' FAKHRUDDIN H. SHAIKH, J.--A Division Bench of this Court has referred the following question to this larger Bench for consideration :- "Whether the Division Bench of this Court has correctly held that the second notification dated 30th October, 1963 (gazetted on November 6, 1963), was superseded by third notification dated 25th March, 1964 (Gazetted on April 1, 1964) by implication ? "
' The circumstances under which the question arose for consideration are briefly stated as under :- ' Mr. Muhammad Ishaq learned IIIrd Class Civil Judge, Larkana had passed ejectment order in Rent Application No, 42 of 1978 filed by respondent Bakhshal Khan and others against the present petitioners on 16-3-1980. The petitioners filed appeal against the said ejectment order, but it was dismissed by the High Court. Thereafter the landlords filed execution application before the same Rent Controller for possession of the premises in question. The petitioners thereafter filed the above constitutional petition praying that the ejectment order be declared ab initio void and ineffective on the ground that it was passed by a IlIrd Class Civil Judge, who on the relevant date, was not invested with the powers of Rent Controller under the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance). The petitioners have based their claim on a D.
B. Decision of this Court in the case of Ghulam Sarwar v. Ghulam Muhammad Mithal (1) (C. P. No, 36 of 1981), dated 21st December, 1981 (I). In the above case it was held by the said Bench that the notification of West Pakistan Government dated 30th October, 1963 whereby II/rd Class Civil Judges were invested with powers of Rent Controllers shall be deemed to have been impliedly superseded by notification of West Pakistan Government dated 15th July, 1964.
3. It may be stated that the Division Bench which took the above decision had placed reliance on the four notifications issued by the West Pakistan Government from time to time investing various Civil Judges with powers of Rent Controllers under the said Ordinance which alone were referred at the Bar. The first notification in this behalf was dated 12th March, 1959 published in 'West Pakistan Extraordinary Gazette dated March 16, 1959, whereby the powers of Rent Controller were invested under the said Ordinance upon the following
(1) All 1st and IInd Class Civil Judges and Subordinate Judges in West Pakistan except Quetta and Kalat Divisions ; (2)all senior Subordinate Judges and Subordinate Judges, Quetta Division ; and
(3) all Civil Judges in Kalat
4. The second notification in this behalf was issued on 30th October, 1963, and published in West Pakistan, Extraordinary Gazette, dated 6th {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1983 C C 480 {{FOOT NOTE}} November, 1963, which was in continuation of the first notification dated 12-3-1959. By this notification all IIIrd Class Civil Judges and Subordinate Judges in West Pakistan, except Quetta and Kalat Divisions, were invested with powers of Rent Controller.
5. The third notification was issued on 25th March, 1964 and published in the West Pakistan, Extraordinary, Gazette, dated 1st August, 1964 which superseded the first notification dated 12th March, 1959 and purported to invest the following with the powers of Rent Controller :- (1)All 1st and IInd Class Civil Judges in West Pakistan in Kalat Division ; and (2)all Qazis and Nazims (Magistrates 1st Class) in Kalat Division.
6. The fourth notification which was relied upon in the case of Ghulam Sarwar in C. P. No, 36 of 1981, was dated 24th November, 1964 published in West Pakistan, Extraordinary Gazette, dated 21st December, 1964. This notification purported to supersede the third notification dated 25th March, 1964 and conferred powers of Rent Controller upon the following :- (1)All 1st and IInd Class Civil Judges in West Pakistan except Kalat Division ; and (2)all Nazims (Magistrates 1st Class) in Kalat Division.
7. It may be stated that one more notification which was issued by the Government of West Pakistan between the aforementioned third and fourth notifications, was not at all brought to the notice of the Bench which decided Ghulam Sarwar's case. This notification was dated 15th July, 1964 published in the West Pakistan, Extraordinary, Gazette, dated 30th July, 1964. By this notification, which was in continuation of the second notification dated 30th October 1963, the Government appointed all Bird Class Civil Judges in Quetta Division to perform the functions of the Rent Controllers under the said Ordinance. The Division Bench which decided Ghulam Sarwar's case was, therefore, of the view, that the fourth notification dated 24th November, 1964 (which in fact was the fifth notification) had by implication superseded the second notification dated 30th October, 1963 whereby IIIrd Class Civil Judges were invested with powers of Rent Controller under the said Ordinance.
8. In the present writ petition which was flied for hearing before another learned Division Bench, the said fourth notification dated 24th November, 1964 as well as the decision of a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of Messrs Nau Asio Trading Co. Ltd. v. Sh. Saeed Ahmad, Civil Judge IIIrd Class (I) was referred. It was held by the learned Judges of Lahore High Court in the above- cited case that the second notification investing IIIrd Class Civil Judges with powers of Rent Controller was not specifically superseded, particularly in view of the fact that the notification dated 15th July, 1964 was issued in continuation of the said second notification. The above Bench was, therefore, of the view that the decision of the Bench which decided Ghulam Sarwar's case in respect of the powers of IIIrd Class Civil Judges, was not correct and needed reconsideration.
