' ABDUL MAJEED MALLICK, J.-This appeal, by leave, arises out of the judgment of the High Court, dated 22nd March, 1977, whereby the judgment of the District Judge, dated 4th August, 1976, was set aside and case was remanded to the District Judge for disposal on merits.
2. Ghazanfar Hussain, respondent, brought a suit of pre-emption in the Court of Sub-Judge, Mirpur, on 21st May, 1973. After institution of the suit he left for England and appointed one Muhammad Ashraf, son of Mirza, his attorney to prosecute the case on his behalf ; power of attorney was executed in England on 27th August, 1974. The suit was at the stage of evidence of the plaintiff and date for leading evidence was fixed on 9th April, 1975, but on 3rd February, 1975, plaintiff's attorney moved an application to dismiss the suit in the light of compromise deed appended with the application. The Court ordered restoration of the file, recorded statement of the attorney, and dismissed the suit in the spirit of the application and statement of Ashraf, attorney. Ghazanfar Hussain, as stated in his memorandum of appeal before the District Judge, was not informed about the fate of his case. He was in England and arrived on 21st May,, 1975. He enquired about the progress of the case from his attorney. On finding no satisfactory answer, he made inquiry from other sources. It is claimed that on 1st June, 1975, plaintiff learnt that his suit was dismissed on the basis of compromise. Not satisfied with the result he preferred an appeal before the District Judge, on 16th June, 1975. An application under section 5 of Limitation Act, accompanied by an affidavit, was filed alongwith the memorandum of appeal. The District Judge not feeling satisfied rejected the application and recorded dismissal of appeal for want of limitation, on 4th August, 1976.
3. The decision of the District Judge was challenged in appeal before the High Court on 23rd of October, 1976. In para. 1 of the memorandum of appeal it was stated that the appellant had applied for the copy of the decree but as the same was not applied the appeal was presented without it. The learned Chief Justice of the High Court held that appeal unaccompanied by the copy of the decree under appeal was incompetent and dismissed the same on 25th November, 1976.
Ghazanfar Hussain presented his appeal in the High Court, second time, on 11th December, 1976.
The appeal was accepted and delay in filing the appeal in the High Court for non-signing the decree as well as delay occasioned for filing of appeal to the District Judge, was condoned and the case was remanded to the District Judge for disposal on merits. The concluding part of the impugned judgment is reproduced as under :- "In the instant case, the appellant lost no time whatsoever in applying for a copy of the decree. The decree was not in existence and came into being for the first time on the 30th of October, 1976. This appeal was filed alongwith a copy of the decree on the 11th December, 1976. So, apart from the normal period of 90 days available to the appellant, the period from the 4th of August to the 30th of October which comes to 87 days has to be added to the normal period of limitation and this take the period available to the appellant for filing this appeal to 177 days while it has been filed on the 128th day from the date of judgment. Under these circumstances, the appeal is within time.
' The appeal filed in the Court of the District Judge is late by 104 days. After careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that it is a fit case for the extension of time under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the following reasons :-
(1) It was a pre-emption case. The plaintiff has a good prima facie case. He was away in England and in his absence, his Mukhtar gave up the suit for no apparent reason.
(2) The plaintiff insists that the Mukhtar had no authority to give up the suit and that it was given up without his instructions and knowledge.
(3) Without going into the question as to whether the Mukhtar was in this case, empowered to give up the case. I think, merely because, as a matter of principle, a Mukhtar is empowered to enter into a compromise, does not necessarily bind the principal if it takes place without his knowledge or contrary to the instruction.
(4) An agent is presumed to act in the interests of the principal and where prima facie be has acted manifestly to his detriment, the later is entitled to show that he had acted contrary to his instructions.
' The result is that the appeal is accepted and the appellant is held entitled to benefit under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Appeal is remanded to the District Judge with the direction to hear parties and decide it on merits."
4. Ch. Muhammad Taj, the learned counsel for the appellant, raised the following points :-
(i) that the decree of the trial court being a consent (and compromise) decree is not open to appeal ; (ii)that power of attorney authorised the attorney to enter into compromise and get the suit dismissed
(iti) that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the first appeal ; and
(iv) that the second appeal was time-barred. In support of his contentions be referred to number of authorities.
