The appellant was selected for appointment as training driver in the respondent corporation, vide letter, dated 11th November, 1980, for a specific period of 9 months. His services were terminated by office order, dated 15th August, 1981. However, by order dated 9th August, 1981, he was offered fresh appointment in the respondent corporation for a period of 3 months. One of the term3 of the appointment was that his services could be terminated at any time without notice. The appellant's services were terminated by order, dated 31st August, 1981 i.e. 12 days after his fresh appointment.
The appellant challenged the order terminating his services through a grievance petition filed before the learned 1st Labour Court but his grievance petition was dis--missed by the learned Labour Court by its decision given on 16th May, 1982, on the ground that his services were terminated during the period of his probation and in accordance with his letter of appointment.
2. Mr. Mazhar Ali Chohan, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant is governed by the provisions of the Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961, as he falls within the defini--tion of worker as given in the said Ordinance. The contention of Mr. Chohan appears to be quite correct. The definition of worker given in the said Ordinance includes drivers, clearness, conductors and checkers employed in a road transport service. The appellant was employed as a driver by the Sind Road Transport Corporation, which is road trans--port service for the purposes of the said Ordinance.
3. It was next contended by Mr. Mazhar Ali Chohan that there is no conception of probationary worker under the Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961, and hence the service of the appellant .Could not be terminated in the manner in which it had been done. Mr. Chohan based his contention on the fact that whereas certain provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, have been made applicable to 'workmen emp--loyed in road transport service, the provisions of clause (2) of Standing Order 12 have been specifically excluded. It may, however, be pointed out that section 7 of the Sind Road Transport Ordinance has made speci--fied provisions of the Standing Order applicable to the employees of a road transport service as if a worker was a workman or a permanent workman for the purposes of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commer--cial Employment (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1968. It is thus clear that there is a conception of .a workman as well as a permanent workman when the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance; 1968, are sought to be made applicable to the employees of road transport service. The appellant admittedly was appointed on probation for a period up to 3 months and he had not completed his probationary period when his services were terminated. He thus was not a permanent workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders. No doubt the provisions of clause (2) of Standing Order 12 providing that the service of a probationary` can be terminated without notice, cannot be made applicable to the appellant, and the said provisions are not applicable to road transport workers, but the non-application of the said clause to the appellant would not make the order terminating the services of the appellant invalid. It m-ay be pointed out that clause (1) of Standing Order 12, which is admittedly applicable to workers in road transport services, applies only to permanent workmen and admittedly the appellant was not a permanent workman. He thus was not entitled either to notice or pay in lieu of notice.
But even if the appellant could somehow be deemed to be entitled to notice or notice pay the failure to give him notice or notice pay would not invalidate the order terminating his services.
4. It was finally contended by Mr. Mazhar Ali Chohan that no grounds have been specified in the order terminating the services of the appellant. I have already pointed out that the appellant was appointed on probation for 3 months only with the specified condition that his services could be terminated at any time. The order terminating his services states that his services were no longer required, and, therefore, are being terminated. In the order sufficient reasons have been stated fort terminating the services of the appellant.
5. For the above reasons, I would uphold the decision of the learned Labour Court and would dismiss this appeal In limine,