1. MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.-The petitioner claimed that Harnam Singh and others evacuee owners had entered into an agreement for sale of the land in dispute in favour of her husband Baga Singh who embraced Islam after Partition and died in Pakistan. Out of the sale price fixed at Rs. 35,255, Baga Singh had allegedly paid to the vendors on the 6th January 1947, a sum of Rs. 16,000.
2. Long after the prescribed period of limitation for filing a suit for specific performance had expired, the petitioner applied to the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner under section 16 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act XII of 1957, for permission to file a suit in civil Court. The permission was refused, but nevertheless she filed a suit and obtained an ex parte decree against the vendors as well as the Custodian of Evacuee Property. In execution of the decree she got a mutation of the land entered in her name and note was made in Register R. L. II against the allotments of the land in favour of the respondents.
3. In 1962 the allottees applied to the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner for resumption of the land.
4. The application was dismissed on 4-3-1963 on the ground that there existed a decree passed by the civil Court against the vendors and the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The allotees then moved the Chief Settle--ment Commissioner who in exercise of his suo motu jurisdiction under section 12 of the Land Settlement Act declared the decree passed by the civil Court as illegal and resumed the land.
5. The petitioner thereupon filed a Writ Petition in the High Court and challenged the legality of the order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the ground that it was without jurisdiction.
6. A Division Bench dismissed the writ petition on 14-4-1971 from which the petitioner now seeks leave to appeal.
7. It is contended that the Chief Settlement Commissioner could not intervene as no order was passed by any Settlement authority and in any case nine months having expired when the decree was executed the order passed by the Revenue authorities sanctioning the mutation of the land in her favour could not be revised under section 19 (i) of the Land Settlement Act.
8. The learned Judges in the High Court found no merit in the Writ Petition. The application filed by the respondents for resumption of land was dismissed by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner on 4th March 1963. The Chief Settlement Commis--sioner took cognizance of the matter on the 20th September 1963, i.e., well within the period of nine months provided in section 1.9 of the Land Settlement Act for suo motu revision by the Chief Settlement Commissioner.
9. The contention that the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner did not act as Deputy Settlement Commissioner to enable the Chief Settlement Commissioner to intervene was equally devoid of force. After evacuee lands were acquired under section 4 of the Land Settlement Act, 1958, the Settlement Authorities alone were given the jurisdiction to deal with it. The Deputy Rehabili--tation Commissioner, who passed the order dated 4th March 1963, was also appointed as Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The order revised by the Chief Settlement Commissioner had, therefore, been made by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner notwithstanding the misdescription of his office as Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner.
10. Mr. Buttar has not been able to displace the reasons given by the learned Judges in support of their view that the order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner was within time and on merits well founded. The land was admittedly evacuee property. Under section 12 of the Land Settlement Act, no Court, tribunal or authority could pass any judgment, decree or order in respect of it. An exception was made in case of persons who had before the bar was imposed on alienation of evacuee properties entered into valid agreements for their purchase and had passed whole or part of the consideration. The holder of such an agreement could file a suit for specific performance with the prior permission of the Custodian of evacuee property. If the suit was decreed it was necessary to again obtain confirma--tion of the decree by the Custodian of Evacuee Property other--wise it could not be executed. In the instant case the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property had specifically refused permission to the petitioner to file a suit for specific performance of the agreement allegedly executed in favour of her husband by the evacuee owners. The proceedings in the suit filed by her were, therefore, corum non judice. Nor was the decree confirmed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property to entitle the petitioner to execute it. The Chief Settlement Commissioner also found the agreement and the payment allegedly made under it to be fabrications. In the circumstances he was justified in resuming the land and maintaining the allotments of the respondents.
11. The petition is dismissed.