JUSTICE SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN)-This appeal by Muhammad Rafique Shad, an employee of the Postal Department has come up before this Tribunal for the second time after remand by the Supreme Court. The facts of the- case are given in detail in the order of the Tribunal which it passed after hearing the appeal on 18-2-1980 and the order dated 19-10-1982 of the Supreme Court, and it is, therefore, not necessary for us to reiterate the facts. This order is to be read in continuation of the Tribunal's previous order and the order of the Supreme Court, referred to above.
2. The appellant had succeeded in the appeal before the Tribunal, because the Tribunal found that the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant bad been taken by the authorities not competent to do so, inasmuch as no authorisation had been made under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 in respect of class of civil servants to which the appellant belonged. The stand taken by the respon--dent Department that the appeal was barred by time was rejected by the Tribunal by observing as follows: 'It being a void order,i.e, without authority, question of limitation does pot arise."
The Tribunal did not go into the merits of the case because the arguments had not been pressed before it in this respect. The Tribunal specifically observed that the learned counsel for the appellant did not take up the point (on facts) for arguments.
3. The Supreme Court had ordered fresh decision after holding that the delegation made by S. R. O.
No. 895/K 163, dated 25-5-1968 under the 1960 Rules holds the field under section 2 of the General Clauses Act and in view of the constitutional provisions whereby the existing laws had been allowed to continue. The learned counsel for the appellant has, however, contended that the authority which passed the impugned order was not com--petent to do so even under the aforesaid notification. In this respect, argu--ments were heard at length, and we also obtained the assistance of some officers, of the Postal Department. However, it is not necessary to determine this point now because the Supreme Court's decision of remand conclusively determines the issue in favour of the Department. In the concluding sentence, the direction is to the effect that the case was remanded to the Tribunal "for a decision afresh on other points involved in the matter". The word `other' is significant to denote that as far as the question of the competency of the officers exercising the jurisdiction was concerned, the Supreme Court was satisfied that it had been validly done.
4. The question of Limitation is left open by the Supreme Court, inasmuch as no decision thereon was given and only the arguments of counsel for the appellant and respondent were discussed.
The Tribunal had allowed the appeal, because it was of the view that the impugned order was void and the question of limitation did not arise. Since the Supreme Court has held that the order was not void and had been validly made, the mainstay of the Tribunal's order vanishes. Even, otherwise, this Tribunal in subsequent cases, has been taking the view that where an order passed without jurisdiction takes effect and a specific period of limitation is provided for in the law, the that period of limitation cannot be circum, vented by raising the plea that the order sought to be set aside was without jurisdiction. In this respect, reliance had in many cases been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Sharif Ahmea Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee (1980 SCM R 711).
5. The departmental appeal filed by the appellant was rejected on 29-4-1975. The appeal to the Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 could be filed within 30 days of the communication of the order of rejection. The appellant does not contend that order dated 29-4- 1975 was received late. As such, the last date for filing the appeal before the Tribunal was 29-5- 1975, but the appellant filed the present appeal on 26-9-1975, which is barred by time by about 4 months.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that after the rejection of appeal, the appellant had made further efforts by approaching higher authorities by way of petition, but since no such representation is provided for in the law, the time has to count from the date of communi- -cation of the order of rejection of appeal. The learned counsel also referred to rules relating to the petitions to the President, but these rules have hardly any relevance to the question of limitation involved in this matter, because the petitions to the President are not made as of right, but they were made to enable the President to exercise his general power which is now available to him under section 23 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and previously as a prerogative. This appeal being barred by time and no other point having been argued before us, is dismissed. The security fee deposited by the appellant shall stand confiscated towards costs.
7. Parties to be informed.