' Qazi Abdul Ghafoor, the learned counsel for the respondents, supported the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court and contended that circumstances of the case show that the learned Single Judge of the High Court was perfectly justified to condone the delay in first appeal and to exclude the period spent on preparation and signing of the decree by the District Judge.
5. It is evident from the reasons advanced by the learned Chief Justin of the High Court in support of his conclusion that he went in detailed discussion on some of the merits touching the roots of the case. It is settle principle that issues sub judice in the subordinate courts are not touched by the Superior. Courts. It is advisable to avoid appreciation of sub judice issue to avoid likelihood of prejudice to either party. We, therefore, hold that the portion 'A to A' in para. No, 4 above shall be considered as nonexistent and would not form the part of the judgment of the High Court. We do so lest it may influence the subordinate courts in its decision on merits.
' The first and second objections raised by Ch. Muhammad Taj, the learned counsel for the appellant, are overruled as the same necessitate adjudication of the subordinate courts. Our view at this stage one way or the other is like to influence the findings of the courts below.
6. First we take up the point of computation of the period under section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Section 5 empowers the court to admin any appeal or application after the expiry of prescribed period of limitation, on its satisfaction that the appellant or applicant, as the case may be, was prevented by a sufficient cause, for not preferring appeal or application, within time. Extension of time rests on (i) showing a sufficient cause which caused the delay and (ii) satisfaction of the court that the party invoking aid of the provisions, had sufficient cause for not preferring appeal with in time.
7. The words "sufficient cause" have received attention of courts invariably. The consensus is that a genuine or good cause, is a sufficient cause. In many cases it is held that a cause which is beyond the control of a party is sufficient cause. Others have held that a cause unavoidable despite care and attention, is sufficient cause.
8. In Atta Ullah Mallik v. The Custodian, Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, Karachi and others (1) Mr. Justice Kaikaus, while discussing the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act, observed :- "Under section 5 of the Limitation Act there has to be a finding of sufficient cause. In pre-Partition India sufficient cause had been defined as circumstances beyond the control of the party and I do not know of any case wherein this definition of sufficient cause had been rejected. However, at least in determining sufficient cause while dealing with the same expression in Order IX, rule 8, C. P.
C. And Order IX, rule 3, C. P. C. The courts had been lenient and had been condoning some negligence i. e. Negligence to the extent to which it is regarded as human though they never condoned gross-negligence. At the same time the Courts had always been strict in demanding proof of sufficient cause for every day which had expired after the ordinary period of limitation.
9. In Said Muhammad v. Goma etc. (2) it was observed :- "The existence of sufficient cause for not filing the proceeding in time is merely a condition that must be satisfied before the court exercises its power of granting or refusing to grant the extension of time. If the condition is not satisfied, there is no room for the applicability of time power to excuse delay. Thus, where no cause has at all been shown, that is. Where no explanation has been given for filing the proceeding out of time, there arises no opportunity of considering the sufficiency or otherwise of the reasons for that fact, and there cannot be any room for the exercise of the discretion given by the section. If the condition is satisfied then the court gets a discretionary power to grant or refuse the prayer for extension of time. It may in its discretion refuse to extend the time even though there may be sufficient cause for the delay. The extension of time is thus a matter of concession or indulgence to the applicant and cannot be claimed by him as a matter of absolute right.
' Whenever discretion is to be exercised it should be exercised in a judicial and not an arbitrary manner and considerable care should be exercised in determining the question of 'sufficient cause' which is always a question of fact in each case. Thus a sufficient cause can properly be said to be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the section. A cause for delay which, by due care and attention, the party could have avoided cannot be a "sufficient cause". The test, therefore, whether or not a cause is sufficient is to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention in other words, whether it is a bona fide cause, inasmuch as nothing shall be deemed to be done bona fide or in good faith which is not done with due care and attention."
10. A "sufficient cause" being a question of fact, varies from case to case and ultimately it rests on the satisfaction of the court. When the court is satisfied that a circumstance or set of circumstances shown by a party, justified the act or omission of such party for not preferring appeal or application within the prescribed period, the court can extend the time. Again, the restriction placed on the powers of the court is that whenever it {FOONOTE}}
(1) PLD 1964 SC 236 (2) PLD 1952 B J 8 ' exercises its discretion in granting or refusing extension of time, the discretion) should be exercised in judicial manner and not arbitrarily.
