The Petitioner is a Limited Company which has been taken over by the Government under the Economic Reforms Order, 1972. This Company has its Headquarters situated at State Life Building, 1.
I. Chundrigar Road Karachi , whereas its factory is situated at Landhi. Respondent No. 2 was employed in the factory at Landhi till 9th August, 1980. He was transferred on the above date to the Headquarters. He, however, applied for leave. Meanwhile he was transferred to the petitioner's office at Lahore, but he did not join there. On 3rd December. 1980, a show-cause notice was issued by the petitioner to Respondent No. 2 in which inter alia it was alleged that Respondent No. 2 had made false statement regarding illness in his application for leave. Ultimately Respondent No. 2 was dismissed by the Managing Director of the Peti--tioner by his order dated 9th May, 1981. This order was challenged by Respondent No. 2 by a grievance petition before Labour Court No. IV within whose jurisdiction the factory at Landhi was situated. The petitioner has filed this petition challenging the territorial jurisdiction of Labour Court No. IV on the ground that the cause of action accrued at the Head-Office of the petitioner's office situated at 1.
1. Chundrigar Road Karachi which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Labour Court No. V. Earlier the petitioner had also moved the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court No. IV challenging his territorial jurisdiction but the learned Presiding Officer dismissed the application by his order dated 4th March, 1982, inter alia on the ground that the objection as to territorial jurisdiction was raised at the stage when the evidence of Res--pondent No. 2 was over and the statements of the witnesses of the Peti--tioner were also partly recorded and only cross- examination was reserved. According to the learned Presiding Officer, objection as to territorial jurisdiction should have been raised at the earliest stage. Probably the learned Presiding Officer had the provisions of section 21 of C. P. C. In his view, while taking the above decision. Thereafter the prescient peti--tion was filed. Later on the learned Presiding Officer had made a reference to the Labour Appellate Tribunal for transfer of the case to some other Court. This reference was accepted and the case of Respon--dent No. 2 was transferred to Presiding Officer, IIIrd Labour Court Karachi , who was added as Respondent No. 3 to this Petition by amend--ing the original Petition.
2. The short question that falls for determination in this case is, whether wrong assumption of territorial jurisdiction by an authority would render all the orders made and proceedings taken by that authority as null and void? Mr. Mamoon Kazi learned counsel for the Petitioner has referred to section 20 of the C. P. C. And relied on several cases in support of his argument that any order passed by an authority, who had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain a matter, shall be deemed to be null and void. Most of they authorities relied upon by the learned counsel pertain to lack of inherent jurisdiction and not lack of territorial jurisdiction. However, the only relevant case which refers to wrong assumption of territorial jurisdiction is that of Messrs Habib Bank Ltd., Gujranwala v.
Khalid Javed and 2 others (1973 PLC 144). This was a case decided by Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. In this case a grievance petition was entertained and decided by the Labour Court which had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter. It was held by the Tribunal that the order passed by the Labour Court was liable to be set aside. Consequently the order passed by the Labour Court was set aside. By making the above order the learned Tribunal also made reference to explanation 2nd of section 20 of the C.P.C.
3. With due respect to the learned Tribunal it may be stated that his attention was not drawn to section 21 of the C.P.C. Although it has been emphatically argued on behalf of the Petitioner that C.
P. C. Is not applicable to the proceedings before Labour Court; but the cases cited b the learned counsel for the petitioner contain references to section 20 o the C.P.C. From which it would transpire that at least the principle laid down in section 20 or for that matter section 21 is applicable to proceed--ings before Labour Courts under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Section 21, C.P.C. Clearly states that no objection as to place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity. The learned Presiding Officer of Labour Court No. IV has specifically mentioned in his order dated 4th March, 1982, referred to above that no objection was taken as to territorial jurisdiction of his Court by' the Petitioner, until after the entire evidence of the worker t. e.
