The appellant, who was employed as a Baker in the respondent company was charge-sheeted on 10th March, 1981, for filing a false complaint and falsely prosecuting the officers of the respondent company including its General Manager in the IVth Labour Court . The complaint was made by the appellant in his capacity as General Secretary of the workers union in the respondent company. It alleged that the said officers of the respondent company, including its General Manager, had committed an act of unfair labour practice punishable under section 15 (1 I read with section 53 (I-A),
1. R. O., in that they not only refused to give to the treasurer of the workers' union the facility of free tickets, to which he was entitled, but he was informed that he would only be granted this facility if he ceases to be an officer of the trade union. It appears that the appellant not only filed this complaint against the officers of the respondent company, including the General Manager and W. Sayer, the Catering Manager of the respondent company, but also gave evidence in the Court against the said officers. The respondent company took the plea that the complaint was demonstratively false in that not only. No such inducement or- threat was given either to Ashraf Masih or any diet workman, but further Mr. Sayer, who is said to have giver) the inducement, was out of Pakistan at the relevant time. Apparently, in view of this position, the appellant, on 12th/14th February, 1981, submitted an application to the learned Labour Court for withdrawal of the case and the said application was allowed by the learned Labour Court on 28th February, 1981, and the accused named in the complaint were acquitted. It was after the withdrawal of the complaint and acquittal of the accused that on 10th March, 1981, the appellant was charge --sheeted. He submitted a reply to the charge-sheet-show-cause notice but at the same was not found satisfactory, a departmental enquiry was held against him. The domestic enquiry was held ex parte as in spite of notice, the appellant failed to participate in the enquiry.
According to the report of the enquiry officer, which was based on the statements of W. Sayer and Miss N. T. D.'Souza the charge of making false prosecution against the officers of the respondent company was established. The appellant was ultimately dismissed from service vide order, dated 9th May, 1981, after the appellant was served with a second show-cause notice, dated 3rd May, 1981, and was also given an opportunity of personal hearing.
2. The appellant challenged the orders of his dismissal before the learned Labour Court but his grievance petition has been dismissed by the learned Labour Court ; vide its decision given on 14th March, 1982. The learned Labour Court has held that although the domestic enquiry against the appellant was held ex parte, the appellant is to be blamed for the same as he failed to turn up in spite of due notice of the enquiry. The learned Labour Court has pointed out that the enquiry officer was considerate to wait for the appellant for a full hour but even then appellant did not appear before him or participate in the enquiry. The learned Labour Court held the view that the act of the appellant in lodging false prosecution against the officers of the respondent corporation is a very serious and grave act of misconduct, which act, in its opinion, has rightly been punished with dismissal under Standing Order 15. The learned Labour Court repelled the contentions made on behalf of the appellant that the dismissal of the appellant was in contravention of Standing Order 15 (4) or section 47,
1. R. O. The plea of violation of the provisions of section 47, I. R. O., was sought to be founded on the fact that at the time that the appellant was dismissed from service, an industrial dispute was pending or was deemed to be pending before a Labour Court . It has been pointed out by the learned Labour Court that the industrial dispute was dismissed by the Labour Court vide its order, dated 19th April, 1981, whereas the appellant was dismissed from employment on 9th May, 1981, some 20 days later. Admittedly no appeal was even pending against the dismissal of the industrial dispute at that time as service of the appeal was filed on 18th May, 1981, 9 days after the dismissal from the appellant.