11. In the present case the facts, already stated, reveal that the explanation advanced by the plaintiff-respondent is that :- Ashraf, his attorney, was not competent to enter into compromise so much so to get the suit dismissed ; (ii)he had no knowledge of the decision of the court ; and
(iii) that at the time of decision of the case he was in England. On his arrival from England, despite his inquiry, no information was passed on to him by the attorney. Consequently he inquired the fate of his case from other sources on which he learnt that his suit was dismissed.
12. Ch. Muhammad Taj, the learned counsel for the vendee-appellant, contended that the suit was dismissed in presence of the counsel of the plaintiff. The council had the knowledge of decision.
Knowledge of the counsel was the knowledge of party. On that assumption, the plaintiff had D.) the knowledge on the date of decision. He referred us to Muhammad Baig and another v. Muhammad Ashraf Khan and others (1) wherein basing on the finding given in AIR 1927 Mad. 707, it was held unless some special reasons can be shown to the contrary, knowledge of a pleader must be taken to be the knowledge of his client."
' This was a case where in presence of the counsel of plaintiff Presiding Officer recorded the death of defendant. Plaintiff moved for substitution after limitation and prayed extension for ignorance. It was under those circumstances that aforesaid opinion was expressed.
13. The other cases cited by Mr. Taj are Mst. Hajran v. Sardar Muhammad (2) and S. H. Mahmood & Co. v. Assistant Commissioner, Income-tax, Ba hawalpur and another (3). It is already stated that a 'sufficient cause' being a question of fact, varies from case to case. A circumstance or set of circumstances in case may constitute a good cause for condonation of delay, but in another case, which may not be identical in situation, such circumstance may not be considered a sufficient cause. The facts of the present case are quite distinguishable. Here the very authority of the person acting as attorney is in dispute. It is contended that the compromise was without authority. The plaintiff has pleaded deception in his case. The Advocate, who represented the plaintiff in the trial Court, in good faith believed that the suit was compromised and on that consideration, he was not supposed to convey the decision to his client. On dismissal of the suit the relationship of counsel and client terminated. The principle of law laid down in Muhammad Baig and another v.
Muhammad Ashraf Khan and others does not strictly apply to this case. Moreover, the rule is subject to an exception (unless special reasons can be shown). The explanation for delay given by plaintiff-respondent, prima facie, constitute a sufficient cause and brings this within an exception to the rule laid down in Muhammad Baig's case.
14. The object of law of limitation is to regulate the course and manner for providing relief or remedy, where substantive rights are pressed in litigation. The restriction of time limit, is an outcome of public policy. Public(1) p L D 1973 Azad J& K 71 (2) 1970 SCM R 656
(3) P D 1951 B J 42 ' policy to limit the time for bringing an action or claim before Tribunal is adopted in the legal system of all civilised States. Whereas the Laws of Limitation in one sense are objective, when strictly construed, so as to lead to disastrous results, destroying valuable vested rights, for no fault or negligence of a party, may result in negation, of the object. The Legislature wisely laid down exceptions in suitable cases. Provisions of section 5 are one of those exemptions. The rule of interpretation is that exemptions are construed liberally to advance the cause of substantial justice. The section contemplates and gives wide discretion in construing what is 'sufficient cause'.
The imperative restriction is that the discretion has to be exercised judicially and not in arbitrary or capricious manner. The other aspect of the proposition is that once a subordinate court has exercised the discretion under the section, superior courts would not interfere with it unless it is found that view of lower court was preposterous and perverse.
' On perusal of the circumstances of the case and reasons advanced in the impugned judgment, we do not find any ground to disagree with the learned Chief Justice of the High Court.
15. The next point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that second appeal before the High Court was filed beyond time. The learned Single Judge of the High Court fell in error by excluding the time spent on preparation and signing of the decree of the first appellate court. In support of his contention, Ch. Muhammad Taj, referred to various authorities.
