' The facts' leading up to this Constitutional petition briefly stated are that the petitioner and Respondent No, 1 were married on 24-8-1980. At the time of marriage the respondent No, 1 was a teacher in a school, whereas the petitioner was a dispenser dispensing ointment in a shop. They happened to have acquaintance when the petitioner visited the school for the admission of one of his cousins. Soon after they developed intimacy and the petitioner expressed his love for respondent No,
1. They thought of marrying secretly and their Nikah was performed. After the Nikah they disclosed the marriage to their parents, and they started living together to their knowledge.
Soon after they developed differences with the result that the respondent No, 1 on 16-7-1981 instituted Family Suit No, 1270 of 1981 for dissolution of her marriage with the petitioner in the Family Court at Karachi. The dissolution of marriage was sought on grounds of cruelty, non-maintenance and Khula`. The petitioner filed written statement on 15-9-1981 denying the allegations. The learned Family Court finding that there was no allegation for non-maintenance for a period of two years, framed the issues only on grounds of cruelty and Khula' in the following terms :-
(1) Whether the defendant has made the life of the plaintiff miserable with cruelty of conduct ?
(2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for dissolution of marriage on the grounds of Khula`?
' The learned Family Court after recording the evidence adduced by the parties found the issue on ground of cruelty in favour of the petitioner, whereas that of Khula` in favour of respondent No, 1 and dissolved the marriage vide his judgment dated 4-2-1982. The petitioner has challenged this judgment in this petition as being without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. I have heard Syed Inayat Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Azizul Hassan for respondent No,
1. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel is threefold ; firstly, that the issue on the ground of cruelty having been decided by the Family Court in favour of the petitioner as not proved, the learned Family Court could not dissolve the marriage on the ground of Khula` on the basis of the same evidence ; secondly, that on the basis of the evidence available on the record, there was no justification for the dissolution of the marriage on the ground of Khula` and, thirdly, that the authority exercised by the learned Family Court suffers from jurisdictional defects and, was therefore, unlawful.
3. As regards the first contention the impugned judgment passed by the learned Family Court is very clear to the effect that the evidence available in respect of the allegation of cruelty was insufficient as it was only a word against a word and, therefore, the allegation of cruelty of conduct was not proved. The impugned judgment passed by the learned Family Court is not to the effect that the evidence adduced on the ground of cruelty wa unreliable. In the circumstances, the contention that if the Family Court decides individual issues like those on cruelty and desertion etc. Against the wife, it would militate against the grant of decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula` is obviously a technical one. In each individual case the issue of Khula` would have to be considered on its own merit, and despite the failure of wife on other issues, there might be some element and M face of those other issues which either individually or when combined together might furnish sufficient ground for dissolving the marriage on the ground of Khula`.
Accordingly, no such general proposition can be laid down that the moment issue on cruelty is decided against the wife, she would not succeed on the claim of Khula at all. If any authority is needed in support of such a view, reference may be had to the case of Mukhtar Ahmed v. Mst. Uma Kalsoom and another.
