry in the statement of account but the aforestated glaring instances of mistake, concealment or irregularities are sufficient for rejection of the statement of account. It does not reflect the correct accounting between the parties. In this regard the statement of P. W. 1 is not correct nor the certification of the statement of account is true.
' The Bankers Books Evidence Act prescribes the manner in which a certified copy of any entry in the book of a bank is issued. Section 4 of the Act provides mode of proof of entries in bankers books. A certified copy of the entries in the bankers book shall be a prima facie evidence of such entry. Such entries reflect the transactions, matters and accounts and a certified copy dispenses with the production of original books of accounts and is admissible.
' As the certified copy is only prima fade evidence the other side has early right to rebut it. Once the authenticity and correctness of the statement of account is challenged and its prima facie value is displaced the bank has to prove the entries in it. By mere production of the certified copy of any entry in the books of the bank, the bank is not absolved from proving these entries by supporting documents. The certified copy is only prima facie evidence of the existence of such entry in the banks books and no more. Unless such entries are challerked or disputed they will be accepted as there is nothing to rebut it The relationship of banker and customer in maintaining the current account is purely of a debtor and creditor. The bank is free to use the money as his own like any other borrower as the customer parts with the control K over it retaining only his right to re-payment. In overdraft accounts the bank always advances money to its customer and the relationship is mostly governed by the agreement between the parties. But cases may arise where spontaneous transactions may be.
Required without previous arrangement and such temporary advances are payable on demand. In all respects and in all circumstances a banker is required to act without negligence and should perform his duty properly and diligently subject to the agreement and/or banking practice. The elementary duty of the banker is to maintain a correct and true account of the dealings between the parties. If a customer without checking the statement of account furnished by the bank and relying on the L balances drawn in such statement of account, executes documents or confirms the balance but at a subsequent time the customer is able to show that the entries in the statement of account are not correct then the very basis on which such confirming document was executed loses its authenticity. In such circumstances a customer is entitled to call for the accounts and the banker is bound to render a true and correct account of the entire dealings.
' From the aforestated discussion it is clear that the statement of account filed by the plaintiffs does not correctly reflect all the dealings and transactions between the parties. Obviously if the statement of account is not correct the interest calculated on the basis of such statement cannot be correct. In the circumstances no reliance can be placed on such statement of account. My finding on this issue is that the statement of account filed by the plaintiff is not correct. Issue No, 8.- The defendants had pledged goods with the plaintiffs particulars of which are mentioned in the statement filed by the plaintiffs which is marked Exh. 5/294. This statement recites that goods worth Rs, 1,96,367 were pledged with the plaintiffs. However, it has been stated by the plaintiffs that the value of the pledged goods was inflated. These goods were sold by the Nazir of the Court.
According to the defendants the goods have fetched lower value because of the damage caused to them while in the custody of the plaintiffs. The defendants have not filed any action claiming compensation from the plaintiffs for causing damage to the goods which were pledged with them.
The defendants have also not produced any evidence to show how and in what manner the goods were damaged. In any event any finding on this issue is completely irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the suit. The defendants have failed to prove that the shortfall of the value of the pledged stock was due to any negligence of the plaintiffs for which they can be held responsible. Relief-In view of the discussion on the aforestated issues it has been held that the suit is within time. The defendants are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs for such amount which may be found due and payable after a true and correct account is rendered by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were holding the account and all the documents necessary for rendering the account. Considering the facts of the case and the relationship between the parties the plaintiffs are the accounting party. In order to ascertain the money due to the plaintiffs from the defendants jointly and severally an account should be taken from the plaintiffs. I therefore pass a preliminary decree for accounts directing the plaintiffs to render true and correct account before the Commissioner. Mr. Afzal Munif is appointed as a Commissioner for taking accounts. The Commissioner shall submit his report within four months. The plaintiff shall deposit Rs, 5,000 towards the tentative fee of the Commissioner which should be deposited in Court within two weeks. The cost will following the result of the preliminary decree.
Preliminary decree passed.