The respondent, who was appointed as Assistant Security Inspector in the appellant mills, with effect from 7-5-1979, was suspended vide order, dated 31-12-1980 and was charge-sheeted on the same day for negligence in connection with loss of electric motor from the premises of the appellant mills, while the proceedings for taking disciplinary action against the respondent were pending, he was transferred to the Fire Fighting Department on or about 1-2-1982. While he was posted in the Fire Fighting Department, his services were terminated on 1 month's notice vide order dated 9-5-1981. Aggrieved by the termination of his service, the respondent filed a grievance petition before the learned VIIth Labour Court . His grievance petition has been allowed by the learned Labour Court which has directed vide its decision, given on 14-11-1981, that he be re-instated in service with full back benefits.
2. I have heard Mr. Nizamuddin Baloch, Advocate, who appeared for the appellant and Mr. Shaikh Amanullah, the learned counsel for the respondent workman. Both the learned counsel agreed that for the purposes of determining whether the Standing Orders are applicable to the respondent and his grievance petition against the termination of his service was maintainable, the nature of the duties in which he was employed to perform in the Fire Fighting Department is to be taken into consideration and not the duties which he required to perform as Sub-Inspector (Security).
Although the respondent in his cross-examination has stated some of the duties which he was required to perform is not clear whether these duties were being performed by him or he was employed to perform these duties while posted in the Fire Fighting Department. There is also lack of evidence on the part of the appellant as to the nature of duties which the-respondent was employed or required to perform while posted in the Fire Fighting Department.
3. Another issue, which merits consideration, but has not been considered by the learned Labour Court is whether the termination of services of the respondent was termination simpliciter and was in accordance, with the provision of clauses (1) and (3) of Standing Order 12 or whether the termination order was in fact a termination for alleged misconduct.
4. Since the determination of the above 2 issues is to be on basis of evidence, and as already pointed out there appears to be wholly insufficient evidence on both the issues, I would set aside the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court and remand the case to it for giving fresh decision after giving an opportunity to both sides to lead evidence on the above issues.