NAZIR AHMAD BHATTI, J.-This Writ Petition, filed by Muhammad Yamin, under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 calls into question the judgment/order, dated 22nd November, 1982 of the Sessions Judge, Dera Ismail Khan respondent No. 1, whereby, he by accepting the revision petition of Dilbar Hussain Shah, respondent No. 3, set aside the order, dated 27th May, 1982 of E.A.C. Illaqa Magistrate, Paharpur, Dera Ismail Khan, respondent No. 2, passed under section 145, Cr. P. C. In respect of the suit land.
2. The facts, as, briefly, stated in the writ petition, are that the petitioner, Muhammad Yamin is owner of land measuring 416 Kanals 4 Marlas situate in Mauza Bochari, Dera Ismail Khan, vide decree, dated 25th June, 1976 of Senior Civil Judge, Dera Ismail Khan. The petitioner is also in possession of some other landed property as attorney of Syed Ahmad Jamal-ud-Din, who is owner of the said other property. This entire property was formerly an evacuee property. Dilbar Hussain Shah, respondent No. 3 was in illegal possession of the same and in order to misappropriate the same, started litigation against the petitioner in respect of the entire property measuring about 1,100 Kanals but his claim was dismissed by all the Courts including the Supreme Court. After the rejection of his claim by all the Courts, respondent No. 3 effected a settle--ment with the petitioner and Syed Ahmad Jamal-ud-Din in respect of the entire land in his possession and received an amount of Rs. 20,000 as compensation for handing over the possession and thereafter from 1976 onwards the petitioner was put in possession as owner of an area measur--ing 416 Kanals 4 Marlas and as attorney of Syed Ahmad Jamal-ud-Din in respect of the remaining area. On 24th May, 1981, Dilbar Hussain Shah lodged an F. I. R. No. 79 at Police Station Paharpur alleging therein that he had been forcibly dispossessed from the landed property in his posses--sion as tenant. The Superintendent of Police, Dera Ismail Khan, made an order, on 8th June, 1981, on the basis of the said F.
1. R., against the petitioner, his attorney and Muhammad Ali Khan alias Papoo Khan Kundi to forthwith vacate possession of the suit property and to hand over the same to Dilbar Hussain Shah.
The petitioner challenged this order of the Superintendent of Police in Writ Petition No. 15/D of 1981 in the High Court, Circuit Bench, Dera Isma il Khan and the former was compelled to withdraw the said notice on 5th July, 1981. Notwithstanding the with--drawal of the notice by the Superintendent of Police, Dera Ismail Khan, the local police submitted a report to E. A. C., Paharpur, respondent No. 2, to the effect that a dispute was likely to arise between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 over the suit property. The latter, on receipt of the said police report, passed an order on 27th May, 1982 under subsection (1). Of section 145, Cr. P. C. Attaching the entire suit property and asking the parties to put in their written statement and produce other evidence in respect of the actual possession. Although the petitioner was in possession of the suit property, but he was dispossessed in pursuance to the aforesaid order of respondent No. 2. Instead of filing the written statement and producing evidence in respect of the alleged possession, the respondent No, 3 filed an incompetent revision petition on 12th September, 1982 before the Sessions Judge, Dera Ismail Khan, against the said order of respondent No. 2. The learned Sessions Judge, respondent No. 1, without realizing that the revision petition did not lie to challenge the order, dated 27th May, 1982 of respondent No. 2. Accepted the same vide his order dated 22nd November, 1982 and ordered restoration of possession of the suit property to respondent No. 3. The petitioner has challenged the said order of the learned Sessions Judge, Dera Ismail Khan, on the grounds ; that the revision petition against such an order did not lie, that there was a dispute about possession of the suit land, and, that respondent No. 2 had not recorded any evidence so far.
