' This is a miscellaneous appeal from the order of learned Senior Civil Judge, Nawabshah dated 9th March, 1982 whereby the learned Judge had allowed a review application filed by the respondents under Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. The circumstances leading to the review application and the consequent impugned order are as under :- Appellant Sobho Khan had filed a suit before the learned Senior Civil Judge for specific performance against the respondents in respect of agricultural land on the basis of a sale agreement alleged to have been executed by respondent No, 1 Farooq Ahmed Khan in favour of the appellant. The appellant also claimed that he made part payment of the sale price to respondent No, 1 who was acting on his own behalf and also as attorney on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 to 7. His further claim was that after making part payment of Rs, 95,000 out of the total sale consideration of Rs, 1,34,437, he obtained possession of the disputed land. The respondents, it is alleged, failed to get the sale deed registered. Hence the suit.
3. The plea of the respondents before the learned Senior Civil Judge was that the alleged sale agreement was a forged document, that there was no question of accepting part payment of sale consideration and that so far as possession is concerned of suit land, it was obtained by the appellant forcibly.
4. Alongwith his plaint, the plaintiff/appellant had also filed an application for injunction praying that the respondents should be restrained from disposing of the suit property during pendency of the suit. After hearing the parties the learned Senior Civil Judge dismissed the injunction application on 24th November, 1980. (This order shall be referred to hereinafter as the first order).
5. Against the first order the appellant filed an appeal before the District and Sessions Judge, Nawabshah who allowed the appeal by his order dated 9th February, 1981, granting the prayer of the appellant, that the respondents Nos. 1 to 7 shall not alienate the suit land pending final decision of the suit and that the defendant/respondent No, 8 i. e. Mukhtiarkar, Taluka Nawabshah shall also not issue any Faridi Intekhab' in respect of this land. The prayer of the appellant that his possession should not be disturbed, was not granted by the learned District. Judge, because in the plaint itself no such relief regarding possession was claimed. The learned District Judge, however, observed in the aforesaid order that the appellant shall be at liberty to amend his plaint and add the prayer regarding injunction in respect of his possession over the suit land also. This order of the learned Sessions Judge shall be referred to hereinafter as the first appellate order.
6. Appellant Sobho Khan then filed an application for amendment of the plaint before the learned Senior Civil Judge, whereby he added the prayer in the para. Regarding relief that the respondents should be restrained from disturbing his possession over the suit land. This prayer was allowed and thereafter the appellant made a fresh application for injunction in respect of his fresh prayer that the respondents should be restrained from disturbing his possession over the suit land during pendency of the suit. This application was allowed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, by his order dated 7th April, 1981. This order shall be referred to hereinafter as the second order.
7. It appears that the respondents realised in the meantime that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in this case from the order of Senior Civil Judge, because the value of the subject-matter of the property was more than Rs, 1 lac. A review application was, therefore, filed before the learned District Judge against the first appellate order on the plea that the order was without jurisdiction. This review application was accepted by the learned District Judge by his order dated 8th September, 1981, the operative part of which is as follows :- "I, therefore, grant the review application and vacate the order of my predecessor, dated 9th February, 1981, and direct that the appeal be returned to the appellant for presentation before the competent Court. Since this objection was not taken during the appeal, therefore, I do not pass any order as to the Costs."
' In pursuance of the above order the appellant was supposed to present his appeal against the first order to the High Court, but this was not done. The respondents, however, made a review application before the same trial Court praying that the second order referred to above had become inoperative and ineffective by reason of the order passed by the District Judge in review. It was further pleaded that the first order dated 24th November, 1980 whereby the injunction application was dismissed, still holds the field. It was, therefore, prayed that the second order whereby the second injunction application was granted by the trial Court on 7th April, 1981 should be declared to have become inoperative, because his order was based on the first appellate order which had been recalled in review by the District Judge.
8. The learned Senior Civil Judge after hearing counsel for the parties Brame to the conclusion that there were two conflicting orders on two injunction applications filed by the appellants on two different occasions. ' The first order was dated 24th November, 1980 whereby the injunction application was dismissed and the second order was dated 7th April, 1981 whereby the injunction application was allowed. According to the learned trial Judge, it was to be decided as to which of the two orders should be deemed to be an existing order. According to him the first order still held good and that the Court was not competent to revise that order and allow the injunction application by the second order referred to above. He, therefore, held that the first order dated 24th November, 1980 still held the field, while the second order of the same Court dated 7th April, 1981 had become ineffective. In view of this finding the review application was allowed, the second order referred to above of the trial Court, was set aside and the first order dated 24th November, 1980 whereby the injunction application was dismissed, was held to be a valid and existing order.
This order was passed by the trial Court on 9th March, 1982 which has been challenged in this miscellaneous appeal.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Abdul Qadir Halepota has argued that the learned Civil Judge was not competent to review the second order dated 7th April, 1981 that there was no cogent reason for the respondents to have moved the review application and that the review application was time-barred because it was filed after three months of the date of the second order which was sought to be reviewed.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Ghulam Hussain Abbasi has on the contrary argued that since the review application was entertained by the learned Judge, he shall be deemed to have condoned the delay. He further urged that since the impugned order i,e, the second order of the trial Court dated 7th April, 1981 granting injunction application, was based on the first appellate order which was itself null and void, hence the said order which is based on a void order shall also be deemed to be null and void.
