1. SALEEM AKHTAR, J.-The respondent No. 3 was a permanent work--man of the petitioner. On or about 24th October, 1974 respondent No. 3 had brought four strangers in the premises of the petitioner which was termed as a misconduct and, therefore, on 26th October, 1974 the peti--tioner called for his explanation. In the result his services were termina--ted and the order was received by the respondent No. 3 on 12th April, 1975. The respondent No. 3 submitted grievance petition and ultimately filed application under section 25-A of I. R. O. Which was dismissed by the Junior Labour Court . An appeal was filed by respondent No. 3 before the Labour Court which was also dismissed. The respondent No. 3, therefore, filed a writ petition bearing No. 123 of 1976 which was allowed by judgment dated 16th October, 1978 and the impugned orders were set aside, however, it was left open to the petitioner to hold a fresh inquiry into the alleged misconduct of the respondent No. 3. Accordingly fresh inquiry was held and the respondent No. 3 was dismissed on 18th November, 1978. A grievance notice was served on 17th February, 1979 which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 10th December, 1979. The respondent filed-an appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal who by the impugned order allowed the appeal and the case has been .Remanded to the Labour Court for deciding the same on merits.
2. It may be pertinent to point out that the Labour Court had dismissed the appeal of respondent No. 3 on the ground that in view of amendment in I. R. O.
3. Whereby the petitioner has been excluded from the purview and operation of Industrial Relations Ordinance the appeal was not maintain--able. By virtue of amendment in Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 made by Ordinance 21 of 1979 which was promulgated on 5th April, 1979, the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance ceased to apply inter alia to the petitioner. In these circumstances the only question which falls for consideration is whether in view of this amendment the remedy provi--ded to respondent No. 3 continued and could be availed by him. The learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has given his finding in the affirmative.
4. Mr. Kazi, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that after a fresh inquiry the respondent No. 3 was dismissed on 18th November, 1978 and grievance notice was served on 17th February, 1979. According to the learned counsel as 1. R. O. Had been amended on 5th April, 1979, the respondent No. 3 had no right to invoke the provisions of I. R. O. Or Standing Order 12 (3). The learned counsel has referred to PLD 1975 Lah. 841 and 379 and has argued that as jurisdiction of the Court had been taken away, no application or appeal could have been filed by the respondent No. 3. In fact the question for consideration is whether after amendment the respondent No. 3 could file a grievance petition under section 25-A of I. R. O. It may be clarified that the dispute between the parties did not start on 18th November, 1978 as the dates mentioned above indicate that it started on 12th April, 1975 when respondent No. 3 was first dismissed and it was continuation of those proceedings which culmina--ted in the judgment in Constitutional Petition No. 123 of 1976 whereby the petitioner was allowed to hold a fresh inquiry. In this regard the averment of the petitioner in para. 9 seems to be very material which is repro--duced as follows :- "The respondent No. 3 was a workman in the Petitioner Organisation. He was originally dismissed therefrom on an alleged act of serious misconduct on 12th April, 1975. It was on 19th June, 1975 that he sent grievance notice to the employer viz. The petitioner who replied to him on 23rd June, 1975 and consequently it was on that date that cause of action arose in his favour to make application to the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 read with Standing Order 12 (3) of West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, .For reinstatement in service. He actually made such application to Junior Labour Court on 19th August, 1975 Therefore, on petitioner's own showing the cause of action to file an application under section 25-A arose to respondent No. 3 in June, 1975 which is much before the amendment in the I. R. O. Namely 5th April, 1979. In these circumstances it would not be improper to conclude that a right bad accrued to respondent No. 3 before amendment in the 1. R. O. Unless such amendment was made with retrospective effect or has speci--fically deprived the respondent No. 3 of the right vested in him it would be wrong to state that by this amendment the respondent No. 3 was de--prived from filing application under section 25-A and the appeal.
5. Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned counsel has invited our attention to PLD 1971 SC 252, where it was observed that "the right conferred by statute which is awaiting adjudication, as in the present case, is as such a substantive or vested right as title to property or office". A reference is made to Abdul Majeed Ahmed Babani v.
6. IIIrd Sind Labour Court (PLD 1979 Kar.549), where question arose whether by an amendment in a statute a right of appeal could be taken away. Relying on Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (1905 A C 369), it was held that an appeal is only a step in, the proceedings which is not a matter of mere proce4ure but a substantive right which has to be preserved till the rest of the career in litigation and further that the right of appeal becomes vested as soon as an action commences. Such right can only be extinguished if the Legislature expressly' so provides or the condition of extinction can be justified on the doctrine of necessary intendment."
7. The respondent No. 3 had a vested right to file a petition under section 25-A and appeal from the very beginning when the' first grievance notice was served and petition under section 25-A was filed on 19th June, 1975. The intermittent proceedings were in continuation of the same proceedings and, therefore, if the amendment has excluded the petitioner from the operation of I. R. O. It will not amount to destroy the rights of the respon--dent No. 3 which had accrued to him. The amendment is not with retros--pective effect nor does it expressly destroy the vested right accrued before 5th April, 1979. For these reasons by a short order dated 26th May, 1983 the petition was dismissed.