DECISION These are two appeals by the Sind Road Transport Corporation, one against the decision of the learned Sixth Labour Court given on 8th Decem--ber, 1981, re-instating respondent, Muhammad Hayat Khan in service and the other against separate but identical ten decisions, dated 8th December, 1981, by the same Labour Court directing the re-instatement in service, with full back benefits, of respondent Muhammad Ashraf and the remaining nine respondents. Both the appeals have been heard together as they involve common issues.
2. At the outset it may be mentioned that the learned counsel of the parties were agreed that the appeals in respect of two respondents, namely, Muhammad Shamim and Khursheed Hussain have become infruc--tuous, as both of them had been taken back in service but Khursheed Hussain has since retired with effect from 14th August, 1982. This order will, therefore, be confined to the cases of the remaining nine respondents.
3. The admitted facts of the case are that by order, dated 28th January, 1980, the S. R. T. C.
Retrenched the services of a large number of bus conductors and bus drivers as there was huge over-staffing in the said organization and further the S.R.T.C. Had been incurring losses. It was sub- -sequently found that through oversight, certain bus conductorrs, though junior to the employees whose service had been retrenched by the aforesaid order, had not been retrenched. Accordingly a supplementary order of retrenchment was passed on 7th May, 1980, by which the services of 36 con--ductors, including the eleven respondents, were retrenched on the ground that they were the junior-most employees. The material portion of the said order reads as follows : "S. R. T. C. Had terminated services of their employees due to reorgani--zation and retrenchment on economical ground who were senior to the following employees these employees being junior to other employees whose services have already been terminated cannot be retained in service as such their services are also being terminated. If any of the following employees is aggrieved and claims seniority in service on those who are retained by the Corporation, he should file his appeal- representation which would be purely decided on merit, on the princi--ple of "Last in First out".
Payment of dues if any to be paid to termination will be paid according to rules after final decision of the appeals filed by the Corporation."
The aforesaid order was challenged by the 11 respondents through grie--vance petitions filed before the learned Sixth Labour Court on the ground that the said order was mala fide and constituted victimization of workers, that the said order was in violation of Standing Order 11 in that the services of more than 50% of the employees had been terminated without obtaining requisite permission from the Labour Court and that the said order was further bad in law in that junior persons, including some of the respondents, had bets re-engaged on daily wages, contrary to their terms and conditions of service.
4. The appellants resisted the grievance petitions of the respondents on the grounds. Firstly, that retrenchment was necessitated on account of the policy of Government, which itself was founded on the fact that the S.R.T.C. Had been consistently running into losses on account of over-staffing, secondly, that by reason of large scale retrenchment it had become necessary for a short period of time to re-employ some of the retrenched staff on daily wages ;thirdly, that the principle of `Last in first to go out' was strictly followed in effecting retrenchment, and lastly, that no grievance notice was served upon the appellants by the respondents.
5. The learned Labour Court repelled the contention of the respondents that the services of more than 50% of employees had been terminated by the S.R.T.C. Or that the temporary employment of some retrenched staff on daily wages invalidated the retrenchment of the respondents, but allowed the grievance petitions of the respondents solely on the ground that the respon--dents had, in contravention of the provisions of clause (1) of Standing Order 12; neither been given requisite notice of one month nor pay in lieu of notice.
6. I have heard Mr. Raees Muhammad Mushtaq, the learned counsel for the appellant corporation and Mr. Ali Amjad, who appeared for the respondents. Mr. Raees Muhammad Mushtaq submitted that though a worker whose services are being terminated under clause (1) of Standing Order 12, is entitled either to one month's notice or wages in lieu of notice, the mere fact that the worker has not received the wages in lieu of notice or the order terminating his services does not specifically recite or state that he is entitled to notice pay does not make the order terminating his services invalid. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Tribunal reported as Chairman, S. R. T. C. v. Bakshan and 27 others (1980 P LC 735). In that case it was contended that the order terminating the services of the 28 workmen was void as they were not paid one month', wages in lieu of notice. It was held that although it appeared from some o1 the orders filed by the workmen themselves that notice pay was apparently paid to them, assuming that the notice pay was not paid to them that would not make the orders terminating their services void. The said decision of this Tribunal was challenged in C. P. No. D.-17 of 1980 before the High Court but the decision was upheld by the High Court, which observed as follows : "With reference to the second contention of Mr. Awan that as respon--dent No. 1 was not paid one month's salary as it was a condition of the retrenchment order, the order is void, it will suffice to observe that the order of retrenchment cannot become void because of nonpayment of one month's salary. The validity of the order is to be judged on the basis, as to whether respondent No. 1 was in fact entitled to retrench the staff on the relevant date and not on the basis whether they failed to pay one month's salary after passing the above retrench--ment order. At the most the petitioners can enforce the recovery of the above amount.'
