' This writ petition has been filed to assail the validity of the acquisition of a piece of land of the petitioner measuring 17 kanals 8 marlas situate within the urban limits of Town Committee Bhakkar which commenced in the year 1961 and was completed in 1963. A challenge is now being thrown to the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the Municipal Committee in whom the property on acquisition stood vested two decades ago, had on 28-4-1980 passed a resolution to utilize this land for commercial purposes.
2. The brief facts of the case are that a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the petitioner's land was issued on 29-9-1961 for the stated public purpose i. e.
Construction of Town Hall, Public Library and recreation park. It was followed by a notification under section 6 dated 30-3-1962. Together with this the provisions of section 17(2) were also invoked in view of the urgency. The Collector gave his Award on 6-11-1963. The amount of compensation was deposited on 24-12-1963 and the said amount was received by the petitioner three days later. The possession of the land was also taken over.
3. It is admitted before me that no reference under section 18 was claimed to the civil Court for enhancement/determination of compensation under section 23.
4. It may be noticed that after the issuance of notification under section 4, the petitioner had filed an objection petition dated 14-5-1962 before the Collector and the matter went before the Commissioner of the Division concerned who on 22-10-1963 issued a stay order and then subsequently the same was withdrawn and the acquisition proceedings went on uninterrupted.
5. After 20 years delay this writ petition has been filed on the grievance that the respondent Town Committee had already constructed a Town Hall, Library and recreation park somewhere else and this area which was acquired for the aforesaid purpose is now being put to some other use and for commercial benefit. The respondents asserted that this allegation was false. The second ground on which acquisition is sought to be attacked is that even originally the land of the petitioner was acquired in colourable exercise of jurisdiction and with mala fide intent. In support of the above submissions the learned counsel relied on the affidavit dated 10-10-1982 of the Chairman of the Municipal Committee and in particular on paragraph 5 of the affidavit which is to the effect that there were some kacha built shops on the road side and these were in dilapidated condition.
Therefore, in order to improve'upon their condition, the Municipal Committee converted those shops into Pacca ones. It is further stated in the affidavit that Sadar Office of Octroi had been built but construction of Town Hall, Library and Recreation Park are being delayed due to paucity of funds.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner subnitted before me that no doubt that the petitioner was satisfied with the acquisition as originally made but the subsequent events gave him a new cause of action because the property was being put to use for a purpose not specified in the notifications of acquisition and thus the petitioner has the locus standi to challange the acquisition. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the point of ladles further submitted that once the petitioner has established that originally the acquisition was made mala fide then no amount of inaction on his part will stand in the way of this Court from granting relief. Furthermore, he said that there were no aches for the reason that the cause of action arose in 1980. To explain the delay, he submitted that High Court was previously moved by way of Writ Petition No, 11068/80 and the same was dismissed for non-prosecution on 6-4-1982. Thereafter, instead of asking for restoration, the petitioner filed this writ petition in July, 1982. ##TSE# The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the real purpose for the acquisition was colorable inasmuch as it was not intended for the purposes stated in the notification for acquisition but to benefit the persons who were the tenants of the petitioner in the shops located on a part of the property and this has been now witnessed by the resolution of 20-4-1980 because their tenancy rights are being perpetuated. The learned counsel has further argued that in so far as the construction of Sadar Office of Octroi and shops are concerned,, this is a purpose in addition to the purpose stated in the notification and therefore, they have no authority to use the land for these two purposes or for any other collateral purpose. The learned counsel then advanced a somewhat ingenious argument by stating that such portion of the land on which the respondents have built shops as well as Sadar Octroi Office ceased to be land acquired and the land should be returned to him. The sum and substance of his submissions is that these are not the purposes for which the land was acquired. According to him, it was unfair and unjust to invoke the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act to deprive the petitioner of his valuable land by stating that the land was required for a public purpose but subsequently to partly utilize it for different purposes.
7. The learned counsel has submitted in Court today an application though it is not the normal practice to receive such applications in this manner. However, on the request of the learned counsel, as the case has been concluded, I deem it fit to place it on the record. It is accompanied by an affidavit of today's date. A copy has been delivered to the learned counsel for the respondents.