Under these circumstances the above question has come before this Bench for consideration. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1966 Lah, 26 {{FOOT NOTE}}
9. We have heard Mr. Illahi Bux Kehar learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Lachmandas, Advocate for the respondent. Mr. Illahi Bux Kehar has argued that the second notification referred to above, was in continuation of the first notification and must, therefore, be deemed to be a part of the first notification or an Addendum to the first notification. His argument was that the words 'in continuation' appearing in the second notification, impliedly made the second notification a part of the first notification and that both the first and second notifications should be deemed to have merged into one. He, therefore, argued that when the third notification dated 25th March, 1964 superseded the first notification, by implication it also superseded the second notification and consequently IIIrd Civil Judges ceased to be Rent Controllers by virtue of the third notification.
10. Mr. Illahi Bux Kehar has referred to 'Legal Thesaurus' for the purpose of determining the real connotation of the word 'continuation'. In the above legal dictionary which is edition of 1979, the word 'continuation' has been defined at page 624 as under :- _ "Adjournment, appendix (supplement), continuance, continuity, extension (postponement), longevity, perpetuity, rider, survival."
' He has also referred to The Illustrated Heritage Dictionary and Information Book" pnblisbed by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston 1977 Edition in which the word 'continuation' has been defined at page 288 as under :- "(1) (a) The act or fact of continuing.
(b) The state of being continued.
(2) A part by which something is carried on or extended; supplement ; Sequel."
' In view of the above meaning of the word 'continuation' Mr. Illahi Bux Kehar has argued that the first and second notifications must be deemed to have merged into one and that when the third notification speaks of supersession of the first notification, by implication second notification must also be deemed to have been superseded.
11. On the other hand we have been referred to 'The Interpetation of Statutes' by Maxwell, 1969 Edition in which the learned author at page 258, while referring to 'Statutes conferring powers' writes as under :- "Where a statute confers a power, and particularly one which may be used to deprive the subject of proprietary rights, the Courts will confine those exercising the power to the strict letter of the statute."
12. In the case of Nau-Asio Trading Co. Ltd., in which the very question of power of IIIrd Class Civil Judge as Rent Controller, was in issues and which was not brought to the notice of the Bench which decided Ghulam Sarwar's case, it was held with regard to the implied repeal of statute as under :- "(9) It is cardinal principle of interpretation of statute (which equally extends to statutory notifications) that "repeal of an earlier statute by implication is not to be presumed on the coming into force or a later statute, unless the provisions of the latter statute are so repugnant to the earlier statute that the two cannot stand together. In such an event the earlier statute stands impliedlyjepealed by the latter. Leges Posteriores Priores contraries abrogant. It was not contended that the second and the third notifications are so repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together, The first notification empowered all First and Second Class Civil Judges and Subordinate Judges in West Pakistan except in Quetta and Kalat Divisions to perform the functions of Controllers. The second notification empowered all 3rd Class Civil Judges and Subordinate Judges in West Pakistan except in Quetta and Kalat Divisions to perform the-functions of Controllers. The appointments under the second notification were plainly in addition to and not in derogation of the appointments made under the first notification. In essence, the first and the second were two parallel notifications which remained in operation in juxtaposition to each other. Moreover, there is no warrant for the suggestion, that the second notification was in the nature of an amendment to the first notification, so that after engrafting amendment, it could not survive the first notification so as to continue in operation independently. The expression 'In continuation of the context in which it is used' plainly means 'in addition to'. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edition), the word 'continuation' means 'the action of continuing ; "Perseverance, continued existence or operation, the causing of anything to continue." Had the intention been to make the second notification merely addendum or corrigendum to the first notification, then the appropriate expression to use would have been 'In modification of' and not 'in continuation of.' As obsorved already, the fact that the third notification supersedes the first notification with reference to its number and its date cannot be explained upon any hypothesis other than this that the intention was to supersede the first notification only; had the intention been to supersede the second notification then the draftsman ought to have referred to the second notification also by its number or date at any rate, suffixed the words 'as amended' after a reference to the first notification. Therefore both on account of the phraseolgy employed in the third notification and absence of any repugnancy between the second and the third notification, the second notification continues to be in operation unimpaired by the third notification."
We are in respectful agreement with the above view of the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court. Had this case or even the notification dated 15-7-1964 which was in continuation of the second notification, been brought to the notice of the Bench which decided Ghulam Sar war's case, perhaps the decision in that case also would have been the same as in the Lahore case.
' Consequently we answer the question under consideration in the negative. The decision in the case of Ghulam Sarwar v. Ghulam Muhammad (C. P. No, 36 of 1981) reported in 1983 C. L. C. 480, is overruled.
' The case will now go back to the learned Division Bench for decision according to law in view of the answer given by us as above.