MR. JUSTICE SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).-The appellant, while employed in B-10 shop of Pakistan Ordnance Factories, Wah Cantt. Was dismissed from service. After exhausting departmental remedy, he has come up in appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunal's Act, 1973.
2. The learned counsel for respondent, Mr. Shahudul Haque, has raised a preliminary objection that the appellant, being a "worker", as defined in the Factories Act (XXVI of 1934) and also a "workman", as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act (VIII of 1923), is not a ",civil servant" within the meaning of clause (a) of section 2 of the Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), read with clause (b) of the Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Tribunal.
3. In order to determine the status of the appellant, we recorded the statement of the Works Manager, incharge of B-10 shop and also the statement of appellant. The evidence recorded by us establishes that in B-10 shop, manufacturing process as defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Factories Act (XXVI of 1934), is carried out. The appellant was attached to Works Manager of this shop, and as such, though he was not employed in (the manufacturing process, he used to be present in the premises where manufacturing process was being carried out. Although there is possibility that the appellant used to spend major portion of his duty in the room where Works Manager had his office and which was separated by wall from the rest of the Factory, nevertheless, the appellant was quite frequently going to the premises where the manufacturing pro--cess was being carried out on the direction of the Works Manager to perform odd duties. No doubt, the appellant's main duty was of taking dak and documents from one place to the other, but there were also such duties as were incidental to the manufacturing process, inasmuch as his position as an orderly of the Works Manager, who himself had to attend the place where the manufacturing process was being carried out, required his presence in the premises where manufacturing process was carried out. Needless to say that for being a "worker", the definition places stress on the place or premises where the duty is performed and not on the nature of duty. Such being the case, the appellant falls within the definition of clause (h) of section 2 of the Factories Act (XXVI of 1934).
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the respondents in their written statement in reply to para. 2 have admitted that the appellant was doing dak distribution duty. We have gone through the reply of the respondents. A plain reading of the relevant portion would show that the statement in the said para. Related to the parti. Cular date, i.e. 12-1-1978 when the incident took place. There is no admission on the part of the respondents that the appellant was solely doing dak work, having no connection whatsoever with the premises where the manufacturing process was being carried out. On the other hand, in para. III of the objections, the respondents categorically stated that the appellant was "worker" and a "workman" within the meaning of the two labour laws, referred to above.
5. Besides being a "worker" under the Factories Act (XXV of 1934), the appellant also comes within the definition of "workman" as given in clause (n) of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (VIII of 1923) read with Item (ii) of Schedule 11 thereto, as he was employed in a premises within the precincts whereof, more than ten persons were employed in manufacturing process.
6. Since the appellant is a "worker" and a "workman" as observed above, is not a "civil servant", and, therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. The appellant may approach appropriate forum to redress his grievance if he so chooses.
7. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
8. Parties to be informed.