' Qazi Abdul Ghafoor, the learned counsel for the respondent, argued that the decree-sheet was prepared and signed much after the pronouncement of the judgment and despite making three applications for issuance of the copy, the copy was issued on 11th December, 1976, when the appeal was presented in the High Court. According to the learned counsel the delay in preparation and signing of the decree resulted out of the negligence of the court for which the respondent could not be punished.
16. It is evident from the record that the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal of Ghazanfar Hussain, respondent, on 4th August, 1976. An application for the copy of the judgment and decree of the District Judge and copy of the judgment of the trial Court, was moved on the next day, i. e.
On 9th August. The respondent, who was appellant in the High Court, was provided with the copies of the judgment of the District Judge and the trial Court. Copy of the decree-sheet was not issued to him. Consequently he preferred his appeal to the High Court, without copy of the decree, on 23rd of October, 1976. But the same was dismissed by the learned Chief Justice of the High Court as incompetent appeal for want of copy of the decree, on 25th of November. The appeal was presented to the High Court, second time, on 11th December, 1976, when the copies of the judgment and decree were supplied to the respondent. The learned Judge of the High Court in view of the aforesaid circumstances excluded the period spent in getting the copy of the decree, under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, and treated the appeal within time.
17. The respondent moved three applications to get the copy of the decree. The first application was moved on 5th of August, second time on 19th of October and third time on 6th December, 1976.
His applications dated 5th of August and 19th of October are relevant to the proposition, we would, therefore, like to deal with them. On presentation of the application for getting copy of the decree, the application was entered in the Register by the Clerk of the Court. At Serial No, 1190, it appears in the register that the respondent filed an application for a copy of the judgment and decree of the District Judge on 5th of August. The note given in the register reads as :-{{URDU TEXT}} ' At Serial No, 1580 of the said register, there is an entry which indicates that Ghazanfar Hussain moved an application for copy of the judgment on 19th October. The note given in the register reads as under :-{{URDU TEXT}} ' This note was made on 2nd of November, whereas the decree was shown to have been signed on 30th of October. It shows that the decree was not available for grant of copy up to 2nd of November. The High Court dismissed the first appeal on 25th November, with a finding that no decree-sheet was available on the file of the District Judge on that date. The obvious conclusion is that the decree-sheet was prepared when the file was sent back to the District Judge, on dismissal of appeal by the High Court.
18. Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act contemplates exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from. In order to seek benefit of the provision, it is imperative for the party invoking aid of the section to show that it applied for the copy within the prescribed period of limitation and that no time was wasted and delay did not result out of any act or omission or negligence of the party. When the party applies for the copy of the decree but the same is not provided for its nonexistence whatever the time is consumed on preparation and signing of the decree, is to be excluded under this section.
19. Next we deal with the authorities cited on the point by the learned counsel for the parties. In Barada Prasanna Lod and others v. Kubbad Mia (1) the question of interpretation of the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act was referred to the Full Bench, wherein the learned Judges on examining the case-law available on the proposition, observed as "It is sufficient to say that the judgment being the basis of the decree, the requirement of Order XX, rule 7, is that it should bear the date of the judgment and that when the Limitation Act speaks of 'the date of the decree', it means the date which is assigned to the decree by the Code, namely, the date of the judgment.
We, therefore, hold that "the date of the decree" is the date of the judgment which pronounced it."
' In East & West Steamship Company v. Queensland Company Ltd. (2) the proposition relating to interpretation of section 12(2) was referred to the Full Bench. The learned Judges made analytical examination of the proposition. Their opinion, briefly, is reproduced as under : ' It a plain construction of the relevant provisions bearing on this point, namely, section 12 (2) and Article 156 of the Limitation Act and Order XX, rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code, read together, yields the result that the period between the date of the judgment {FOONOTE}} PLD 1962 Dacca 381 (2) PLD 1960 Kar. 840 ' and the date of the singing of the decree, which elapses uncovered by any application by the appellant for a copy of the decree, was never intended by the Legislature to be excluded in the computation of the period of limitation for an appeal."
