' This writ petition calls in question the judgment, dated 5-9-1982, of the learned District Judge, Faisalabad, as well as the order, dated 4-7-1981, of the learned Rent Controller, Faisalabad, arising out of an ejectment petition.
2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this petition are that Property No, 469-A, Nazim Abad Colony, Faisalabad, was initially rented out to one, Inayat Ullah, for residential purposes, by one Jafar Ali, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos. 3 to 6, at a monthly rental of Rs, 150.
Subsequently, it is alleged that the said Inayat Ullah was running a privately managed school in the said premises under the name and style of "Noble Voice Girls Primary School." The management of all private schools and colleges was taken over by the Government by virtue of Privately Managed Schools and Colleges (Take Over) Regulation, 1972, known as "Martial Law Regulation No, 118." In consequence, with effect from 1-10-1972, the school was being run in the premises, in dispute, by the petitioner. Some time in May, 1974, the said, Jafar Ali, filed an eviction application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) for the ejectment of Inayat Ullah, his original tenant. The petitioner was not impleaded as party to the proceedings. Jafar Ali died during the pendency of the eviction proceedings. In consequence, respondents Nos. 3 to 6 were brought on record as his legal heirs. The petitioner was also impleaded as party to the ejectment application. The petitioner and Inayat Ullah resisted the eviction application. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:-
(1) Whether the respondents are not defaulters in the payment of rent? O. P. R.
(2) Whether the respondent No, 1 has sublet the property to respondent No, 2? O.P. P.
(3) Whether the disputed house was required by the petitioners in good faith for personal need? O.
P. P.
(4) Relief.
' The learned Rent Controller, in view of the evidence led by the parties, decided Issues Nos. 1 and 3 in favour of respondents Nos. 3 to 6 and Issue No, 2 against them and consequently, passed an eviction order on 4-7-1981 (Annexure A). The appeal filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the learned District Judge, vide his judgment, dated 5-9-1982 (Annexure B). Both the Courts below gave a concurrent finding of fact as to default and bona fide personal need of respondents Nos. 3 to 6.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the proceedings before the learned Rent Controller under section 13 of the Ordinance, were wholly without jurisdiction, in that, in terms of Martial Law Regulation No, 118, the petitioner became the owner of the property by operation of law and, therefore, no eviction application was maintainable against him. The submission is based on the proposition that since, by virtue of Martial Law Regulation, the property of privately managed schools and colleges vested in the Government and, therefore, the original owner stood divested as a result of the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Regulation. The controversy raised in this petition is settled in Deputy Director (Nationalization), Hyderabad v. Syed Zahur-ul-Hassan. Respectfully following the ratio laid down in the precedent case, I hold that the nationalized educational institutions are not exempted from the Ordinance and only its management became vested in the Government. In any event, it is an admitted fact that the management of the Noble Voice Girls Primary School, whose management now vests with the Government in consequence of Martial Law Regulation No, 118, was never the owner of the disputed property. The property, in question, was admittedly owned by the predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos. 3 to 6 and, therefore, after their death, by operation of law, they stepped into the shoes of the original landlord/owner. The main rational behind the Regulation was to improve the management and lot of the teachers employed in the privately managed schools and institutions and to bring them at par with the teachers of the Government managed schools and colleges and in the matter of their scale of pay etc. It is true that in terms of paragraph 8 of the Regulation, no compensation shall be payable to any person because of his being divested under or by virtue of Martial Law Regulation No, 118 of any privately managed college or privately managed school or of any property attached thereto. The provisions of Martial Law Regulation No, 118 being in the-nature of an exception to the general law are to be strictly construed. Such an unjust intention cannot be imputed to the Legislature that while improving the lot of the teachers of the privately managed schools and colleges and the management of the schools, the owners of the property who have no connection whatsoever with the management are deprived of the proprietary rights. I am, therefore, not inclined to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Rent Restriction Ordinance was not applicable in the present case.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the finding as to default was based on misreading of evidence. He has, however, failed to point out any misreading of evidence on record and in any event, the contention in fact relates to appreciation of evidence which cannot be taken into consideration in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Be that as it may, even if it is assumed that finding of the Courts below is based on misreading of evidence, it is proved on record that the premises were required for the bona fide personal need of the respondents/landlord and merely because in the application, the term "bona fide" is specifically not mentioned would not lead to the conclusion that the premises were not required for bona fide need. Furthermore, concurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered with in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Reference may also be made to Muhammad Sharif and others v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc. wherein the Supreme Court1 2 deplored the tendency of filing writ petition in the High Court against final order passed by the appellate authority as it attains finality in terms of section 15 thereof and, therefore, the mere fact that the tribunal has decided the matter rightly or wrongly would not make it a case for interference in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction.
' For the reasons stated above, I find no force in this petition which is hereby dismissed in limine. 1982 CLC 1640 PLD 1981 SC 246