' SHER ZAMAN CHAUDHRY, J.-This appeal by leave filed by Niaz Muhammad and Sain is directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 24-2-1981, whereby their appeal against the order of their conviction and sentence under section 4/5, Islamic Penal Laws Act of 1974, passed by the District. Criminal Court, Muzaffarabad, was dismissed.
2. The circumstances giving rise to the controversy are ; that on the morning of 19th November, 1977, at about 6-30 a.m., Sher Muhammad complainant had gone to the shop of Mir Muhammad situated in village Haryala but found it closed. Present there in verandah of the shop were Muhammad son of Faqir Muhammad, Niaz Muhammad son of Soofi and Wali Muhammad son of Sittar Muhammad. He was told that his brother Mir Muhammad had gone to a nearby spring for a wash. After a while he saw his two brothers namely Mahboob-ur-Rehman and Mir Muhammad coming back. On their way back home while passing from near the house of Raj Muhammad they were attacked by the appellants along-with 4 other co-accused already acquitted. The appellants were armed with '12 bore guns while others had hatchet and sticks. Niaz Muhammad appellant took a shot at Mir Muhammad while Mahboob-ur-Rehman was fired upon by Sain appellant. Both were hit and had fallen down. The complainant witnessed the shooting and saw his brothers falling down. He rushed to the place so did others i,e, Wali Muhammad, Niaz Muhammad, Wali Muhammad son of Sittar Muhammad and then Maulvi Noor-ul-Hasan also reached on the spot. By the time they reached the place Mahboob-urRehman was already dead but Mir Muhammad was still alive. He narrated the incident to Maulvi Noor-ul-Hassan who recorded his statement which is Exh. P. F. On the record. After a while he also died.
3. The complainant Sher Muhammad in order to report the occurrence to the police left the place for Ghari Dopatta. While on his way to police station he met S. H.
0. In village Dopatta who had come there in connection with investigation of some case. The incident was reported to him who after recording the statement at about 10-30 a.m., sent it through a Constable to the Police Station, Ghari Dopatta. The F. I. R. At police station was registered at 11-30 a.m.
4. The motive claimed by the prosecution was that one Mst. Marian got a case registered against Raj Muhammad (her former husband who had since divorced her) his sons and some female members of his family. This lady, as claimed by the prosecution, had a considerable property inherited by her from her late husband Kaloo. She then married this Raj Muhammad who tried to deprive her of that property. After having been divorced by Raj Muhammad she was helped and looked after by Mir Muhammad deceased.
5. After investigation a challan was submitted in the District Criminal Court, Muzaffarabad. The appellants alongwith for others were tried for offences under section 4/5, Act Islami and under sections 302, 147, 148 and 149, A. P. C. The learned Dstrict Criminal Court vide its judgment dated 19- 6-1979, convicted the appellants under section 4/5, Act Islami and awarded the sentence of 'Qisas'.
The other co-accused were however, acquitted. On appeal before the High Court the conviction was set aside and the case was remanded back to the District Criminal Court for conducting the purgation of the prosecution witnesses. After complying with the direction issued by the High Court, the learned District Criminal Court again convicted the appellants under section 4/5 of Act Islami with the sentence of Qisas vide its judgment dated 19-6-1979. Their appeal in the High Court failed and the sentence passed by the District Criminal Court was confirmed vide High Court's judgment dated 24-2-1981.
6. It is this judgment of the High Court, for the reversal of which, the appellants sought leave to appeal which was allowed by this Court vide its order dated 9-6-1981. From among various grounds listed in the petition, leave, however, was granted for the consideration of the following points :-
(a) as to whether the occular witnesses of the occurrence namely Sher Muhammad and Wali Muhammad (real brothers of the deceased) could be believed without independent corroboration which was lacking in the present case and the High Court failed to insist upon for such corroboration?
(b) as to whether the F. I. R. In view of the statements of the S. H.
0. And eye-witnesses is proved to have been prepared after making preliminary investigation at spot and as such it was inadmissible in evidence. Has this aspect of the case not been determined objectively by the High Court? And
(c) as to whether the prosecution case stands contradicted by the medical evidence and as to what would be the position in view of the distance of 50 to 60 feet between the victim and the place of firing as entered in the site plan, and the distance of 20 to 25 feet as shown in the post- mortem and how would this contradiction affect the case?
