The appellant, who was employed as a weaver in the respondent establishment, preferred a grievance petition to the learned Illrd Labour Court on 13-2-1982, claiming that he had been illegally removed from service by the respondents on 7- 10-1982 by a verbal direction. The learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant's grievance petition on the grounds, firstly, that the grievance petition was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed in section 25-A, I. R. O., secondly, that it has been established that the appellant had voluntarily resigned and been paid his full dues on such resignation, and that thirdly, the grievance petition of the appellant was also not maintainable by reason of the fact that the Standing Orders are not applicable to the establishment of respondents as less than 20 persons are employed therein. Aggrieved by this decision the appellant has preferred an appeal to this Tribunal.
2. It was admitted by Mr. Ali Ahmad, Advocate, for the appellants, that the appellants had sent a grievance notice, dated 13-10-1981, to the respondents. A reply to this grievance notice was given to the appellants by the respondent vide their letter, dated 18-10-1581. The grievance petition should, therefore, have been filed within 2 months of the receipt of the said reply, i. e. 18-10-1981. The grievance petition, however was filed on 13-1-1982, almost 3 months after the receipt of the reply to the grievance notice. The grievance petition thus appears to be clearly time-barred. It was, however, argued by Mr. Ali Ahmad that the appellant had served on the respondents a copy of the notice, dated 13-10-1981, on or about 22-12-1981, after cutting out the original date, 13-10-1981. It was contended that on account of the service of this copy upon to the respondents the first show- cause notice should be ignored and the copy of the notice served on 22-12-1981, should only be taken into consideration. It is well settled law that time begins to run from the service of the first grievance notice and the period of limitation cannot be extended by serving successive grievance notices. As such, I would agree with the view taken by the learned Labour Court that the grievance petition preferred - by the appellant was barred by limitation.
3. There is also ample evidence on record to show that the appellant had voluntarily resigned. He has admitted in his cross-examination that the resignation application, dated 15-3-1981, which is at page 55 of the record of the learned Lobour Court , bears his signature. He, however, sought to explain away his signature on this document by asserting that at the time he signed it, it was a blank paper. It his not been explained by him why he had signed a blank document. If a person chooses to blindly sign a document, he must suffer the consequences thereof. In any case, there is no tangible evidence on record to substantiate his allegation that he has signed a blank paper on which his resignation was subsequently written.
There is also no tangible evidence on record to show that 20 or more persons are employed in the establishment of the respondent. It appears that there are only 8 looms in the factory of the respondents. It is highly unlikely that more than 20 persons would be employed in the factory in such circumstances. No doubt, the respondents did not produce any attendance or' were- register, but if the appellant wanted to rely on such registers, it was open to him to apply for their production. This he failed to do. He, therefore, now cannot complain that these documents were not produced by the respondents.
4. For the reasons discussed by me above, I find no merit in this appeal and accordingly dismiss the same in limine.