3. The respondent No, 3 has contested the writ petition and sub--mitted a very lengthly written statement, supplemented by another additional para-wise answer to the grounds taken in the writ petition. The sum and substance of the extraordinarily lengthy written statement of respondent No. 3 is that a civil suit was pending in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Dera Ismail Khan, since 1978 regarding the suit property and a status quo order was in force when the proceedings under section 145, Cr. P. C. Were initiated in connection with the suit land and the petitioner is a party in that suit, that the suit property being a subject --matter in dispute in the civil Court, no order could be passed by a Criminal Court, that the petitioner and his companions were influential persons and bad been invoking powers of Martial Law and police to harass the respondent No. 3 who was admittedly in possession of the suit property.
4. It is admitted that the suit property is subject-matter of a litigation pending in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Dera Ismail Khan, wherein the respondent No. 3 is the plaintiff and he has prayed for a declaration that he is owner in possession. It is also admitted that the respondent No. 3 had made an F. I. R. On 24th May, 1981 against the petitioner alleging that he was being forcibly dispossessed from the suit property. It is also admitted that a status qua order was passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Dera Ismail Khan, on 23rd May, 1981. Presently, none of the parties is in possession of the suit property because the order of learned Sessions Judge was suspended by the Honourable Chief Justice on 28th November, 1382.
5. The points for determination in this writ petition are, firstly whether there was any dispute with regard to the possession of the suit property, secondly : whether the learned Sessions Judge could interfere in revision with the order made by the learned E. A. C., on 27th May, 1982 and, thirdly : what would be the effect of the civil suit which is pending in the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Dera Ismail Khan.
6. We have hard Qazi Muhammad Anwar, counsel for the peti--tioner, and Muhammad Ishaq Khan Kundi, counsel for respondent No. 3, at length for and against the writ petition.
7. In so far as the first point is concerned, the very suit of the respondent No. 3 instituted in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Dera Ismail Khan, in 1978, for a declaration that he is owner in possession of the suit land, shows that his ownership and possession were both chal--lenged by the defendants in that suit, particularly the present petitioner. He then lodged an F. I. R. No. 79, on 24th May, 1981 its Police Static, Paharpur wherein he himself alleged that he was being forcibly dispossessed from the suit land. These circumstances would clearly indicate that a dispute did exist regarding the possession of the suit land between the petitioner and respondent No. 3. Not only that, only police report was sufficient to show that there was a danger of breach of peace regarding possession of the suit property and the Magistrate was, on this report t alone, competent to take cognizance of the matter and pass an order under subsection (1) of section 145, Cr. P. C.
Restraining the parties from, interfering with the disputed land. In support of this conclusion, reference:, with advantage, can be made to Dilbaz Khan v. The State, H. Inouye, Director, M/s. Nichiman Company (Pak.) Ltd., Karachi (PLD 1959 (W. P.) Lab. 264), wherein it was; held that the Magistrate may act (under subsection (1) of section 145, Cr. P. C.) on any information e.g. Police report, without examining, witnesses. In another case Muhammad Ishaque Chowdhury and another v Nur Mahal Begum and others (PLD 1961 SC 426), coming to the notice of the Supreme Court, their Lordships were pleased to observe that Magistrate in hic initial order (under section 145, Cr. P. C., not stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, order not necessarily illegal or without jurisdiction Ye: in another case, Sarghan Shah and others v. Jafar Khan and others (1972 SCMR 562), the Supreme Court was pleased to observe that jurisdiction to make preliminary order under section 145, Cr. P. C. Depends on existence of elements necessary for founding jurisdiction and mere omission to stag grounds upon which Court was satisfied, did not make order without jurisdiction. It shall thus be seen that respondent No. 2 had sufficiency material before him to proceed under section 145, Cr. P. C. And the notice issued by him on 27th May, 1982 restraining the parties from interfering with the property and attaching the same was not without jurisdiction.