11. It is to be seen whether the second order of the trial Court granting injunction application is an order which is in any way connected with the first appellate order. After the first appellate order, the appellant had amended his plaint and made a second injunction application on the basis of the fresh prayer which was added in the plaint regarding injunction in respect of appellant's possession over the disputed land. After amendment of his plaint, the appellant was fully entitled to repeat an injunction application notwithstanding the dismissal of his first application by the first order of the trial Court. After amendment of the plaint, he had fresh grounds for repeating injunction application for a different relief. The first application for injunction was only to the extent that the respondents should be restrained from alienating the land. In the second injunction application it was prayed that the respondents should be restrained from interfering with the possession of the appellant over the disputed land. After going through the record the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the appellant had a prima facie case and as such he was entitled to the injunction as prayed. It cannot, therefore, be said that this order i. e. The second order is in any way connected with the first appellate order which was set aside later in review by the same appellate Court.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents has drawn my attention to several reasons given by the trial Court in the second order and argued that these reasons are verbatim repetition of the reasons which the first appellate Court has given in the first appellate order and argued that as the first appellate order has been declared to have been passed without jurisdiction, therefore, the trial Courts' second order on the fresh injunction application, which is based on the same reasoning as adopted by the District Judge in the void order, should also be held to be null and void. The perusal of the second order dated 7th April, 1981 which was sought to be reviewed by the respondents, shows that the learned Civil Judge had applied his mind to the facts of the case himself and had come to an independent conclusion that the appellant had made out a prima facie case and therefore, he was entitled to injunction in respect of his possession. It is not disputed that the appellant is in actual physical possession of the disputed land. The learned trial Court perused the disputed sale agreement and compared the signatures of respondent No, 1 with his other signatures on the pleadings and vakalatnama and concluded that it was prima facie established that the sale agreement was executed by respondent No, 1 in favour of the appellant. In view of these reasons given by the learned trial Judge in the second order dated 7th April, 1981 it cannot be said that this order is in any way based on the first appellate order. The fact that some of the reasons given by the trial Court in the second order are the same as given by the District Judge in the first appellate order, would not render the second order of the trial Court to be illegal or null and void. Even if those portions of the second order of the trial Court, which appear to be the repetition of the reasons given in the first appellate order are ignored, still the trial Court has given other cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that there was prima facie case in favour of the appellant. The argument of Mr. Ghulam Hussain Abbasi learned counsel for the respondents that the second order being based on a void order i. e. The first appellate Court should be deemed to be null and void, has no substance.
13. The second point urged on behalf of the appellant in support of the appeal was that the learned trial Court did not consider the question of limitation which was specifically raised before that Court. It is admitted that the review application was filed after more than three months of the second order of the trial Court dated 7th April, 1981 which was sought to be reviewed. According to Article 173 of the Limitation Act review petition is to be filed within 90 days. Admittedly the review application filed by the respondents before the trial Court was out of time by several months. There is no discussion in the impugned order of the trial Court as to how the review application was entertainable after the expiry of 90 days. The order of the trial Court, therefore, cannot be upheld on this ground as well. The learned trial Court had fallen into error in assuming that there were two conflicting orders of the Court which were existing and that it was necessary to decide as to which of the two orders should be deemed to be holding the field. The first order relates to dismissal of the injunction application. The second order which was sought to be reviewed, was passed on a fresh injunction application which was allowed. In view of the second order, the first order shall automatically be deemed to have been set aside. It is not unusual for a plaintiff to file several applications one after another for interim injunction on fresh grounds. In such case if the first application is dismissed while the second injunction application is allowed on fresh grounds, it would not imply that there are two coflicting existing orders of the Courts on the record. Nor the Court shall, under such circumstances be required to decide as to which of the two orders is holding the field. The last order made on the last application shall normally be deemed to be the existing order while all previous orders which are in conflict with the last order, shall be deemed to have been set aside. The same was the case in the suit of the plaintiff/appellant. His first application for injunction was disallowed. He then amended his plaint and made a fresh application for injunction on a fresh ground which was available to him in view of the amended plaint. If the trial Court allowed the second application it shall be understood that the first order stood recalled. There was no question of two conflicting orders existing on the record. The order of the learned trial Judge in recalling the second injunction order was, therefore, illegal and not sustainable on any proposition of law. The proper course for the respondents would have been to challenge the second order dated 7th April, 1981 in appeal before this Court, because it was an appealable order. Still another remedy was open to the respondents that is to move the same Court for vacating the injunction under Order XXXIX, rule 4, C.P.C. Instead of resorting to these remedies the respondents filed a review application before the trial Court which, in the circumstances, was not only misconceived but was also barred by time.
' For the above reasons the appeal is allowed with costs and the impugned order of the trial Court dated 9th March, 1982 passed on the review application under Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. Is set aside