7. On the first point formulated above Mr. Manzoor-ul-Hassan Gillani the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that from among the prosecution witnesses only Sher Muhammad and Wali Muhammad are the eye-witnesses of occurrence. Both happened to be the real brothers of the deceased. Besides, Sher Muhammad is the person who lodged the report and this fact makes an incompetent witness under the Islamic Penal Laws Act, 1974. In view of the above it was contended that the judgments of the trial Court as well as that of the High Court, stand vitiated for the reason that since Sher Muhammad being a complainant was incompetent witness under Islamic Law and thus only the evidence of eye-witness i,e, Wali Muhammad is left, the number obviously falls short of as required under section 26 of the Islamic Penal Laws Enforcement Act, 1974, and conviction thus recorded being illegal is to be discharged. Both the Courts below failed to appreciate this aspect of the case. There being no 'nisab the learned Court and the District Criminal Court misdirected themselves by awarding the sentence of Qisas. The judgment under appeal is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
8. The impugned judgment, according to the learned counsel, suffered from another inherent defect. Eye-witnesses being the real brothers of the murdered men were heirs of the deceased and thus incompetent witnesses to depose against the appellants. Reference was made to verse 11 of fourth Sura of Holy Qur'an. In the estimation of the learned counsel since the evidence of these P.
Ws. Could not be legally used against the appellants the finding of both the Courts below being bad in law is liable to be set aside.
9. While replying to the points raised on behalf of the appellants, Raja Muhammad Akram Khan, the learned Advocate-General argued that the complainant or the complaint in a criminal case could not possibly be equated with the plaintiff or %.5."-o.{{URDU TEXT}} or plaint {{URDU TEXT}}`614..)' as visualized under Islamic Law. Besides, section 26 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act, it was submitted by the learned Advocate-General; has been misconstrued and misunderstood by the learned counsel for the appellants. With regard to the second part of objection, it was contended that the brothers in presence of parents are excluded from the list of heirs. In the present case it was submitted that the deceased were survived by their father and naturally the brothers of the deceased were not entitled to inherit anything. In this view of the matter, it was contended that the submission on the point made on behalf of the appellants having no substance merit no consideration.
10. On the first point of objection listed above made on behalf of the appellants it may be stated here that Islamic Law in its entirety has not yet been enforced though much we would wish it to be so enforced. There is also no denying the fact that edifice of a true Islamic society could only built by allowing every aspect of or life governing and regulated b laws and principle of Shariat, but till that happens the Courts of law are to apply the law which is in force and decide the cases accordingly. So there fore, Islamic Laws at the present are applicable so far as these have been expressly provided for under the terms of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Islam' Penal Laws Enforcement Act, 1974. Neither the complainant nor the complaint has been defined under the Act. The trial for offences under the Act are still conducted and regulated, with exception of few amendments, by rules of procedure as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure and rules of evidence under the Evidence Act. Section 26 of Islamic Act is an illustration of a departure from rules as contained in the evidence. But on careful examination it becomes clear that the departure is only to a limited extent and only in respect of the number of witnesses required for in a case of 'Hudood' and 'Qisas'.
The number has been fixed under section 22 as to be two male Muslim witnesses. The term complaint or the complainant could, therefore, only be considered as visualized under the provision of Cr. P. C.
11. The proposition may be viewed from yet another angle. For the proper determination of the point involved the (distinction between '"-40{{URDU TEXT}} visualized under Shariat Law and the complainant as used in the Cr. P. C. Must clearly be understood and maintained because the failure to do so would lead to an erroneous conclusion. The term{{URDU TEXT}} 'Lsg..1-#' connotes something more than a person who is merely an informant of a happening. It means a person who in persuance of his right residing in him lays a claim. Whereas a complainant under the provisions of Cr. P. C. May just be a reporter of a commission of offence either witnessed by him or which might have otherwise come to his knowledge. So the complainant under the Cr. P. C. May not necessarily be a 'Lla-1,4'{{URDU TEXT}} as well. The difference is obvious. So, therefore, in order to declare a person as incompetent witness it must first be established that he had some legal right or interest vested in him e.g. The father, the son, the husband or the wife of a murdered person.
