' This is an appeal against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Thatta, who maintained the order of Rent Controller, Thatta, by his judgment dated 29th September, 1980.
2. The appellant Muhammad YaKub was a tenant of respondent Haji Yar Muhammad in respect of a shop paying Rs, 30 per month as rent. The appellant was running business of foodgrain in the said premises. The respondent filed a rent application alleging therein that the appellant had converted food grain business in a hotel business and that due to the burning of fuel in the shop, it has caused damage to the value and utility of the shop. The respondent further pleaded in his rent application that the suit premises are required by him in good faith for the personal bona fide use for his son who would use the premises for running business. The premises in question were rented out by an oral agreement and that there was no rent deed executed\
3. In the written statement the appellant denied the allegations of the respondent that the premises were required for personal bona fide use for his son or that the appellant had materially impaired the value and utility of the -premises.
4. The Rent Controller framed the following four issues
(1) Whether the applicant has rented out the shop to opponent for food grain purpose and the opponent has converted the shop from foodgrain into hotel business ? If so what is its effect ?
(2) Whether the opponent has impaired the value and utility of the shop by constant burning of fuel and made nuisance to the occupants ?
(3) Whether the applicant required the shop for personal bona fide use ?
(4) What should the order be ?
5. The Rent Controller decided first two issues in the negative while Issue No, 3 was decided in favour of the respondent and consequently ordered ejectment of the appellant from the premises in question.
6. The appellant preferred an appeal before the District Judge who dismissed his appeal on 29th September, 1980 holding that the issue with regard to requirement of shop for personal use was correctly decided by the Controller in favour of the respondent.
7. I have heard the arguments of Mr. M. S. Khatri on behalf of the appellant and Mr. K. B. Umrani for the respondent. Learned counsel for appellant has raised a plea that actually the respondent wanted to enhance rent of the premises and under the cover of this, he had filed the rent application and that the landlord does not require the shop in good faith for personal use for his son. I am referred to the deposition of respondent/landlord before the Rent Controller wherein he has repelled a suggestion by the appellant's counsel that the rent application was filed only to enhance the rent. It appears from the record that the matter was pending before the Rent Controller for several years. Since the respondent has deposed that he did not intend to enhance the rent, the argument of the counsel of the appellants has no force.
8. Second piece of argument is that section 13 (3) (ii) (a) and (b) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 does not help the respondent in respect of Issue No, 3 decided in his favour. The provisions referred to by the counsel are as under : "Section 13 (3).-(ii) In the case of a non-residential building or a scheduled or rented land, if-
(a) he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children ;
(b) he or his said child is not occupying in the same urban area in which such building is situated for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land, as the case may be, suitable for his needs at the time."
9. It is urged by the counsel of appellant that the son of the respondent has another shop in the bazar which is suitable for his needs. The deposition of respondent, makes it clear that the shop in which son of the respondent is doing business in the Shahi Bazar was not suitable because the goods brought in trucks were to be off loaded at a distance of one furlong away from his shop as the trucks could not pass through the Shahi Bazar. It is further asserted by the respondent/landlord that the suitable premises would be the shop in possession of the appellant. This fact was also considered by the learned District Judge, Thatta and he has come to the concussion that the need of the respondent was bona fide. Both the points raised by the learned counsel of the appellant do not find support from, the record of the cage which is read out in the Court.
10. The learned counsel in support of his case has cited two authorities ; (a) PLD 1979 Note 69 at page 40 and (b) PLD 1981 Lah.
609. Both these citations, in my view, go against the case of the learned counsel of the appellant. It was held in the first case of Muhammad Anwar v. Suraya Bano in the Second Appeal that only possession of respondent of another property of similar character in the same locality could render his application for ejectment incompetent. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that the respondent has six other shops rented out to other tenants shopkeepers and, therefore, he cannot have benefit under the provisions of section 13 (3) (ii) (a) (b). The above citation refers to the actual possession of the landlord and not the shops given on rent possession whereof remains with the tenants. Similarly his second authority quoted by him is also against him. It provides that the determination whether the particular premises are required by landlord for personal use, fundamental importance to be attached to the statement of landlord himself. Section 13 (4) is an adequate safeguard against abuse of section 13 (3) (a) (ii) and that the statement of landlord is got to be considered and if the statement is confidence inspiring, it is to be accepted.
11. The arguments of the learned counsel of the respondent briefly are that there are concurrent findings of the two Courts below and that such findings may be given due weight. He refers to PLD 1963 SC 466 in which it was held that concurrent findings of .The fact (necessity of the landlord) arrived at by Controller and the District Judge cannot be disturbed in such appeal. Reference is also made to PLD 1976 Kar. 233 wherein the principle is well-illustrated and discussed and it is held that question of fact found in favour of the landlord by two Courts below could not be agitated in second appeal unless any legal error is found in the finding.
12. The two Courts below have given a concurrent finding as to the bona fide of the landlord that he needed the shop in question for the business of his son and the shop in question was more suitable for his needs. I do not find any weighty arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant to disregard or to have a contrary view to the one held by the two Courts below. In the result dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs. The appellant shall vacate the premises within a period of two months from today.