8. In so far as the second point is concerned, it may be stated that at the stage when the learned Sessions Judge made the order of restoration of possession to respondent No. 3, no evidence had yet been recorded in proof of possession of any party over the suit land. The exercise is yet to be carried out by the respondent No. 2. It was yet to be determined as which of the party was in actual possession of the suit property when the order under section 145, Cr. P. C. Was made. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge pre-empted the jurisdiction which vested in the Magistrate by entertaining the revision petition of respondent No. 3. Nell doubt, the learned Sessions Judge, could entertain a revision petition and could also interfere with the order of the learned Magistrate provided there was an illegality or material irregularity in the same. At the stage when the revision petition was entertained by the learned Sessions Judge, there was only the notice under subsection (1) of section 145, Cr. P. C. In existence and the same did not appear to be without jurisdiction. As such the learned Sessions Judge had improperly exercised his revisional powers. In this respect, reference may be made to Babu Ram Pandey v. Shymdeo Narayan and others (AIR 1939 Pat. 187), wherein it was held that High Court did not interfere in revision with orders under section 145, Cr. P. C. On the merits as a rule, and Nurul Hasan and another v. Mst. Majidan (AIR 1944 All. 210), wherein it was held that unless the Magistrate had acted with gross irregularity, the High Court would never interfere in revision with an order passed by the Magistrate under section 145 (1), and Ratan and others v. Tika (AIR 1939 Lah. 233), hereinwas held that failure to make order under section 145 (1) or to serve notice on opposite party or to affix copy of order in conspicuous, place near land in dispute or to record finding in final order that flange: of breach of peace exists does not vitiate proceedings under section 14, -f pasties are not prejudiced and Dr. Akhtar Ali v. The State and an--other (PLD 1970 Lah.450), wherein it was held that Magistrate's failure to discuss, in hay. ,order under section 145, in light of contentions put forth by one of the parties per se not sufficient for setting aside an order. It was also held in PLD 1959 (W. P.) Lah. 264 (referred to earlier as well) that the High Court will not lightly set aside in revision the Magistrate's prelimi--nary order (under section 145, Cr. P. C.). We are, therefore, of the con nary opinion that the learned Sessions Judge was in error in assuming revisional jurisdiction in the matter where per se no illegality or irregularity had either existed or was pointed out.
9. In so far as the last point is concerned, it may be stated that it is a settled principle of law that any proceedings under section 145, Cr. P. C, would be subject to any order made by a Civil Court. It was urged by the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that an order of status quo had been issued by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Dera Ismail Khan in this case which operated in favour of respondent No. 3 and the order made by respondent No. 2 under section 145, Cr. P. C. Was un-- called for and without jurisdiction. In this respect, he relied upon Mst. Asaja Sultana v. The State and another (PLD 1971 Lah. 478), Imdad Khan and 7 others v. Syed Muhammad Ilyas and 2 others (1971 SCMR 581) and Mst. Sabira Almas and another v. Gul Baz Khan and 4 others (PLD 1974 Lah. 289). No doubt an order of status quo was made by the said Civil Court on 23rd May, 1981 and extended upon 19th June, 1981, but we have perused the file of that case, which is still pending before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Dera Ismail Khan, and the said order of status quo was discharged on 19th September, 1982. As such there was no stay order of a Civil Court in the field when the present Writ Petition was field on 27th November, 1982. How ever, we are conscious of the fact that ultimately the question which has arisen in the proceedings under section 145, Cr. P. C. Would be subject to any decision of the Civil Court in respect of the suit pro--perty and there can be no cavil about this proposition of law.
10. The upshot of the above discussion is that the order, dated 22nd November. 1982 of the learned Sessions Judge, Dera Ismail Khan, respondent No. 1, is without any legal force. We would, therefore, set ,side the said order and restore the notice `dated 27th May, 1982 ; made by the respondent No. 2, under section 145, Cr. P. C. And would also direct that he should further proceed with the matter according t provision of the said section. However, proceedings before the reason--dent No. 2 shall be subject to any order or judgment made by the Civil Court. We would made no order as to costs.