1. ' This second appeal has been- filed against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Poonch, dated 30-11-1980, dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree of the Sub-Judge, Rawalakot, dated 26-4-1978.
2. ' The brief facts giving rise to the filing of the present appeal are that appellant No, or Muhammad Khan brought a declaratory suit in the Court of Sub-Judge, Rawalakot wherein he sought declaration to the effect that he is the owner of the land measuring 4 kanals 6 marlas out of land Bearing Survey No,. 633 situate in village Rawalakot, on account of the same having been purchased from Muhammad Afsar Khan, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 8, through a registered sale-deed dated 8-3-2003 Bk. By way of consequential relief, it was further prayed that the entries in respect of the suit land in the revenue record, in the name of the respondent be cancelled.
3. ' The respondents in their written statements denied the claim of the appellant regarding the purchase of the suit land from their predecessor-in-interest. They also brought a separate suit for possession of the suit land against the appellant and pro forma-respondents alleging the same to have fallen to their share by private partition and Muhammad Hanif, respondent No,. 11, being in its possession as their tenant-at-will. Both the suits were consolidated by the trial Court and after framing necessary issues arising out, of the pleadings of the parties and recording evidence thereon produced by them, dismissed the declaratory suit of the appellant but decreed the one filed by respondents 1 to 8 for possession of the suit land, vide its consolidated judgment and decree dated 26-4-1978. The appellant preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial 'Court before the Additional District Judge, Poonch but the same was dismissed vide his judgment and decree dated 30-11-1980 and hence this second appeal.
4. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record of the case.
5. ' Before entering into discussion on the . Merits of the case, I am of the opinion that this appeal is liable to be dismissed on a legal ground. The trial Court by its consolidated judgment had decided two suits ; one filed by appellant against the respondents for declaration to the effect that be is the owner of the suit land and the other by respondents 1 to 8 against the appellant and pro forma- respondents, for possession of the suit land and the two decrees were passed in the said suits. The appellant had appealed only against the decree passed, in one of the abovementioned suits whereas under section 96, C. P. C. He was required to file appeals against each of the said decrees.
6. The appeal preferred by the appellant before the Additional District Judge was not competent because the decree passed in the other suit, against him, operated as a res judicata. No, relief could be granted to the appellant in an appeal filed by him before the Additional District Judge unless the decree in the other suit was also appealed against by him as each decree should have been separately appealed against and one appeal did not lie against two decrees passed in different suits based on different causes of action, instituted by parties to this appeal against each other. In this view of the matter, the first appellate Court ought to have dismissed the appeal of the appellant and consequently, the present appeal is also not competent on this score alone.
7. ' Apart from the above legal flaw found in the present appeal, it is, in my opinion, also liable to be dismissed on merits as well. The only point which fell for determination in the suits instituted by the parties against each other, was as to whether or not the suit land was sold to the appellant by Muhammad Afsar Khan deceased whose legal representatives are respondents 1 to 8. The case of the plaintiff appellant was that Muhammad Amir Khan had executed a sale deed of the suit land in his favour on 8.3-2003 Bk. Which was also registered by the Sub-Registrar, Rawalakot. It was further his case that the said sale-deed having been registered' by Sub-Registrar, was sent to Poonch for countersignature but the same was not received back for delivery to him till the launching of Jammu & Kashmir War of Liberation, with the result that the mutation of the suit land on its basis could not be got sanctioned in the revenue record in his name. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove the execution of the sale-deed of the suit land in his favour and that in any case, there was no proof of its registration and the document having been countersigned by the competent authority. The learned counsel for the appellant had contended that from the entries in the deed-writer register and in the despatch register of the Court, the copies of which are Exh. P. A. And P. B. Respectively, it is fully proved that the then owner of the suit land had executed its sale-deed in favour of the appellant and had also got it registered by the Sub:-Registrar, Rawalakot but both the Courts below have wrongly held the appellant to have failed to prove the purchase of the suit land from its owner. On the other hand, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that whether or not the suit land had been sold by Muhammad Afsar Khan to the appellant, was a question of fact which having been found in negative, cannot be re-opened in second appeal and no second appeal lies on this finding of fact before this Court. It is further argued that the entries of the documents, the copies of which are Exh. P. A. & P. B. Are forged and have been manipulated by the appellant on the basis of which the claim of the plaintiff-appellant regarding the suit land having been purchased by him, cannot be held to have been proved.