' In Shivan Ditta Banarsi Dass Kapur v, Rai Sahib Radha Kishan Kapur and another (1) it was observed as under :- ' In case an application for obtaining a copy of the decree has already been made, and a decree is signed later on, the period which thus elapses, would be deemed to be the time requisite for the obtaining of the copy, because the signing of the decree is a matter which is not within the control of the applicant. By the mere act of applying for the copy the applicant does whatever is within his power with due diligence and caution to obtain the benefit of section 12. But if he does not put in the application for a copy till after the decree has been signed, he cannot be said to have exercised due diligence and caution, and in that case period which elapses between the date of the judgment and the date of the signing of the decree cannot be considered to be the time requisite for obtaining the copies."
' In Mst. Hoshnak Bibi v. Khan Muhammad Ismail Khan and others (2) it was observed as : 4$ - in a case of non-signing of the decree after judgment, like the present one without minimizing the (delinquent) of the Court's duty, we feel that premium cannot also be placed on the inactivity and non-vigilance of a prospective appellant. We are inclined to follow the Full Bench case, 12 All.
461, in which the following observation was made :- "It appears to me upon general principles that it would be defeating the object of limitation to allow the would-be appellant ' o sleep over his right of appeal for more than the limitation period, and then, by the accidental or unavoidable delay in the decree being 'prepared, to claim extension of the period of limitation for appealing from a decree, for obtaining a copy of which he had not taken even the first step by filing an application therefor. The words 'requisite' and obtaining' as they occur in the context seem to assume that some definite step ancillary to the obtaining is not only intended to be taken but has already been taken. If at the time when the application for copy is made, the decree is not ready, he will of course be entitled to the allowance of the time during which the decree remained unsigned, the reason being obvious that the act of obtaining has already commenced and the delay in such a case could not be referred to any omission or neglect on his part. But when he has made no application to obtain a copy, and the decree remains unsigned for a portion of or the whole period of limitation, he cannot claim the benefit of a matter which in no sense and to no extent frustrated or retarded any endeavour on his part to obtain a copy of the decree, the endeavour itself not having yet commenced."
' We, therefore, hold that the period between the date of order (judgment) i. e., 7-5-1958 and date of signing the decree i. e., 27-12-1951 cannot be excluded as the application for obtaining a copy of the decree was not made within limitation from the date of the order (judgment). {FOONOTE}}
(1) AIR 1941 Pesh. 74 (2) PLD 1961 Azad J & K 18 ' The fact that the application for the copy of the decree was made 7 months after the order (judgment) is, therefore, of no avail to the appellant. We think that by virtue of section 33, C. P. C., the would-be appellant can act on the expectations that a decree shall follow the judgment and therefore it is incumbent on him to apply for the copy of the decree within the period of limitation.
In this view of the matter the preliminary objection prevails and we hold that this appeal of Mst.
Hoshnak Bibi is beyond time."
20. The upshot of the aforesaid authorities is that a period covered by an application for the copy of the decree, is to be excluded under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. Applying the test laid down in the aforesaid authorities to the present case we find that the learned Judge of the High Court was justified to hold that the appeal was in time. The objection is, therefore, overruled.
' In view of the foregoing conclusions the appeal being devoid of force stands dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed. P D 1983 SC (A J & K) 35 Present : Sher Zaman Chaudhry, J GHULAM MUSTAFA AND OTHERS-Petitioners versus ASHRAF DIN-Respondent Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No, 14 of 1979, decided on 11 th October, 1982.
(On appeal from the judgment and orders of the High Court, dated 20-2-1979 and 18-2-1979).
Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1970- -- S. 42-Appeal to Supreme Court-Review-Whether review permissible when points raised already fully attended to and decided by court, whether permission to review on ground of incorrectness would not tantamount to conferring on court jurisdiction to hear appeals against its own judgments or perhaps jurisdiction to one Bench of court to hear appeals against other Benches- Question raised, held, of vital importance and merit consideration-Leave to appeal granted.- [Review]. [p. 37]A B. A. Farooqi, Advocate for Petitioners. Sh. Abdul Aziz, Advocate for Respondent.
' The petitioners Ghulam Mustafa and others feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of the High Court dated 20-2-1979 and 18-2-1979, through this petition, seek leave to appeal.