Here in the present case the first informant is also an eye-winesses of the occurrence. He is not an heir of the murdered person. It is in evidence that Sittar Muhammad the father of, the deceased was alive. It would, therefore, be wholly wrong to discard the evidence of an otherwise competent witness simply because he reported the occurrence witnessed by him. So, therefore, he could not be regarded as{{URDU TEXT}}! V--1-` as visualized under the Shariat Law.
12. Adverting to the second part of the objection we have given or rest consideration to the point.
The argument that eye-witnesses being he real brothers of Mir Muhammad and Mahboob-ur- Rehman were incompeent witnesses and their evidence could not be used against the appellant, is without any substance. The verse referred to by the learned counsel from the only Qur'an has been misunderstood and misconstrued by him. For the better appreciation of the point involved the relevant verse of the Holy Qur'an reproduced. It reads :- "Allah (thus) directs you as regards your children's (Inheritance) : to the male, A portion equal to that of two females. If only daughters, two or more, their share is two-thirds of the inheritance. If only one, her share is a half. For parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each, if the deceased left children ; if no children and the parents are the only heirs, the mother gets the third. If the deceased left brothers or sisters the mother has a sixth. (The distribution in all cases is) after the payment of legacies and debts. Ye know not whether your parents or your children are nearest to you in benefit. These are the settled portion ordained."
' From the plain reading of this Holy Verse it becomes clear that the only even tuality in which the brothers or sisters are entitled to inherit is where the deceased is not survived by his father or his children. According to Verse brothers or sisters are entitled only if from among the parents only the mother is alive. The presence of father would totally exclude the brothers or sisters. In the present case it is in the evidence that Sitter Muhammad the father of the murdered persons was very much alive ; so under the circumstance brothers could not be regarded as legal heirs of the deceased.
Hence the submission that eye-witnesses being brothers of the slain were not competent witnesses has no force. The judgments of both the Courts below, therefore, suffer from no such defect as has been claimed on behalf of the appellants.
13. It was also argued on behalf of the appellant that 4 eye-witnesses of the occurrence were shown in the calendar of the witnesses. The prosecution, however, in order to suppress the truth gave up two of them namely Wall Muhammad son of Faqir Muhammad and 'Niaz Muhammad son of Soofi. Holding back the independent witnesses and producing only the close relatives of the deceased who were partisan, is a fact sufficient enough to cast serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case. We on principle are quite in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant that where apart from highly interested and inimical witnesses, others who were nonpartisan and independent were also available but kept back and given up by the prosecution without any sufficient cause, would in some appropriate cases cast a serious doubt on the truthfulness of the prosecution story.
14. The position in the present case is however different. We have carefully gone through the evidence on record. The witnesses given up the prosecution were also very closed relatives of the deceased. So, if there are number of witnesses on a point the prosecution is not obliged to produce all of them and the non-production of some would not necessarily in the absence of anything else give rise to adverse inference against the prosecution.
15. The question next to be attended to is as to whether the evidence of P. Ws, Sher Muhammad and Walt Muhammad needs corroboration. ANA from challenging the competency as witnesses and their being related to the deceased nothing much was said about the quality of evidence deposed by these P. Ws. It has been submitted that the relations between the accused party and the complainant party were strained on account of help and protection extended to Mst. Marian by the deceased. But then on careful consideration of the point it is found that there is nothing in the evidence that the accused party ever did anything against the complainant party which might have created ill-will and enmity in the minds of the complainant party against the accused. So ill- will and enmity was more on the side of accused party rather than on the side of the complainant party. The evidence of P.Ws. Could not be rejected merely on the ground of relationship. Conviction can be based on evidence of even interested witnesses provided of course it otherwise of a convincing quality. It is indeed correct to say that while considering such evidence Court should be on its guard and would conduc the appraisal of the evidence with utmost care and caution. If on careful appraisal it is found of a quality on which safe reliance could be placed, it will not then be necessary to look for the further confirmatory evidence. Corroboration as observed in Muhammad Sharif v. The State is not to be insisted upon as a rule of law. In each case the evidence of a witness has to be evaluated on merits and if it rings true in the context and circumstances of case free from any fault and uncontradieted by any cogent circumstances emerging from case it must be relied upon as the basis for conviction without corroboration.
16. On careful examination the evidence of these P. Ws. Is convincing on material particular of the case. Besides if witnesses found competent under Shariat Law and then discarding their evidence on account of their being related to the deceased, would in fact amount to disregarding the qualification and capacity of a witness otherwise approved by Shariat Law. If we do so we may be guilty of violating the provisions of Shariat Law.
17. Now let us examine as to what corroboration exactly means. Broadly speaking the corroboration means a sort of confirmation of concluiscions about existence of certain fact. It is in the nature of reassurance arriving at a certain conclusion. In Mehtab Khan v. State at page 32 of the judgment, Mr. Muhammad Aslam Khan, J. Speaking for the Court observed as: "Corroboration does not necessarily mean the evidence of an independent witness but anything in the circumstances which tends to satisfy the Court that each interested witness has spoken the truth."
' In Muhammad Sharif v. State, Mr. Justice Raja Muhammad Khurshid Khan (now the Chief Justice) speaking for the Court observed :- "Corroboration of the statement of interested witnesses does not mean that the statement of the witnesses is false or untrue. What it really means is that to accept it as wholly true it is desirable that it should have a confirmatory support. In fact, when it is said the statement of witnesses needs corroboration to support it, this finding proceeds on the basis that version of P. Ws. Is prima fade correct but by way of precaution it needs corroboration to attain clarity."
' It is thus, manifest that corroboration is insisted upon only to satisfy the mind of the Court that the witnesses in the circumstances of the case' are speaking truth. What facts and circumstances are sufficient to satisfy the mind of the Court about the truthful nature or otherwise of the testimony of an occular interested witness, is a question which varies from case to case and no hard and fast rule can be formulated on the point."
18. In the present case no infirmity or inherent defect except for the point of relationship and incompetency as a witness under Shariat Law I which has already been dealt with at considerable length, has been point out. In fact evidence on material particulars rings true.
19. After having examined as to what corroboration really means we now will proceed to determine as to whether there exist any corroborative evidence in the case in hand. The prosecution's case is that Mahboobur-Rehman after having been shot, had died immediately. Mir Muhammad however, after having been injured stayed alive for some time. The P. Ws. Immediately after the shooting arrived at the place where the injured person were lying. Maulvi Noor-ul-Hassan P. W. 3 had 'also arrived at the place of occurrence. The place of occurrence is about 50 to 60 feet away from the house of the appellant Niaz Muhammad and some other acquitted co-accused. It is a daylight occurrence. It is in the evidence that Muhammad Nazir P. W. 5 a Dispenser living a mile or so away from the place, of occurrence was called in but Mir Muhammad had died by the time the witness1 2 arrived. The fact of the Dispenser having been called and his arrival has not been seriously challenged by the defence. So therefore, through the evidence of this witness it can be taken that Mir Muhammad stayed alive for some time. This in turn lends support to the recording of dying declaration as well as to the evidence of eye-witnesses on the point of Mir Muhammad staying alive for some time.
20. The interval between the death and injury shown in the post-mortem report and proved by the Doctor is between 30 and 70 minutes. P. W. Nazir Dispenser is not shown to be connected with either party in any way. There is nothing in the evidence which could reflect on the integrity or impartiality of this witness. His evidence could be regarded as a corroborative piece of evidence.
Besides, the medical evidence too is an important corroborative evidence at least on the point of nature of injuries, the weapon used, the distance at which the victim were hit, the time that lapsed between injury and death, having an important bearing on the point of capability of Mir Muhammad deceased to make a statement which he is alleged to have made after he was injured. So therefore, it could not be said that there was no corroboration in the present case.
21. On the point of recovery it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the recovery witnesses were not the person of locality but belonging to different villages as such these are useless and could not be used be against the appellants. Replying on the point the learned Advocate-General contended that since the crime empties recovered at the instance of the accused and the gun, weapon of offence, according to the ballistic expert report form a corroborative piece of evidence in the case as because per report the empties were found to have been fired from guns belonging to the appellants, the evidence of recovery was therefore, a strong corroborative evidence.
22. After giving or careful thought to the proposition we are of the view that strict compliance with the requirement of section 103, Cr. P. C. N could not always be insisted upon. Each case has to be examined in the light of its own facts and circumstances. The place of occurrence in the present case is a mountainous area, with scattered population. Few houses are built on different hill-tops.