8. After giving my due consideration to the arguments addressed at the bar and taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal on a question on which the decision of the present case rests because it is a question of fact which cannot be agitated in a second appeal unless it is shown that the finding arrived at by the Courts below is vitiated by misreading or misrepresentation of evidence on record or that it is founded on no evidence at all. Section 100, C. P. C. Which confers right of second appeal is very much clear on this point under which this Court is competent only to entertain an appeal on the ground of error of law or substantial procedural defects which have affected the decision of the case on merits. In this case, the decision has, been made on a finding of fact which, in my opinion, is neither based on no evidence nor is the result of misreading or non- reading of evidence brought on the record by the parties. Both the Courts below have thoroughly discussed the evidence led by the parties on the pivotal issue involved in the suits, filed by the parties against each other and given sound and cogent reasons for not relying upon the evidence produced by the appellant in support of his plea regarding the suit land having been transferred to him by its owner through a registered sale deed. I myself have gone into the evidence on the record regarding the execution of the sale-deed of the suit land in the name of the appellant and its subsequent registration by the Sub-Registrar but the same was not found reliable and convincing, in the circumstances of the case. There is every possibility of the entries in the register of deed-writer and in the despatch register pressed into service by the appellant to show that the sale-deed of the suit land had been executed in his favour and the same was also got registered in the Registration Office at Rawalakot being fake and manipulated by the appellant to derive benefit out of them. It is not known as to by whom and when the deed writer register was deposited in the record-room as the record-keeper who produced this register before the trial Court was unable to state anything in this respect. Similarly, from the entries of document Exh. P. B. Which is certified copy of the despatch register, it appears that the said register was found in some office and was later on deposited in the Court. The entries contained in such documents as mentioned above become highly unreliable and undependable particularly when it is common knowledge that during the Jammu & Kashmir War of Liberation most of the record of the Courts and offices at Rawalakot was either destroyed or misplaced and that the fake and forged documents were created by the interested parties with a view to deriving benefit out of them. Even if for the _sake of argument the entries in the aforesaid documents are considered to be genuine and reliable and, admissible in evidence, still they do not go to prove that the interest or title of the appellant was created in the suit land. There is no dispute about the legal position that the sale-deed in question was compulsorily to be registered and that its registration could be only complete and lawful making it effective and operative if the same was countersigned by the competent authority. It is the case of the appellant himself that the sale-deed of the suit land after having been registered by the Sub-Registrar, was remitted to Registrar, Poonch for his countersignature but the same was not received back in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Rawalakot till the commencement of Jammu & Kashmir War of Liberation. So, the suit land could stand transferred in the name of the appellant only when its sale deed alleged to have been, executed and registered by the Sub-Registrar, had been countersigned by the competent authority and not by merely its execution by the executants and registration by the Sub-Registrar. There is not an iota of evidence on the record which may even suggest that the sale-deed was ever countersigned by the competent authority and this being the state of evidence, it cannot be held that the registration of the sale-deed was complete so as to have created or transferred the interest in the suit land in favour of the appellant and made him its owner. The sale-deed under consideration would have been considered to aver been registered and become effective and operative if the same had been countersigned by the authority competent to do so and before that it could not be held to have been registered as required under the then prevalent law and extinguished the right of Muhammad Afsar Khan deceased the suit land. It needs hardly any mention that a document which is subject to fulfilment of certain legal formalities does not create any legal right title unless those formalities are completed and nothing further remains be done. Since in this case there is a complete lack of evidence regarding the sale-deed of the suit land having been countersigned by the competent authority after its registration by the Sub-Registrar. the ownership of the suit and did not stand transferred to the appellant and the respondents are its awful owners after the demise of Muhammad Afsar Khan, ' There is also a substantial evidence existing in the shape of entries in the revenue record regarding the suit land which belie the claim of the appellant that he had purchased the suit land before the War of Liberation. Had he purchased the suit land in 2003 Bk. There was no reason why in the revenue record he had not been shown in possession of the same but according to the said entries, Muhammad Hanif, respondent is shown to be holding the suit land on behalf of Muhammad Afsar Khan whose legal heirs are respondents 1 to 8. Similarly, had the suit land been transferred to the appellant in the year 2003 Bk. As alleged by him, then in the ordinary circumstances, the sale-deed would have been received back by the Registration office at Rawalakot after its countersignature from the competent authority to whom it was sent for the said purpose as more than one year had elapsed between its execution and start of War of Liberation.
9. ' For the foregoing reasons, I find no substance in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs.