1. ' By this Revision application three orders passed by the trial Court on 23-9-1971, 10-12-1970 and 26- 10-1971 are called in question and the prayer is made that the same may be set aside as the learned trial Judge has acted with material irregularity in passing impugned orders.
2. ' Shortly stated the relevant facts are that respondents namely Mst. Rajbai, Allah Bachayo and Mst.
3. Noor Jehan have filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction against Riasat .Ali applicant before me, and one Ahmed, who has been impleaded in this revision application as respondent No,
4. It is stated in the plaint that plaintiffs in the suit are heirs of deceased Haji Allah Jiaro and after his death allowed their relative Ahmed, defendant in the suit, to look after the property of the deceased as Mst. Rajbai widow was Pardahnasheen woman and other two plaintiffs in the suit were minors. Subsequently plaintiffs in the suit lost confidence in Ahmed, divested him of the responsibility of looking after their property and published such information in the newspaper. Thereafter the said Ahmed forged power of attorney on the basis of which he sold the land of plaintiffs in the suit to Riasat Ali, who has been impleaded as defendant No, 2 in the suit.
4. Consequently the suit has been filed for declaration that the sale of land in favour of Riasat All by Ahmed is illegal and void and no legal right has secured to said Riasat Ali arising from that transaction and for injunction against the defendants in the suit from interfering with the title and possession of the plaintiffs in the suit in respect of land in question. Defendants in the suit have filed written statements. Defendant Ahmed has taken the stand in the written statement that power of attorney as well as sale-deed in favour of Riasat Ali are forged and he has nothing to do with the land in question. Defendant No, 2 Riasat Ali has taken stand in the written statement that he has purchased the land in question for Rs, 30,000 from Ahmed, who was authorised to sell by power of attorney executed in his favour by plaintiffs in the suit. Subsequently issues were framed by the trial Court. Plaintiffs in the suit examined their witnesses and the case was fixed in the trial Court for evidence of defendants. On 13-11-1970 an application was filed by Riasat Ali under Order XIII, rule 2, C. P. C. Praying for admission of documents mentioned therein on the plea that the said documents were misplaced by him hence could not be produced earlier. The application was partly allowed in consequence whereof some of the documents mentioned therein were allowed on payment of cost and others were not allowed vide order dated 10-12-1970. Subsequently an application under section 151, C. P. C. Was moved for review of the previous order and for admission of attested copy of general power of attorney in evidence. The trial Court vide order dated 23-9- 1971 dismissed this application on the ground that the previous order dated 10-12-1970 was passed after full consideration and hearing the arguments and contained cogent reasons for not allowing documents mentioned therein. Both these orders are impugned in this revision application. The third impugned order is dated 26-10-1971, which is an application Tiled under Order XV11, rule 1, C. P.
5. C. For adjournment on the ground that defendant Riasat Ali had gone to Karachi. Request for adjournment was rejected by the trial Court. Revision application has been filed in the High Court against the three impugned orders mentioned above on 3rd November, 1971 by Riasat Ali defendant in the suit.
6. ' I Have heard Mr. Riazul Hussan Advocate for the applicant and Mr. G. H. Abbasi Advocate for respondents. Sequencewise the first order called in question is dated 10-12-1970 passed by the trial Court. This order is on application filed under Order XIII, rule 2, C. P. C. Request was made for admission of documents specified therein. There were 10 such documents which were admitted by the trial Court with the exception of three documents, which are sale-deed dated 19-4-1968, sale- deed dated 9-10.1947 and true copy of general power of attorney in favour of Ahmed dated 22-3- 1968, Order on this application was passed after hearing the counsel appearing for both parties.
7. Reasons are given by the trial Court in this Order for rejecting request for admission of documents mentioned above. Second impugned order is dated 23-9-1971 on application under section 151, C. P.
8. C. With prayer for review of previous order and for admission of attested copy of general power of attorney in evidence. It is clear from the contents of this application that only partial review of previous order of trial Court has been sought for admission of attested copy of general power of attorney and admission of other two documents has not been pressed. The trial Court declined to grant request on the ground that sufficient reasons have been given in the previous order.
9. However, I find it pertinent to mention here that as it appears from the order of the trial Court dated 10-12-1970, request for admission of documents was made after side of the plaintiffs was closed and genuineness of power of attorney had been challenged in the plaint and still no steps were taken by applicant Riasat Ali for discovery of original document. I do not propose to make further comments on these two impugned orders for the reason that Mr. G. H. Abbasi Advocate for the respondents has submitted that this revision application is not competent and maintainable.
10. According to him three orders passed by the trial Court on different dates have been put together and called in question by way of this revision application for the reason that no time limit is prescribed for filing revision. It is submitted by him that language of section 115, C. P. C. Is very clear and interference can be made only when the trial Court has acted in excess of jurisdiction or failed to exercise jurisdiction or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
11. It is submitted by the learned counsel that even the words "with material irregularity" are corelated with jurisdiction of the Court. In the instant case the trial Court had the jurisdiction and none of the orders impugned herein can be stated to have been passed without jurisdiction or with material irregularity relating to the jurisdiction. So far the refusal of the trial Court A to admit the document stated above is concerned. Mr. Abbasi has drawn my attention to the order passed by the Supreme Court in the case o Habibullah Khan v. Zeal Pak Cement Industry, in which it is held that an order1 admitting or declining to admit evidence orally or documentary does not amount to a "case decided" within the purview of section 115, C. P. C., therefore, such order of the trial Court cannot be interfered within exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Even otherwise as stated above applicant has not pressed admission of other documents in his review application, which was filed before the trial Court for limited review of the order in respect of power of attorney only. In the circumstances stated above so far the first two impugned orders are concerned no interference is called for.
