' This Constitutional Petition calls in question the order dated 4th March, 1981 passed by the Additional District Judge, Lahore. Viz. The annulated authority un. Restriction Ordinance, 1959, ordering the ejectment of the petitioner from shop bearing property No, S. 54-R-44 situated in Anarkali, Lahore.
2. The tenanted shop belongs to Dr. Sultan Muhammad, respondent No, 1, a dentist and this was rented by the petitioner in the year 1961 at a monthly rent of Rs, 200. In 1971, respondent No, 1, the owner of the shop filed ejectment proceedings against the petitioner inter alia on the ground that he needed the same for his bona fide personal use. The litigation remained pending for about two years but on 19th April, 1973, a compromise was effected between the petitioner and respondent No, 1 as a result whereof rent of the shop was increased to Rs, 300 per month and respondent No, 1 withdrew his ejectment petition.
3. On 22nd April, 1980, respondent No, 1 again filed ejectment petition against the petitioner seeking eviction from the shop in question on the grounds of default in payment of rent, damage to the tenanted shop and bona fide personal need of respondent No,
1. The ejectment petition was resisted by the petitioner and the necessary issues arising out of the parties' pleadings were framed. Learned Rent Controller, after recording the parties' evidence, found the issues pertaining to the default in payment of rent, damage to the property in question and personal need of the owner against respondent No, 1 and consequently his ejectment petition was dismissed on 22nd January, 1931.
4. Respondent No, 1 preferred an appeal and the learned appellate authority, viz. Respondent No, 2 upheld the findings of the Controller on issues relating to default in payment of rent and damage to the suit property but he reversed the findings about the issue relating to personal need of the landlord and consequently he accepted the appeal and directed the eviction of the petitioner through the impugned order.
5. In the under-consideration Constitutional petition, it has been contended by the petitioner that respondent No, 1 alleged that he needed the shop for the use of his elder son but the said elder son was not examined before the Controller and that the learned Additional District Judge failed to consider that on earlier occasion also respondent No, 1 sought the eviction of the petitioner on the ground of personal need but after increase in rent he withdrew his ejectment petition. It has further been urged in the present Writ Petition that the learned Additional District Judge while accepting the appeal placed reliance on the provisions of subsection (4) of section 13 of the Ordinance, which are to the effect that if the landlord fails to prove by a subsequent action that he needed the tenanted premises for the bona fide requirement, the same are liable to be restored to the tenant and he thus relieved the landlord of the basic onus on him to prove affirmatively that he did require the premises for his bona fide requirement.
6. Respondent No, 1 to prove his bona fide requirement of the shop in question. Examined P W-1 Tufail Ahmad, P W-2 Fazal Hussain, P W-3 his son Nasir Jamal and he himself also appeared as his own witness as P W-4. All these P Ws. Stated that respondent No, I needed the shop for his personal use to start his clinic as a dentist in the said shop. In rebuttal, petitioner examined before the Controller, R W-1 Abdullah and R W- 2 Muhammad Tufail, while he himself came into the witness box as R W-3. These witnesses stated that respondent No, 1 was residing in his house at Dhani Ram Road and in the upper portion of that house he was running the clinic as dentist. They also stated that in fact the respondent wanted to increase the rent or to get the shop vacated for purpose of sale.
7. This is a common ground between the parties that respondent No, 1 was residing in a rented house at Dhani Ram Road, Lahore. He has no other house or shop in the urban area of Lahore, it is also not denied that he is a qualified dentist. Respondent No, 1 has stated that his landlord did not permit him to run a clinic as dentist in the residential house. Respondent No, 1 as also his son Nasir Jamal have disclosed that they wanted to run their clinic in the shop in question so that Nasir Jamal is also absorbed in some business as he was doing nothing at the moment.
8. It is sufficiently established from the evidence on the record that respondent No, 1 who does not own any property except the shop in question genuinely needs the said shop for running his own business as dentist so that he is able to absorb his son along with him who is otherwise jobless. The fact that 6/7 years earlier, respondent No, 1 after increase in the rent withdrew his ejectment petition which A was inter alia filed on the ground of personal need does not legally debar respondent No, 1 from filing the fresh application. In Allah Rakha v. Muhammad Shafi of it has been ruled that withdrawal by landlord of his previous ejectment application on the basis of some private settlement with the tenant does not debar him from filing a subsequent ejectment application on the ground of personal need.
9. As already observed, in the circumstances of the present case, the Additional District Judge has not found that the landlord B needed the shop for his personal use merely on the statement on oath of the landlord or on the basis of provisions of section 13 (4) of the Ordinance, but he has arrived at this conclusion after analysing the evidence produced by the parties. On the basis of that evidence, his finding certainly appears to be unexceptionable. Otherwise too. a Constitutional Petition is not legally competent merely on the ground that on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties, some other conclusion is possible as has been held in Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail and another. The fact that respondent No, 1 can work as a dentist in the premises in which he lives as tenant also does not go against him because the said premises are admittedly rented ones and do not belong to him in Muhammad Shabbir v. Vensimal and four1 2 others it was held that words "such building" as occurring in section 13 (3) (i) (b) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 do not include rented premises.
10. In the light of the above observations, it is concluded that the impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge Lahore does not suffer from any legal infirmity calling interference in exercise of Writ jurisdiction by this Court. In this view of the matter, the Petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. The petitioner, however, is allowed three months' time from today for vacating the shop in question. 1978 SCM R 437 PLD 1981 SC 246 PLD 1980 Kar. 409