4. As regards the second contention, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as respondent No, 1 have relied on the cases, Mst. Bilqees Fatima v. Najamul Ikram Qureshi and Mst. Khursheed Bibi v. Babu Muhammad Amin. In the former case, it was held that the wife is entitled to dissolution of marriage on restoration of what she received in consideration of marriage if the judge apprehends that the parties will not observe the limits of God. This view was confirmed in the latter case by the Supreme Court. The result would be, that the wife has a right to a dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula` if the judge apprehends that the parties will not observe the limits of God. The only limitation would be that the conscience of the judge shall be satisfied for such affixed aversion between the parties and that the wife shall restore on dissolution of marriage what she received in consideration of the marriage. Relying on these two cases, the Supreme Court in the case of Nishat Ahmed 'Chan v. Ramlah Zdkaria and others, observed that since the wife had developed an extreme dislike for the husband, it would be highly improper to force her to a life which would be quite repulsive to her. It was further observed that she would in those circumstances certainly be transgressing the limits of God, while living with him. And, therefore, came to the conclusion that the learned Civil Judge in view of the evidence petitioner is a man of 26 years of age and is working as dispenser dispensing ointments in the shop and has passed intermediate science, whereas respondent No, 1 is of 32 years of age and is a teacher in a school and has worked as such for about last decade and is a graduate sightly dissolved the marriage in question. Judging the facts and circumstances of the instant case in the light of the principles laid down in the above-mentioned authorities, it would not possible to say that the conscience of the Family Court was not satisfied while dissolving the marriage between the petitioner and respondent No, 1 on the ground of Khula`. The once then. It is obvious that she is more well-placed in life than he husband, the petitioner. It is, therefore, contended that the petitioner often demands money from her and is often dependent on her, with the result that he is not of up to her expectations. She has alleged in her plaint as well a has deposed in her statement that on 28-4-1981, he went to the school and demanded money from her in presence of others. She has further deposed that on her refusal he gave her a slap and snatched from her wedding ring1 2 3 4 with the result that she developed hatred for him. Though she has not been able to substantiate the allegations by adducing a corroborative evidence as observed by the learned Family Court in the impugned judgment, the circumstances which resulted in the differences between the parties would clearly suggest that the petitioner conducted himself in the manner that has been alleged against him. There has also been other litigation between the parties, apart from the suit for dissolution of marriage. The respondent No, 1 has alleged that the petitioner has also filed a suit for restitution o conjugal rights against her. Though defendant No, 1 has denied it, but there has been no denial that as a result of the differences the petitioner instituted a suit No, 2516/81 for injunction against the parents and relations of respondent No, 1 and one Malik Hanif Nihariwala which is pending in the Court of XXI Civil Judge, Karachi. It is also clear in the evidence on the record that the learned Family Court put in efforts for reconciliation in pretrial proceedings but could not succeed. The post-trial efforts for reconciliation between the parties were also made but with no result, as respondent No, 1 was not ready to live with the petitioner in any case. The learned Family Court has observed that respondent No, 1 during the trial was not ready even to look at the petitioner and that during the pre-trial and post-trial reconciliation proceedings she showed hatred against him. It appears that the continuous adverse conduct of the petitioner towards respondent No, 1, coupled with the incident by which the petitioner went to the school and demanded money from her and on her avoiding slapped her and snatched away her wedding ring, has resulted in extreme hatred for him with the result that she has come for dissolution of marriage. Keeping in view all this evidence and circumstances, it would not be justified to say that the learned Family Court by dissolving the marriage between the parties on the ground of Khula` acted without any evidence and material available for such decision. The facts and the circumstances of the case, would, therefore, disclose that respondent No, 1 has developed a hatred against the petitioner to the extent that she will not be able to live with him within the limits of God and the conscience of the Family Court seems to have been satisfied in that respect.
6. As regards the third contention, in view of my above discussion, the conscience of the learned Family Court appears to have been satisfied on the basis of the material available for decision for dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khula`. Even otherwise if it is assumed that the order of the learned family Court is erroneous or such at which the High Court would not have arrived, that would not render the order without jurisdiction, for where there is jurisdiction to decide then as it is often said, there is jurisdiction to decide either rightly or wrongly and merely a wrong decision does not render the decision without jurisdiction. Reliance in that respect has been placed on the case of Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others, wherein the learned Judges of the Supreme Court, made the following observations :- "It is wholly wrong to consider that the Constitutional provision was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case, it would make the High Court's jurisdiction indistinguishable from that exercisable in a full-fledged appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution-makers. When there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction."
' It would, therefore, be very clear that the authority of the learned Family Court suffered from no jurisdictional defect, and, was not unlawful. None of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, have any substance.
7. In the result, I find no merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. PLD 1975 Lah. 805 PLD 1959 Lah. 5665 1 2