Respondent No. 2 was recorded and the statements of the witnesses of the petitioner were also partly recorded. In this view of the matter, the learned Labour Court was quite justified in rejecting the objection as to territorial jurisdiction.
4: It will be pertinent to observe that lack of territorial jurisdiction should be distinguished from lack of inherent jurisdiction. Wherever an authority passes an order in a matter in which it has no inherent jurisdiction, then the order shall be deemed to be void ab initio and non-i existent in the eyes of '3w. For example a IIIrd Class Civil Judge who is not vested were' the powers of Rent Controller, assum--ing jurisdiction of Rent Controller, passes an order of ejectment. The order shall be void ab initio. Similarly if a Magistrate 1st Class tries and decides a case which is exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, or an Special Judge Anti-Corruption decides a case in which no sanction to prosecute a Civil servant has been obtained under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, then orders passed by such Magis--trate and Special Judge shall be deemed to be null and void for want of inherent jurisdiction.
5. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of S. A. Latif v. Nadir Khan (PLD 1968 Lah.
144) in which the objection relating to territorial jurisdiction of a Court was distinguished, from one as to inherent jurisdic--tion of ,a Court. The relevant observation made by Single Judge in the above case may be reproduced with advantage. The same is as under:- "it is now well established that the validity of decree can be challeng--ed in execution proceedings on the ground that the Court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seizen of the case because the subject-matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the Court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject --matter of the suit or over the parties to it. In Ahmad & Co. v. Muhammad, Siddique (PLD 1965 Kar. 293) it was held : 'The only ground which has been recognised by Courts which , can be urgedin execution proceedings as regards the validity bf the decree is that the Court which passed the decree had no jurisdiction to do so. 'Such absence of jurisdiction must be inherent. Except in such cases the execution Court has no jurisdiction to go behind the decree.'
An objection relating to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court is not one which is inherent in the Court. If the Court has notice the territorial jurisdiction but is precluded to try the suit on the ground that it had no jurisdiction in the case on account of the subject-matter or the persons who are parties in the case, or because of the value of the suit, it does not lack in inherent jurisdiction. A provision in a statute for territorial jurisdiction contains a direction to a suit or and not. To the Court and does not purport to deal with inherent or general jurisdiction of a particular Court or purport to deprive any such Court of its jurisdiction in the event of its non-compliance. It is for this reason that in section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is clearly provided: `No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first in--stance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice."
6. It has been stated in the petition that the petitioner is running a factory at Landhi. It is not the case of the petitioner that the factory situated at Landhi and the Head Office situated at I. I.
Chundrigar road are two separate entities. On the contrary from the petition it would transpire that both the factory and the Head Office constitute one entity. Hence even according to explanation II of section 20 of C. P. C. Respondent No. 2, was entitled to approach any Labour Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the factory at Laodhi was situated or where the Head Office was situated, f.' e.
Either Court No. IV which had jurisdic--tion over Landhi or Court No. V, which according to the petitioner, had jurisdiction over I.
1. Chundrigar Road where the Head Office was situated. Attention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was drawn to the transfer order of the Appellate Tribunal whereby the case of Respondent No. 2 was transferred from Court No. IV (Respondent No. 1) to Court No. III (Respondent No. 3). It was urged on behalf of respon--dent that if there was any error on the part of Court No. IV in assuming wrong territorial jurisdiction, it should be deemed to have been correct--ed by the Appellate Tribunal, who was empowered to transfer a case from one Labour Court to any other Labour Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that although Labour Court No. III shall be. Entitled to proceed with the matter in view of the transfer order made by the appellate Tribunal, but it shall have to proceed with the case de novo because all proceedings taken by Court No. IV who had no territo--rial jurisdiction in the matter shall be deemed to be null and void and should be expunged from the record. The argument has no substance. As already held above, there was no lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Presiding Officer of Labour Court No. IV to take cognizance of the petition of Respondent No. 2. Hence the evidence recorded by that Court cannot be expunged from the record simply for the reason that the cause of action did not accrue within his territorial jurisdiction.