8. I think this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the groe,nd of excessive laches and conduct of the petitioner. The land was acquired during the year 1961 to 1963. The compensation was paid to the petitioner and possession of the land was taken over in 1963. The petitioner fully felt satisfied with the acquisition and did not even claim reference for enhancement of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner thus being satisfied acquiesced in the proceedings. Now 17 years thereafter, he woke up one fine morning aggrieved by the treatment that the Municipal Committee was giving to some of its tenants/occupants of the shops. The above conduct of the petitioner is sufficient to disentitle him to discretionary relief on the basis of settled principles governing the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction.
9. To dispel doubts reference may be made to the dictum of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Ghulam Mohyuddin's case (1) to the effect that a writ would not issue as a matter of course to quash a proceeding or order. It was held :- "The principle upon which the writ is refused in such cases is not that jurisdiction has been conferred on the Tribunal concerned by waiver and acquiescence but that even though the impugned order is without jurisdiction the person seeking to have it quashed should not be granted that discretionary relief as he had stood by and allowed the Tribunal to usurp a jurisdiction which it did not possess knowing that the Tribunal concerned was committing such an illegality in consequence of something done by that person himself."
10. ' Out of long chain of, precedents, reference may advantageously (1) PLD 1964 SC 829 be made to some of the cases decided under the Constitutional jurisdiction by the learned Supreme Court of Pakistan on the question of laches. In re : Settlement Authority v. Akhtar Sultana (1) inaction for 6 months was considered sufficient to justify dismissal of writ petition for lathes. The Supreme Court held that the delay and laches were so palpable that this should have attracted the notice of High Court and the mere fact that no objection was taken to such delayed filing of petition, furnished no ground to omit consideration of consequences to explain laches. It was the duty of the respondent to explain the obvious delay in moving the writ petition, it was further held. The Supreme Court also approved an earlier decision in the case of Din Muhammad v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (2) which, inter alia, laid down "In view of the above facts and circumstances the High Court has rightly pointed out that he having accepted the order of Settlement Officer cannot be permitted to challenge the said order.
Furthermore, his petition could have also been dismissed for laches."
' Reference may also be made to following reported cases 1968 SCM R 995, 1970 SCM R 574, 1970 SCM R 295 and 1968 SCM R 103.
' Again In re : Mohsan Khan v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (3) the Supreme Court held :- "It is true that mere delay is not by itself a sufficient ground for non-suiting a party in a proceeding of this nature but where the delay is accompanied by such circumstances as indicate a clear negligence on the part of the applicant to pursue his remedy with due diligence or conscious acquiescence in the adverse order made against him, then that would a very good ground for denying this extraordinary remedy. The law assists those who are vigilant about their richts and not those who sleep over them."
' In the light of precedents, the facts of the petitioner's case when seen would show that the petitioner accepted the acquisition way back in the year 1963 and did not even raise his little finger in protest. He did not even claim a reference for enhancement of compensation. So it is not a mere case of delay simpliciter but delay coupled with failure of the petitioner to pursue his remedies with due diligence which also exhibits his acquiescence in the adverse order made against him. The mere fact that the Municipal Committee in the year 1980 was contemplating to deal with the property which was acquired for it and stood vested in it as its owner is no ground for condoning the culpable negligence and inaction of the petitioner for about 20 years. The petitioner had been unable to offer any satisfactory explication of his failure to challenge the acquisition in the year 1963 within reasonable time. 1t cannot be denied in the circumstances of the case that the interests of Municipal Committee are involved in this case and the proceedings having taken place created consequences and any interference by this Court would work to the serious prejudice of the local body at such a belated stage.
11. The petitioner earlier in point of time moved a writ petition being W. P. No, 11068/80 which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 6-4-1980 c too. So in any view of the matter, there was delay of 17 years in moving1 {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1976 SC 410 (2) 1968 SCM R 1274
(3) 1969 SCM R 306 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' this Court to have the acquisition annulled. The argument advanced by the learned counsel that once he was able to establish that the acquisition was maia fide and coram non judice, there was nothing else required for him to obtain the relief is based on misconception. It is now well settled that the High Court acting in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction is not obliged to set aside every order which is challenged before it. The High Court by refusing to interfere on proper consideration of facts and circumstances of a case does not bless the order with any more sanctity than it otherwise possessed but merely refuses to interfere.
12. I have considered over all facts and circumstances of this case carefully and I find that the explanation offered by the learned counsel and the arguments raised by him to justify this inordinate delay do not make out a fit case for condoning the delay nor the pleas being raised inspire confidence. In the circumstances, I am not called upon to adjudicate the pleas which touch upon the merits of the case.
Writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.