' In a petition filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 against the appellant for his eviction from a shop in his possession, on the ground of reconstruction, the parties through an agreement dated 12th October, 1971 compromised, whereby the appellant agreed to vacate the demised shop on 13th March, 1972 and respondents 1 and 2 were required to deliver back the possession of the shop to the appellant on 13th May, 1972 after its reconstruction. The parties further agreed that for the first three years the rent would be Rs, 40 per month and thereafter it would be refixed in consonance with the circumstances then prevalent. The learned Rent Controller on 12th October, 1971 passed the ejectment order in pursuance of this compromise.
2. It appears that the appellant delivered the possession of the shop to the respondents within the date. But after reconstruction of the shop they leased it out to respondent No, 3 instead of the appellant. It also transpires that, notwithstanding the rate of rent agreed to between the parties some differences arose between them in respect of the monthly rent and presumably for this reason, the respondents declined to deliver possession of the shop to the appellant. He, therefore, moved a petition for execution of the order dated 12th October, 1971, but it was turned down by the learned Additional Civil Judge who was seized of the matter, by his order dated 18th Septemaber, 1972. Dissatisfied by this order the appellant preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge on 17th March, 1973. He was of the view that the order dated 12th October, 1971 was executable and the appellant's remedy lay in moving the Rent Controller under section 15 (5-B). Accordingly, the appellant filed such application before the learned Rent Controller praying for delivery of possession of the shop in dispute. Later on, with the Permission of the Court, respondent No, 3 was also impleaded as a party.
3. The learned Rent Controller, by his order dated 15th November, 1974 held that the application which was filed after the construction of the new shop and its occupation by respondent No, 3, was clearly beyond time and thus, rejected the same. The appellant challenged this order through an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge, who heard it, shared the view taken by the learned Rent Controller and by means of his order dated 31st July, 1976 dismissed the appeal. The validity of this order has been called in question through this. Second Appeal.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record.
' The respondent's learned counsel raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was barred by time. It appears from the record that the impugned order was passed on 31st August, 1976. The appellant applied for the copy thereof on 3rd August, 1976. Although the copy was prepared on 14th September, 1976 and could be delivered to him on that day yet it was collected by him on 1st October, 1976. The appeal was filed on 28th October, 1976. If the period of limitation is reckoned from 14th September, 1976 the appeal is barred by time. If, however, the date of delivery of the copy is treated as the date for commencement of the period of limitation the appeal is not barred by time. The submission of the respondent's learned counsel was that as the copy of the order was ready for delivery to the appellant, on 14th September, 1976 and he did not collect it, the period of limitation would be deemed to have started from that date and, therefore, the appeal filed on 28th October, 1976 was barred by time. While making these submissions the respondent's learned counsel appears to have overlooked an application placed on the file by the appellant for extension of time wherein he explained the circumstances under which the copy of the order, could not be collected on 14th September, 1976. It is averred therein that the copying agency did not give any specific date to the appellant for collection of the copy ; even on 15th September, 1976 and 27th September, 1976 the clerk concerned informed him that the copy was not ready. This application is supported by an affidavit. The respondent has not filed the counter-affidavit. It is well-settled that the "time requisite" for obtaining the copy can be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act.
The time can further be extended if the copying agency fails to give any information to the applicant or gives wrong information as to the preparation and date of delivery of the copy.
Reference in this connection may be made to West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi.
' In the circumstances of the case I am inclined to accept the explanation given by the appellant and treat the appeal as within time.
5. On merits, the appellant's learned counsel argued that the compromise reached between the parties was in conformity with law, the appellant performed his part of the obligation and delivered the possession of the shop to the respondents by 13th March, 1972. It was submitted that the respondents having obtained the possession of the shop treacherously, after its reconstruction, in violation of the agreement rented it out to respondent No, 3, who was in league with them. The learned counsel strenuously argued that the purpose of requiring the tenant, ejected under section 13 (3) (a) and desirous of obtaining newly constructed premises on rent, to move an application under section 13 (5-B), before the completion of the new building and its occupation by another person, is to impart sufficient notice to the landlord of the tenant's intention that he was interested in having the new building leased out to him. In the submission of the learned counsel, the agreement between the parties was sufficient notice to the respondents and in any case, as the parties have been litigating, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 could not have been unaware of the appellant's intention to obtain the newly constructed shop on lease. The learned counsel, thus, assailed the findings of the learned two Courts below, that the application was barred by time. He also placed reliance on a judgment dated 2nd June, 1979 pronounced by a learned Single Judge of this Court in S. A.0. No, 359/79, wherein it was observed that if the order is made on the basis of a compromise contemplating arrangement different from the one envisaged by subsection (5-B)1 then what has to be enforced are the terms of the compromise and not the provisions of subsection (5-B) and that in such a case strict observance of section 13 (5-B) is not called for.
6. Upon the language of section 13 (5-B) application by a tenant, who is evicted under subsection
(3) (a) and is desirous of having the newly constructed building rented out to him, has got to be filed before the completion of the new building and its occupation by any other person. - It is not denied that the application was filed long after the construction of the new building and its occupation by respondent No, 3 as a tenant under respondents Nos. 1 and 2. It is well-settled that in lease a lessor transfers his interest in immovable property to the lessee. Though in the petition it was averred that there was collusion between the landlords and respondent No, 3, yet till such time the allegation was proved, respondent No, 3 could not be denuded of his rights acquired by him in the property by virtue of the lease. Under law, every Court is bound to dismiss the cause instituted after the period of limitation, even if limitation has not been set up as a defence. The language of subsection (5-B) is plain and clear. When the language of a statute is unambiguous effect must be given to the plain meaning thereof. The effect of lapse of time cannot be ignored by referring to the objects of the Act, and the opposite party to whom valuable rights have accrued, deprived of his defence of. Limitation. It was open to the appellant to have pleaded before the learned Rent Controller the grounds for extension of time. But neither any such averment was made by him in the petition nor an independent application was moves in this behalf. If respondent No, 3 is found to have entered the demised property, with notice of the previous agreement between the D landlord and the appellant, in law, he would be deemed to be holding the property in trust for the appellant and would be subject to the same equities, as enforceable against respondents Nos. 1 and 2 from whom he acquired his rights. These merits of the case, however, could be gone into only if the application was not barred by time.
7. Even if the ejectment petition filed by a landlord on the ground of reconstruction of property, is decided on the basis of a compromise, the Rent Controller who is moved by a tenant, for delivery of the possession to him of the newly constructed building, being a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction has to proceed strictly within the framework of subsection (5-B). It is not for him to enforce the agreement between E the parties, as such a jurisdiction vests in the civil Court alone, section I3(5- B), has, therefore, to be applied on its own terms, and the fact that the parties entered into a compromise cannot whittle down the austerity of the provisions of- the law of limitation. With respect therefore, I am unable to share the view taken by the learned Judge, the judgment relied upon by the appellant's learned counsel. It is unfortunate that the appellant could not be given any relief and the solemn agreement between the parties was flouted by the respondents, but the provisions of the statute must prevail, the appellant is to blame himself for not having proceeded in the right direction. The view taken by the two Courts below in holding the application as barred by time is unexceptionable and I have no reason to differ with them.
8. The appeal having been found to be without any merit is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. PLD 1973 SC 222