The concept of compact population like villages in Punjab would not be relevant in this part of Azad Kashmir. It is in evidence of P. Ws. Wali Muhammad and Noor-ul-Hassan that people0 of area had gone to their residences on the mountain top. There is nothing in the evidence to the effect that some other were people present on the scene or that they were available. So in these circumstances if the witnesses of recoveries were not from the neighbourhood it would not render the recoveries invalid.
23. There is however another aspect which we feel has not been attended to properly by the Courts below. The crime empties in the case were not recovered from the place of occurrence. The recovery of empties alleged to have been made at the instance of Niaz Muhammad appellant was effected on 22nd November, 1977, from inside his house and empties connecting Sian appellant with the occurrence was made on 3-12-1977. Both the empties were recovered, as claimed by the prosecution, from inside the house of the appellant. The occurrence took place on the morning of 19th November, 1977. It is hard to believe that the appellant, despite the time at their disposal, kept empties safe for such a long time for the purpose of recovery. It would not therefore, be safe under the circumstances to place reliance on these recoveries. So as a rule of abundant caution we rule these recoveries out of consideration.
24. The conviction however, can well be sustained on other evidence despite the recoveries being defective or there being no recovery at all provided of course the evidence is sufficiently convincing, truthful and confidence inspiring. If it is of a quality which rings true it could be made basis for conviction.
25. Adverting to the next point the learned counsel for the appellants argued that the F. I. R., in view of the evidence, is proved to have been prepared by S. H. O. After conducting a preliminary investigation at the spot. As such he submitted there remains no legal F. I. R., and conviction based on the consideration of so-called F. L R. Is therefore, liable to be set aside. It was argued that the F. I.
R. If not recorded at Police Station would give rise to unavoidable inference that it was recorded at the place of occurrence after conducting the preliminary investigation. In support of his argument the learned counsel referred to Muhammad Siddique v. The State . Controverting the submission the learned Advocate-General argued that there is nothing in the evidence which would warrant such an inference as claimed by the learned counsel for the appellants.
26. Before going into the merits of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties we would like to state that each case is to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances. The inferen that F. I. R. If not recorded at police station be always deemed to hay been prepared after conducting the preliminary investigation on the spot could not be accepted as a principle to the applied in each case regardles to the fact of that case. To hold it so would not be in keeping with th principle of safe administration of justice. To accept it as a rule of universa application would neither be just nor logical.
27. The facts of the case titled Muhammad Siddique .v. The State referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants were of a totally' different nature than those in the present case. Any law enunciated in the light of particular facts could not be said to be of general application in respect of other case irrespective of the peculiar facts of each case.
28. For the proper appreciation of the point involved the facts of the case referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants were that village Moin Kot the venue of murder, belonged to two brothers namely Muhammad Moin and Ghulam Moin. They were big landlords and owned many other villages. They lived in a village, few miles away from Moin Kot. Muhammad Siddique appellant and Mst. Rajjan daughter of Sadoo, former their employee and the latter the daughter of their tenant lived in that village. From the perusal of the report of that case it appears that Mst. Rajjan was something of a paragon. She was murdered by Muhammad Siddique. The occurrence was claimed to have been reported by Sadoo on the direction of his landlord Ghulam Moin to a Police Officer who happened to have been present in a nearby village.
' According to the F. I. R. Sadoo was directed by Ghulam Moin to go to that village where the S. H.
0. Had arrived. On evidence it was found that Muhammad Siddique and Mst. Rajjan had developed love affairs. The prosecution story was that the father of Mst. Rajjan had asked Siddique that he should refrain from visiting their house on which the appellant got annoyed and killed Mst. Rajjan in a field near the village. After the woman was shot and killed Ghulam Moin the landlord arrived on the scene. He was told about the occurrence and himself saw the killer standing on the scene of murder and was threatened by him.
' The accused made a confession but stated that the story told by P. W. Was a farbrication, stating his version of the occurrence he said that he had secretly married Mg. Rajjan. On the day of occurrence he went to the fields and saw the deceased and P. W. Ghulam Moin his landlord in a compromising position. He lost control of himself and shot Rajjan. All the P. Ws. Were tenants of Ghulam Moin. They in order to protect the reputation of their landlord, concocted a false story. The F. I. R. According to him was prepared at a much later stage when the police had already conducted the preliminary investigation.