7. Mr. Raees Muhammad Mushtaq also relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported as Ghulam Sarwar v. Pro--vince of Punjab (1982 SCMR. 46). In that case also the order terminating the services of a Government Servant had been challenged on the ground that he was not given one months notice as required by law. Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court observed as follows : "It is true that the petitioner was not given a month's notice as was required to be given while terminating the services of an ad hoc appointee. This requirement of the law, however, is not without an alternative. In the absence of such a notice, the petitioner's claim extends to a month's pay. He-has to seek it from the appropriate authority. He cannot on that score avoid the termination of his ad hoc appointment."
If is true that the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court is in respect of a Government Servant and not workman to whom the Labour Laws are applicable, but the principle enunciated by their Lordships in the above case would clearly be applicable while interpreting the provisions of, clause (1) of Standing Order 12.
8. Mr. Ali Amjad, however, sought to argue that the giving of one month's notice pay in lieu of notice was a precondition to terminating the services of a workman under clause (1) of Standing Order 12.
I am, how-- ever, inclined to the view that law merely entitles a workman whose services are to be retrenched under the said clause to one month's notice or pay it lieu of notice and does not make the order of termination invalid if the e workman is not given one month's notice or pay in lieu of notice or the order terminating his services does not specifically state that he could collect his wages in lieu of notice. As pointed out by the High Court 11 C. P. No. D-17 of 1980 the validity of the order of retrenchment cannot be .Judged, on the basis whether the workman has or has not been paid one months wages in lieu of notice but on the entitlement of the employer to retrench the staff on the day that the retrenchment is effected. If the legis--lature had intended that the' order of termination of services itself should provide payment of notice pay to the retrenched workman, the wording of clause (1) of Standing Order 12 would have been different and on the lines of the language employed in clause (3) of Standing Order 12, which provides that the reasons for terminating the services of a workman should be stated in the order of termination of services. It may also be pointed out that the order retrenching the services of the respondent itself seems to contemplate payment of all dues to the respondent which would also include notice pay. It is true that the order provides that the workers, whose services are being retrenched, would be paid their .Dues after final decision of the appeals, if any, filed by them to the Corporation, but it must be noted that the order terminating the services of the respondent. Specifically provides that if' any of them are aggrieved by the said order they would have right of appeal to the Corporation.
Obviously, in the circumstances if any workman preferred an appeal to the Corporation, the entitlement of such workman to one month's wages in lieu of notice would arise only if the Corporation rejected his appeal. In any case I am of the firm view, relying upon the decisions noticed above, that mere absence of notice/notice pay or wages of a work man would not vitiate or invalid the order terminating the services of t1le workman under clause (1) of S. O. 12.
9. It is also sought to be argued by Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned counsel for the respondents, that the respondents in fact were not the junior --most employees and that the principles of `Last in first to go out' had not been followed by the Corporation. Mr. Ali Amjad sought to rely in support of his contention upon the provisional seniority list, circulated under S. R. T. C. Letter, dated 27th July, 1980.
Mr. Ali Amjad pointed to the fact that the said seniority list shows a number of persons who were appoin--ted after 1969. Whereas the respondents were appointees of 1967. Now apart from the fact that the list relied upon by Mr. Ali Amjad is a provisional list and its covering letter specifically provides that objections could be filed against the seniority as indicated in the said list, there is nothing on record to indicate that any person junior to the respondents, had been retained in service by the S. R. T. C. No such claim or assertion has been made by the res--pondents either in their grievance petitions or in their affidavits. .411 that they have claimed is the Corporation has re- employed some junior staff on daily wages. It was observed by this Tribunal in the case reported in 1980 PLD 604; that appointment of staff on daily wages appeared to have become necessary on account of large scale retrenchment effected by the Corporation. In any case the appointment of workmen on daily wages is something totally differ--ent from the retention in service of junior staff.
There is, thus, no sub stance or even foundation for the contention of Mr. Ali Amjad that persons junior to the respondent were retained in service when the services of the respondent were terminated.
10. The upshot of the above discussions is that I would allow both the appeals and would set aside the orders of the learned Labour Court directing the re-instatement in service of the respondents subject to the observation indicated above that the appeals in respect of respondents Khursheed Hussain and Muhammad Shamim had become infructuous and are disposed of as such.