3. The plea of violation of the provisions of Standing Order 15 (4) was sought to be founded on the fact that notice of the alleged misconduct was not given to the appellant within one month of the- commission of the act constituting misconduct. As this is the only point on which Mr. Riaz Baloch, the learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court , I would deal with the same in some detail. As already pointed out, the complaint was filed before the learned IVth Labour Court by the appellant on 4th August, 1980. On 12th November, 1980, the evidence of the appellant and his co-worker, Ashraf Masih was recorded by the learned Labour Court . On 12th/14th February, 1931, the appellant submitted an application for withdrawal of his complaint, after Mr. Roppli-Olf, the Deputy Catering Manager of the respondent company, had testified before the learned Labour Court that Mr. Sayer, the Catering Manager was away from Pakistan from 9th/10th of May, 1980 upto 7th of July, 1980. Finally, it was on 28th February, 1981, that the learned Labour Court allowed the withdrawal of the complaint and acquitted the officers of the respondent company. It was contended by Mr. Riaz Baloch that the show-cause notice should have been given to the appellant within one month of the filing of the complaint by the appellant or at best of giving evidence by him in the Labour Court and since the charge-sheet was given to him on 10th March, 1981, some 7 months after filing of the complaint by the appellant and about 4 months after the appellant had testified in the Labour Court on his complaint, the mandatory requirements of Stand--ing Order 15 (4). Prescribing the period of one month from the act of misconduct within which the show-cause notice is to be given to the offending workman, have not been complied with and hence dismissal orders in respect of the appellant are bad. On the other hand, Mr. Abdul Hafeez, the learned counsel for the respondent company, submitted that the misconduct of the appellant lay not only in instituting a false complaint against the officers of the respondent corporation but maintain--ing and continuing the false and malicious prosecution and hence this was a continuing wrong starting from the date of the complaint upto the date when the proceeding on the complaint terminated on 28th February, 1981. 1 am inclined to agree with the submissions of Mr. Abdul Hafeez. The conception of continuing misconduct is not novel or alien to the Labour laws. In cases where a person is unauthorizedly absent for a period A exceeding 10 days, the act of misconduct commences on the date immediately following 10 days of absence and would continue so long as the workman unauthorizedly remains absent from duties. In the case of Khawaja Auto Cars v. Saeedur Rehman's (1980 PLC 1236), the admitted position was that the workman absent from 11th October, 1979 upto 16th January, 1980, when the charge-sheet was served upon the workman. It was contended that the charge-sheet was belated as it was served upon the workman much after the expiry of one month of the first 10 days' absence. Repelling this contention, it was held by this Tribunal that there was continuity of the alleged misconduct up to the last day of absence of the workman and charge-sheet was served upon the workman on the very next day. When the workman appeared for work. In the case of false or malicious prosecution, it is not merely institutions of the com--plaint or even the giving of the evidence that constitutes misconduct but the act of misconduct continues from the date of the filing of the complaint upto the termination of the proceedings. In the case reported as Mudviraps Kulkarni v. Pakir Apa Kena R D I and another (L R 1881 Bom. 427) the distinc--tion between mere filing of false complaint and the maintaining of false or malicious prosecution has been pointed out and it has been observed as follows :- "In the case of a prosecution the conduct of the prosecutor is looked on as a continuous act prolonged until the close of the case, and limitation is to be computed from that pointAct XV of 1877, Schedule II, Art. 23 but when the complaint made is the only act done, the date of the complaint is that of the wrong."
4. In the case of Ch. Abdul Ghani Ghummon v. Province of Punjab and 2 others (PLD 1975 Lah. 1238) one of the issues which fell to be considered by the Lahore High Court was that was the period of limitation for filing of suit for damages for malicious prosecution. In the reported case, the plaintiff accused had been discharged but the complainant went in revision. It was held that the limitation period for filing suit for damage for malicious prosecution started from date of disposal of revision petition. In other words, if a person persists in taking further action towards the maintaining of a false or malicious prosecution, even after his complaint has been dismissed by a Court having jurisdiction, such actions of his, would, constitute a continuing wrong. Relying on the principle enunciated in these authorities, I am of the view that the act of misconduct of the appellant was a continuous act of misconduct starting from the filing of the complaint up to acquittal of the accused on 28th February, 1981. As the show cause notice to the appellant was served well within the period of one month from the termination of- the proceedings upon the complaint of the appellant there was full compliance of the provisions of Standing Order 15 (4).
5. The evidence led in the domestic enquiry establishes that the appellant had preferred a false complaint against the officers of the respondent company and launched false prosecution and thereby unnecessarily harassed them. The appellant's misconduct was thus fully established.
6. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would dismiss this appeal.