1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The petitioner is a Zamindar and according to him the third respondent owned land to excess of the limits prescribed under Martial Law Regulation No. 115 (hereafter called the Regulation), therefore, he filed an application before the Land Commissioner, Sind that the respondent No. 3 had not declared the land i;, his possession ;.Although it exceeded the prescribed limits under the Regulation, and according to learned counsel, this application was filed under paragraph 30 of the Regulation. The Land Commissioner, however held after hearing the parties, that the third respondent had not violated the provisions of the Regulation but only that of the repealed Martial Law Regulation 64, therefore, the petitioner challenged the Land Commissioner's order before the second respondent, who held by his order dated 28-12-1974 that the third respondent had committed breach of the Regulation, therefore, the second respondent ordered this respondent's prosecution under paragraph 30 of the regulation. This third respondent challenged this order of 28-12-1974, before the first respondent in a Revision. As the first respondent allowed the Revision and set aside the second respondent's order by his order dated 2-7-1975, the petitioner challenged this order in a writ petition in the Sind & Baluchistan High Court, which was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on 7-9-1976, on the short ground that the petitioner had no locus standi to file a Writ Petition, and in coming to this conclusion the learned Judges relied on this Court's judgment reported in Abida Khatoon v. Mian Ghulam Shabbir, Settlement Commissioner, Multan Division, Multan (P F D 1964 SC 793). Hence this petition for leave.
2. Although learned counsel submitted that the petitioner's case fell under paragraph 30 of the Regulation, this paragraph does not confer on the informant any right to the land about which he has supplied information under this paragraph, therefore, all that an informant can do is to set the law in motion against the, person who has committed the breach of paragraph 30, but this would not confer on such a person the right to challenge the order finally disposing of the information laid by him and that was also the view of the High Court. But according to learned counsel the petitioner's case was supported by a Notification issued by the first respondent on 21-11-1972,and specially by paragraph 2 of this Notification. Learned counsel's reliance on this Notification is misconceived for more reasons than ore. In the first place, on the assumption that the third respondent was in breach of paragraph 30 of the Regulation, his land would have been forfeited, but the Notification refers to resumed land and not to forfeited land. Secondly, when we invited learned counsel to explain how the Notification supported the petitioner's case, his reply was that the Notifica--petition prescribed a scheme for the distribution of land which fell under the mischief of paragraph 30 of the Regulation, that this scheme contained various provisions for the distribution of such land, and, at the discretion of the authorities, such land could be given to other small Zamindars of the deh in which such land was situated, therefore, as the petitioner and the third respondent were Zamindars of the same deh, the further submission was that the authorities might have given a part of land in dispute to the petitioner if the second respondent's order had not been set aside. Mr. Muhammad A.I Shaikh could not put the petitioner's case higher, because it is clear from the Notification that the distribution of resumed land is within the discretion of the authorities, and that the authorities are not bound to transfer the resumed land or any part of it to an informant. Accordingly, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the petitioner's case fell under this Notification, did this give him the locus standi to challenge the second respondent's order in a writ petition? This was the very question which was examined in Abida Khatoon's case and answered in the negative.
3. The facts in this case were that the petitioner had given information about the irregular transfer of an evacuee house, but the Settlement Commis--sioner held that there had been no irregularity in the transfer. The petitioner then challenged the Settlement Commissioner's order in a writ petition and prayed that the house should be transferred to her. Thus the facts in this case are very similar to those in the instant case and as the petitioner's Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court if: limine on the ground that she had no locus standi to file a writ petition, who filed a petition for leave in this Court. This petition was also dismissed and in dismissing it, Cor--nelius, C. J., who pronounced the order of the Court observed :- "But the informant has no vested right in the property and certainly would have no right of appeal or revision under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 to have the decision reconsidered or reversed, if it went in favour of the transfer being regular. At the most, should there have been no enquiry or if the proceedings were merely colourable, with no visible effort to investigate the allegation of irregularity, certiorari may perhaps be available to oblige the authorities to act in accordance with the law. Moreover, the Settlement Authorities are not bound in law to transfer the property to the informant, even if the transfer be found to be irregular. The law is expressed in permissive terms the authority may transfer the house in whole or in part, to the informer, in such a case and we entertain no doubt that the decision might take into account other factors besides that of the information proving ,to As these observations are fatal to the petitioner's case, Mr. Muhammad A.I Shaikh attempted to distinguish them on the ground that they related to the claim of an informant under the Settlement Laws. That is correct, but the distinction is not material because the rights of an informant under this Notification cannot possibly be placed higher than that of the petitioner in the case cited, therefore, as rightly held by the learned Judges of the High Court, these observation's" are fatal to the petitioner's case. Accordingly, as he had no locus standi to file a writ petition against the second respondent order, it is not necessary to examine learned counsel's criticism of this order.
4. The petition is without merit and is dismissed.