ABDUL HAMID CHAUDHRY (MEMBER).-Mr. Shaukat Ali has made this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, wherein he has impleaded Secretary (Administration), Government of the Punjab, Board of Revenue (Settlement and Rehabilitation Wing), I 1--Egerton Road, Lahore and Member, Board of Revenue (Settlement and Rehabilitation/ Secretary) to the Government, Punjab, Settlement and Rehabilitation Department, Lahore as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal the appellant has prayed that the impugned orders dated 21-1-1981, 23- 12-1981, 4-2-1982 and 26-8-1982 of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 be set aside and the appellant be re- instated to the post of Chaukidar with all back benefits w.e.f. 22-2-1981.
3. Brief facts of the case are that appellant, Mr. Shaukat Ali, was appointed as Chaukidar w.e.f. 1-6- 1973 on purely temporary basis and his services were liable to be terminated any time without assigning any reason by giving a notice for a period of not less than 14 days, or payment in lieu of notice a sum equivalent to his pay -for 14 days vide order dated 21st September, 1973 of Secretary (Administration) to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab. The services of the appellant as Chaukidar were terminated by giving one month's notice vide order dated 22-1-1981 of respondent No. 1. The appellant was again appointed as `Dusting Coolie' for a period from 17-12-1981 to 28-2- 1982 only vide orders dated 23-12-1982 and 4-2-1982. The appellant made an appeal to Punjab Board of Revenue (S & R Wing) against his termination of services, which was rejected vide Revenue order dated 26-8-1982. Hence this appeal.
4. We have heard the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the order of termination of services of the appellant as Chaukidar with one month's notice on the pretext that his services were no longer required, was not in order and unlawful. Actually the services of the appellant were terminated on account of his absence and dereliction from duty and the appellant was required to be charge-sheeted, should have been proceeded under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules and allowed to put up his defence. Thus, the appellant has been condemned unheard and he has been prejudiced in the matter. Similarly, the appointment of the appellant as `Dusting Coolie' though for a particular period should have been allowed to be extended as there was a vacancy beyond 28-2-1982. He prayed that the impugned orders be quashed as there is very justifica--tion for the same.
5. Controverting these arguments the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant was a purely temporary employee as Chaukidar and his services could be terminated with one month's notice at any time as per terms and conditions of his appointment. Thus, the impugned order terminating his services with one month's notice is per--fectly in order and lawful.
Similarly, in case of 'Dusting Coolie' he was only appointed for a particular period i.e. 17-12-1981 to 28-2-1982, hence this impugned order is also a valid order. Concluding his arguments the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that no injustice has been done with the appellant and there is no cause of any grievance.
6. We have given our anxious thoughts to the arguments of the parties and have also perused the impugned orders referred to above. The terms and conditions of appointment of the appellant as Chaukidar are reproduced below :-- "(i) that his appointment is purely temporary and his services may be terminated at any time without assigning any reason by giving a notice for a period of not less than 14 days, or payment in lieu of notice a sum equivalent to his pay for 14 days."
Thus, the services of the appellant could be terminated with a notice when his services were no longer required. Thus, the impugned order terminating the services of the appellant as Chaukidar with one month's notice is perfectly in order and lawful. Similarly, the impugned orders regarding appointing the appellant as Dusting Coolie' were for a period of 17-12-1981 to 28-2-1982 only and the appellant has no claim for the extension beyond this date as a right. These impugned orders are also valid and no exception can be taken against these.
7. Keeping the above analysis in view, the result is that there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed as such.
There will be no orders as to costs.