2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that Ashraf Din respondent brought a pre-emption suit against Haji Gul the father of the petitioners. During the pendency of the suit in the trial Court Haji Gul died. His son Ghulam Mustafa and Mst. Tahira his widow were impleaded as legal representatives. Through an application the attention of the trial court was however, drawn by the petitioner-defendants to the effect that Mst. Taurat Begum and Begum Jee, daughters of Haji Gul, were not impleaded as his legal representatives, the suit, therefore, was claimed to have abated.
After due trial the learned Sub-Judge, Authmaqam finally dismissed the suit of the respondent on 20-3-1972 holding the plaintiffs' suit had abated in tow. The District Judge, Muzaffarabad concurring with the finding of the trial Court dismissed the respondent's appeal on 29-7-1975. The appeal was filed by the respondent in the High Court and the ground listed in the memorandum of appeal by the respondent was that his plea with regard to the lack of knowledge about the existence of the two daughters of Haji Gul deceased, who were not impleaded as legal representatives in time, never received consideration by the trial as well as the first appellate Court.
This appeal too was dismissed on 8-12-1975. On 28-2-1976, a review petition containing almost the same ground as listed in the memorandum of appeal, which had been disposed of earlier on 8-12- 1975 by the High Court, was moved by the respondent. On 3-1-1977, the learned Single Judge referred the review petition to the Full Bench for consideration but without formulating the specific points on which the reference was made. On 5-3-1977, the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, raised objection with regard to the competency of the Full Bench to hear the review petition on the ground that only the learned Judge who disposed of the appeal in the first instance was competent to hear the review. The objection was overruled and the learned Judges in the Full Bench answered the points raised in the review petition on 18-2-1979. The points raised in the review petition were answered in the following terms (a)that the second appeal in the High Court in case of abatement of suit was competent ; and (b)that omission to take into consideration a particular provision of law was held to be a sufficient ground for a review petition as it would legally be regarded as a mistake and an error apparent on the face of the record. The learned Single Judge accepted the review petition and remanded the case back to the trial Court.
3. Feeling dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the Full Bench dated 18-2-1979 and that of the learned Single Judge .Dated 20-2-1979, the petitioners now seek leave to appeal on the grounds :-
(i) that no review petition under law was competent. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge on 8-12-1975 was well considered and the points on which the review was sought were already fully attended to and decided by the learned Single Judge ;
(ii) that the learned Single Judge without formulating the specific points referred the case to the Full Bench ; so the judgment of the Full Bench was vitiated. Besides, other Judges except the one who decided the appeal in the first instance were, under law, not competent to hear the review petition ;
(iii) that the orders of the High Court dated 18-2-1979 and 20-2-1979 are invalid and contrary to law.
4.. Mr. B. A. Farooqi, the !Learned counsel for the petitioners, argued that the plea with regard to the lack of knowledge about the existence of 2 daughters of deceased Haji Gul having not been attended to by all the Courts below was incorrect as this point received full consideration and was decided by the learned Single Judge in the High Court while disposing of the appeal.
5. I have carefully gone through the judgments of the Full Bench and that of the learned Single Judge in the High Court passed in appeal. The dominant consideration which, it appears, influenced the mind of the learned Judges in Full Bench was that plea of lack of knowledge on the part of the respondent was not considered by the learned Single Judge as well as by the courts below.
6. For the better appreciation of the points involved the relevant part of the Full Bench finding is reproduced as follows :- "The next point for determination is whether a review petition is competent on the ground that the Single Bench of this Court as well as subordinate courts have not taken into consideration the plea taken in the application submitted by the plaintiff alleging therein that he had no knowledge about the daughters of the deceased Haji Gut We feel that this is a valid question and under Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. This is a mistake apparent on the face of record,"
7. The important query is as to what would be the position if the points raised in review petition were already fully attended to and decided by the court while deciding the appeal against which a review is sought as well as by the Courts below?
8. By permitting a review on the ground of incorrectness, would it not tantamount to conferring on the court the jurisdiction to hear appeals against its own judgments or perhaps a jurisdiction to one Bench of the court to hear appeals against the other Benches?
' In view of the points raised I would prefer only to hold that prima facie, points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners are of vital importance and merit consideration. The petition is, therefore, allowed with the direction that Rs, 1,000 shall be deposited by the petitioners as security towards the cost under rules.