12. ' The third impugned order is order passed by the trial Court on 26-10-1971 on application filed by applicant Riasat Ali for adjournment. Mr. Riazul Hassan Advocate for applicant has submitted in this context that the Trial Court should not have closed the side of the defendant in the suit after rejecting the request for adjournment and Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. Would apply only when time is granted by the court to the party to produce evidence and the party fails to do so within the time allowed by the Court. In the instant case on 26-10-1971 when the impugned order was passed, the case was not fixed before the trial Court for the purpose stated in rule 3 of Order XVII as mentioned above. What Mr. Riazul Hassan really means is that the side can be closed by the Court only when an application is filed by the party requesting for time to produce evidence and such request is granted and time is allowed specifically and thereafter the party fails to produce evidence within that stipulated time, only then the side can be closed under Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. In this context I would like to point out that impugned order passed by the trial Court on 26-10-1971 on application for adjournment does not mention that side of the applicant is closed. It mentions that for reasons stated therein adjournment cannot be granted. The trial Court on the same day passed separate order in the case diary closing the side of the applicant and that order has not been impugned.
13. Any way this appears to be only a technical objection and since record is before me I have checked both the orders one passed on application for adjournment and the other in the case diary of the record of the Court and both are to be read in conjunction with each other. The reasons are given in the order passed on the application for adjournment and the side has been closed vide order in the case diary for reasons recorded in the order passed on application for adjournment. In this context perusal of case diary of the record of the trial Court shows that the plaintiffs in the suit close their side and thereafter on 18-9-1970 the case was put off to 8-10-1970 for evidence of defendants. Thereafter there were several dates on which the case was fixed time and again for the same purpose stated above i. e. For evidence of defendants when ultimately on 26- 10-1971 application for adjournment was rejected and the side was closed. In the order dated 26- 10-1971, it is stated in clear terms that plaintiffs in the suit had closed side on 2-12-1969 and since then about 1 year and 10 month have passed but the defendants have neither summoned their witnesses nor have produced them. For such reasons the trial Court being impressed by the fact that matter was 2} yel.Rs old and defendants did not produce evidence, rejected the application for adjournment and closed the side of defendant/applicant. I think that the trial Court was quite competent to pass order under Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. Mr Riazul Hassan Advocate for the applicant has failed to satisfy me that even if the applicant felt aggrieved against this order on merits then he could justifiably invoke revisional jurisdiction. Learned counsel has cited before me two decisions in support of his contention. The first case is Muhammad Manikuddin v. Simiran Bibi and others and the other La! v. Ghulam Muhammad and another. In both these reported cases the proposition laid down is that provisions of Order XVII, rule 3 are exceptional in nature and should be resorted to when the party has taken time from the Court on his application for some specified purpose and has failed to do so. The facts of both the reported cases mentioned above are different from the facts of the instant case. In Dacca case plaintiff was examined on commission and both parties failed to make appearance in the Court on the next date fixed for hearing. None the less the trial Court proceeded with the suit and passed decree on the basis of deposition of plaintiff under Order XXVI, rule 8, C. P. C. It was held in the reported judgment that the2 3 course available to the trial Court was to dismiss the suit under Order IX, rule 3, C. P. C. In Lahore case mentioned above the position admitted on record was that before the trial Court it was the first date for production of the evidence by the parties. It is thus obvious that the facts in the instant case are different from the facts in the reported cases. Another important thing discernible in these reported cases is that the point in dispute stated above has been agitated before the appellate Court and not before a revisional Court. In this context Mr. Abbasi counsel for respondent, while defending the impugned order, has submitted that in Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. It is not stated that time must have been granted to the party for production of evidence on such "application" made to the Court by that party. According to the counsel it is enough if the matter is fixed in the Court for production of evidence of that party. It was next contended by Mr. Abbasi that even if order was wrong on merits, no interference could be made on revisional side. On the scope of revisional jurisdiction learned counsel has cited before me celebrated decision of the Privy Council reported in PLD 1949 P C 26 the relevant portion from the said judgment at p. 15 is reproduced hereunder :- "Their Lordships can see no justification for any such view ; it would indeed be difficult to formulate any standard by which the degree of error of subordinate Courts could be measured. Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies and where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of the trial Court, right or wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters, (a) That the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction ; (b) That the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction ; and (c) That in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied upon those three matters, it has no power to interfer because it differs, however profoundly from the conclusions of the subordinate Court upon question of fact or law."
14. ' Mr. Abbasi further submitted that guidelines laid in the decision of Privy Council as stated above, have been consistently followed by superior courts of this country.
15. In view of this legal position and facts and circumstances stated above of this case Mr. Riazul Hassan, Advocate has not been able to convince me that it is open to the applicant to invoke revisional jurisdiction. It is indisputable that the questions which have been raised before this Court can be agitated before the appellate Court, which appears to be the proper forum. For the facts and reasons stated above no interference is called for and the revision application is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
16. ' Needless to say that final judgment is not yet delivered by the trial Court and it is open to the applicant to pursue whatever remedies according to law are available to him in the trial Court. 1969 SCMR 965 PLD 1967 Dacca 633 PLD 1975 Lah. 385