DECISION The appellant was originally employed in the respondent Corporation as bus conductor and gradually rose to the post of Station Superinten--dent. On 18th May, 1980 he was served with the following charge-- sheet over the signature of the Managing Director of the respondent corporation.
(1) That on I st May, 1980 and 2nd May, 1980 in 'A' Shift, you checked TL-6s of conductors, though you were specifically directed by District Manager, Orangi Depot, vide his order No. KTC/OP/470/180/379, dated the 5tb April, 1980 not to check TL-6s of conductors. This practice of checking and signing of TL-6s, by Station Superintendents was stopped as it was complained that Station Superintendents were accepting hush money from conductors.
(2) In spite of clear instructions from District Manager, you wrote "Checked" and put date but did not sign.
(3) Thus you have disregarded and disobeyed lawful .Orders, issued by District Manager.
(4) Report against you has been made by Assistant Traffic Manager Mr. Mansahdar, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.
You, are, therefore, required to show cause and explain within seven days on receipt hereof, failing which it shall be understood that you plead guilty and have no -defence to put forth. If your reply is not received within stipulated time of seven days, ex parte proceedings will be held without further notice. Also state if you want to be heard in person."
A domestic enquiry founded upon the above charge-sheet was held against the appellant and as according to the report of the Enquiry Officer the charges against the appellant were established, the appellant was dismissed from service vide order, dated 10th September, 1980.
2. The appellant preferred a grievance petition against his dismissal from service before the learned Fifth Labour Court. The grievance petition was resisted by the re4pondent corporation on two main grounds, firstly, that the appellant was not a workman and hence was not entitled to file a grievance petition challenging his dismissal from service, and secondly. That the orders of dismissal from service of the appellant were valid and were founded upon a domestic enquiry wherein guilt of the appellant was fully established. The learned Labour Court upheld the, first contention without examining the second contention and dismissed the appellant's grievance petition on that ground alone. Aggrieved by the said decision the appellant has come up in appeal to this Tribunal.
3. The learned Labour Court in holding, that the appellant was not a workman has relied upon the decision of the Tribunal in Appeals Nos. 191, 192 and 193 of 1979, decided on 2nd September, 1979, wherein it has been held that Station Superintendents in the respondent Corporation are not workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders. Mr. Abdul Monim Khan, the learned counsel for the appellant, however, sought to argue that the nature of. Duties of the appellant was clerical as also mobile and hence he was a workman both for the purposes of the Standing Orders and the Road Transport Workers Ordinance. In support of his contention that the appellant was required to perform mobile duty, the learned counsel relied upon the once orders, dated 15th August, 1979 and 6 August, 1979. The first- order provides for the constitution of the special squad, in which the appellant was included, for repatriation of persons, from Bangla Desh on 16tb August; 19'79. As this was a special assignment, limited to one day only, and completed long before the appellant was charge-sheeted or dismissed, it cannot be said that this was the normal duty of the appellant. The second order. Provides for the posting of the appellant in the D.S. Special squad for duty. It was, however, conceded by Mr. Abdul Monim Khan that both at the time that the appellant was charge- sheeted and was dismissed-he was not doing mobile he was posted in the special squad for route duty. No doubt the appellant in paragraph 6 of the affidavit before the learned Labour Court has claimed that he was required to perform mobile duty, but since this claim is founded upon the aforementioned Office Orders, which orders were not in force at the relevant time, it cannot be said that the appellant was required to perform mobile duty at the relevant time.
4. Mr. Abdul Monim Khan, however, strongly urged that the appel--lant was required to perform clerical duties and in support of his conten--tion he relied upon paragraph 5 of the affidavit of the appellant as well as the charge-sheet served upon the appellant. In paragraph 5 of his affidavit the appellant has claimed that he was required to check TL-6 forms (way bill forms). However the charge-sheet which was served upon the appellant clearly indicates that not only the appellant and other Station Superintendents were not required to check these way bills but there were specific orders prohibiting the Station Superintendents from checking the way bills as this unauthorised practice was resulting in corruption and the appellant was charge-sheeted for disobeying the Office Order. Mr. Abdul Monim also relied upon the Office Order, dated 6th September, 1980 requiring the Station Superintendents to check TL-6 of the conductors before depositing the cash but this office order was passed long after the appellant was charge-sheeted on 18th May, 1980, for disobeying the orders prohibiting Station Superintendents from checking TL-6 form. The two grounds, thus, on which the appellant claims that he was a workman appears to have no foundation. On the other hand, it has been stated by N. A. Baseer, Secretary of the respondent Corporation, in his evidence before the learned Labour Court that the Station Superin--tendent used to supervise the job of conductors, drivers and inspectors.
No doubt the appellant has denied that he was performing this work, but as he has not shown that be was performing any other work his denial can--not be taken seriously. I am, therefore, of theth view that the appellant a Station Superintendent was performing duties mainly of supervisory nature and hence cannot be considered to be a workman for the purpose of the Standing Orders.
He is, accordingly, not entitled toy file a grievance petition against the termination of his services under clause (3) of Standing Orders 12 read with section 25-A, I. R. O.
5. For the reasons, discussed by me, above, I find no merit in this appeal and would dismiss the same.