' During the trial however, it was found that no report was made through Sadoo to S. H. O. About the occurrence in any nearby village. In fact it was established that occurrence happened in a manner described by the accused-appellant. It would thus appear that the principle enunciated in the light of the peculiar facts of that case was perfectly justified.
29. Each case is to be considered in the light of its own peculiar circumstances and the principle enunciated in one case may not be applicable! To another case having totally different circumstances.3
30. In the present case the facts are totally different. The P. W. Sher Muhammad, the first informant was on his way to police station, On reaching Dopatta he learnt that S. H.
0. Was there in the village. His statement Exh. P. A. Was recorded there and then sent to the police station on the basis of which the case was registered. This witness appeared before the Court and made the statement. He was cross-examined at a considerable length. Not a single question was put to him suggesting to him that he never went to the police station or he never made any statement to the S. H.
0. While he was on way to police station or that the S. H.
0. Recorded his statement not in village Dopatta but at the place of occurrence after he had conducted the preliminary investigation, nor is there anything in the evidence which could support that inference. So there is no basis for such an inference that the F. I. IL was prepared as it is claimed by the defence to have been made. Besides, we are of the view that judicial decision specially in criminal matters generally apply to the facts on which those are given an it could not be said that such law attains authenticity for every case of that nature. It cannot be accepted as a principle of universal application to the applied indiscriminately. The submission on the point having no substan is therefore, rejected. Besides merely the case would not be thrown on because the F. I. R. Has been recorded after preliminary investigation if it stands otherwise proved. On the point we reiterate or view in case Muhammad Hang' v. The State .
31. Lastly it was argued that in view of conflict between the medical evidence and other occular evidence on the point of distance between the victim and place from where they were fired upon the prosecution's case had become doubtful especially when from medical evidence the possibility of making dying declaration is also clearly excluded.
32. We have given or earnest thought to the point raised and have with the help of the learned counsel of the appellants and the learned Advocate-General carefully gone through the relevant evidence. In order to determine as to whether Mir Muhammad was capable of making the statement it is necessary to examine the post-mortem report and the evidence of the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem on the point. According to the post-mortem report carotid artery of Mir Muhammad at the level of right mendible was damaged. The time that lapsed between the injury and the death entered in the report was between 30 to 70 minutes. On cross-examination the Doctor stated that after receiving the injury the deceased stayed alive approximately from 30 to 40 minutes. He further stated that Mir Muhammad was capable of talking. There is nothing in the evidence of this witness from which it could be inferred that a carotid artery if damaged at mendible level, a point where the artery is further sub-divided and not base level, the whole functional system will collapse, instantaneously and the victim would go unconscious. As the Doctor had stated that the deceased could talk and the approximate time he stayed alive, has also been stated there exists nothing on the record to hold otherwise. P. W. 3 Maulvi Noor-ul- Hassan a Imam of Local Mosque and a religious man not connected with any party was the scribe of dying declaration. There appears no valid reason and no such infirmity in the evidence which could corroborate the discarding of the evidence of P. W. 3 or the dying declaration.
33. On the point of distance between the place of firing and where the deceased were hit according to the site plan was 50 to 60 feet. A cartridge, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants, containing the small pellets when fired would only be effective up to a distance of 20 to 30 feet. He contended that in this view of the matter, it can safely be taken that. P. Ws.
Never witnessed the occurrence otherwise they could not have been mistaken on the point of distance.
34. We have considered the evidence of P. W. Sher Muhammad and wali Muhammad. They claimed to have witnessed the, occurrence from the distance of 50 to 60 yards. Wall Muhammad stated before the Court that the appellants fired at the deceased from a distance of about 10 to 154 yards. Sher Muhammad was never asked about the distance P. Ws. Being villagers could not be expected to be very precise in terms of feet and yards while describing the distance. Besides, they should have specifically been' asked to explain the so-called inconsistency if any existed. Moreover, the site plan could hardly be regarded as substantive piece of evidence. There fore, no adverse inference under the circumstances could be drawn against the prosecution on this count.
In the ultimate analysis we are of the view that the impugned judgment is well-considered and well reasoned. The appeal being without any substance is, therefore, rejected. PLD 1978 SC(AJ&K)146 PLD1979 SC(AJ&K)23 PLD 1958 Lab. 601 1983 P Cr. L 225