MR. JUSTICE SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).-The order of the removal of the appellant made by the President/Chief Martial Law Administrator on 12-3-1972, under the Removal from Service (Special Provisions) Regulation, 1912 (M L R 114), was reviewed along with the orders pertaining to other civil servants, under the Removal from Service (Review Petition) Regulation, 1972 (M L R 116), on 12th August, 1972, by notification dated 7-4-1972. Omitting the names of the other civil servants, the said noti--fication reads as follows :- "In exercise of the powers conferred by paragraph 4 of the Removal from Service (Review Petition)
Regulation, 1972, the President having considered the review petitions of the following persons retired under the Removal from Service (Special Provisions) Regula--tion, 1972, and other relevant material, is pleased to rescind with immediate effect, the orders of premature retirement from service passed against the said persons :-
(1) Mr. Sajjad-ul-Hassan, C. S. P., formerly Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar.
(2)------------------------------------------..
2. Subsequently, on November 3, 1973, the Establishment Division issued Office Memorandum No. 6/4/72-Rev, which, inter alia, provided in condition (i) that the Government servants, who had been retired under M. -L. R. 114 and had been re-instated, shall, for the period they remained out of service, be paid subsistence allowance at the rate of 50% .Of the pay they were in receipt of, at the time of retirement under M. L. R. 114.
3. It appears that the appellant, who had remained out of service from 12-3-1972 to 12-8-1972, was not paid full emoluments for the intervening period in view of the aforesaid Office Memorandum of November 3, 1973, in spite of his efforts, and consequently he made a representation on 21-8-1979 for the payment of full pay and allowances for the period in question. This representation was rejected and an Office Memorandum in this respect under No. 6/4/72-DA (Rev. G), dated 21st April, 1980, was issued. It would be convenient to reproduce the entire text of the Office Memorandum, for understanding the reasons, which led to the making of the decision. It reads as under :- "The undersigned is directed to refer to the Ministry of Defence O. M. No. 2/412/D-26 (Adorn-I), dated 30th March, 1980, on the above subject, and to say that the claim of Mr. Sajjad-ul-Hassan, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence for payment of full pay and allowances of the intervening period between his premature retire--ment under M. L. R. 114 and re-instatement under M. L. R. 116 is not admissible because the orders of his premature retirement were rescinded "with immediate effect", and not with retrospective effect. The instructions issued by the Establishment Division vide O. M.
No. 6/4/72-DA, dated 3-11-1973 apply with full force.
(2)
4. Having failed to get redress from the departmental authorities, the appellant filed the present appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period from 12-3-1972 to I2-8-1972, when he, without any fault of hid own, remained out of service.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to para. 4 of M. L. R. 116, which deals with the powers of the competent authority in dealing with the Review Petitions under the said Regulation.
This para. Is as follows :- "The Chief Martial Law Administrator may, on consideration of the review petition, and any other relevant material confirm, modify, or rescind the order in respect of which such petition is made."
It was argued that in this particular case, the order has been rescin--ded by the President, and, therefore, the appellant was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remained out of service. The stand taken by the Government is that since the notification giving relief to the appellant says that the order of premature retirement was rescinded "with immediate effect", it took effect from 12-8-1973 when it was made, and did not affect the period prior to that. It was urged that the payment of 50% pay and allowances was, as a matter of grace, and that the Government could withhold the total emoluments for the period during which the appellant did not render any service. The argument, on the face of it, shows the indifference of the persons who had been dealing with this case : for under no canon of interpretation of documents, it can be said that the order giving relief to the appellant would take effect from the date when it was made, merely for the reason that the words "with immediate effect" have been used. The said words obviously mean that effect to the order should be given immediately. It does not mean that the relief will be available to the appellant immediately on the passing of the order and shall not pertain to any prior period. The word rescind by itself is were enough to show that the intention of the President was to annul the effect of the order under which the appellant was compulsorily retired. The word rescind has different meanings, all showing that when an order is rescinded, that order shall be deemed not to have ever been passed. The dictionary meaning of the word is-"revoke, repeal, recall and annul". In legal parley, "revocation" means-"calling back of an order of punishment, or of grant or any other order". It also means "to do away with, or to take away, or to take back or to abrogate". More precisely, "revocation" means-"to vacate an order and make it void". It has also been interpreted as "restoring a party to the original position". All this shows that the Federal Government has not complied with the order of the President and has wrongfully curtailed the emoluments of the appellant for the period he remained out of service, because, on the language of the order of the President under M. L. R. 116, the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant made under M. L. R. 114, shall be deemed never to have been made. We have not been able to find out the reasons, under what authority the restriction on the emoluments was placed by Office Memorandum of November 3, 1973. If the author of' the order had F R 57 in his mind, the exercise of the power under that rule was wholly out of context, because the order rescinding the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant had been passed under special provisions, to which F R .51 is not attracted. Even if F R 54 was applicable, it was only the President who could have curtailed the emoluments of the appellant. The President while setting aside the order of the com--pulsory retirement of the appellant did it without any clog.. The order dated November 3, 1973 was never shown to the President. It appears that the Establishment Secretary himself made the order, which, in fact, amounted to partly modifying the effect of the order of the President himself.
6. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that condition (i) of the Office Memorandum of November 3, 1973, is ultra vires the power of the Establishment Secretary, who made it, and that the order of the President rescinding the order of retirement shall take effect, with full force, and the appellant shall be entitled to total emoluments as raised from rim to time, for the period in question. However, if during this period, the appellant had received any amount by way of salary, fee, or from any other business or profession, that amount shall have to be deducted from the salary for the said period.
7. Ordered accordingly.