' The facts giving rise to this writ petition are that respondent No. 1, Mrs. Abdul Karim, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, made an application for eviction of the petitioner, Muhammad Rafiq, from certain property. Admittedly, the said property was an evacuee property. It was transferred to the respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitalion) Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the said Act. It was alleged by the respondent that the petitioner was occupying the property in question at the time of its transfer to her and, therefore, had become her statutory tenant. According to the respondent, he had not paid any rent and was, therefore, liable to be evicted. It was denied by the petitioner that there was relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. His plea, ,however, did not find favour with the .Rent Controller, who was seized of the ejectment application, and since he had not pleaded payment or tender of any rent, the learned Rent Controller ordered his eviction without holding any further proceedings in the case.
The petitioner went in appeal before an Additional District Judge but without success. He has, therefore, invoiced the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court,
2. It was not denied by learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent was transferee of the disputed property and that the same was occupied by the petitioner at the time of its transfer in her favor. It was, however, urged by him that no notice under section 30 of the said Act was served by the respondent before launching the ejectment proceedings and, therefore, the petitioner was not liable to be ejected in consequence of those proceedings. It was also submitted by him that even if notice under section 30 of the said Act was not required to be served, the respondent was bound to give a notice to the petitioner under section 13-A of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance, and since it .Was not served on him, the ejectment application was not competent.
3. A perusal of the orders of the two tribunals below would show that the contentions rose before me were not advanced before either of the two. Admittedly, the ejectment application was filed after the repeal of the said 4 Act. It was, therefore, not necessary to serve the petitioner with a notice under section 30 thereof. If any authority were needed for the said proposi tion I would respectfully refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Ramzan v. Ch. Bashir Ahmad (1). As for notice under section 13-A of the said Ordinance it is required to be served if in the case of an existing tenancy relating to any property the landlord is replaced as a result of the transfer of the property. It is not the plea of the petitioner that he was occupying the disputed property as a tenant under the evacuee who had abandoned the said property and was then transferred to the respondent. Therefore, the transfer of the disputed property to the respondent as evacue property does not attract the provisions of section 13-A of the said Ordinance. In this view of the matter, there is no force in the points canvassed by the learned counsel.
4. Resultantly, this writ petition fails. It is dismissed in limine.
(1) PLD 1981 SC 340