GHULAM SAFDAR SHAH, J.--This writ petition is directed against the order of the Chief Land Commissioner dated 21-5.1960, which was passed under the following circumstances.
1. One Sardar Ghaus Bakhsh Mazari died on 31-10-1955, leaving considerable landed property and many legal heirs some of whom were minors. Consequently the entire landed property left by him was taken over by the Court of Wards. Respondent Umar Bakhsh, who claimed to be the son of the deceased, made an application to the Assistant Collector that his share in the property should be mutated in his name. By order dated 20-5-1957, the Assistant Collector accepted this application and accordingly his share in the property was mutated in his name. Feeling aggrieved of this order, Mst. Hijab Khatun a daughter of the deceased, filed a declaratory suit challenging the said mutation and by way of consequential relief prayed that the entries in the revenue record, which were made in the name of respondent Umar Bakhsh on the strength of the order of the Assistant Collector dated 20-5-1957, may be cancelled. It seems that simultaneously Mst. Anwar Khatun, another daughter of the deceased, had filed an appeal before the Collector against the said order of the Assistant Collector. This appeal was accepted and the order of the Assistant Collector set aside. The finding of the Collector was that respondent Umar Bakhsh was not the son of late Sardar Ghaus Bakhsh Mazari and directed that the share of the property of the deceased, which had been mutated in his name, should be cancelled. Respondent Umar Bakhsh challenged this order before the Commissioner who by his order dated 15-3-1958 held that until the suit of Mst. Hijab Khatun was decided the question of mutation should be kept pending. Against this order Mst. Anwar Khatun went in revision before the Board of Revenue and by order dated 23-2-1959 the Board held that the entire property of the deceased should be mutated in the name of Court of Wards until the question of its inheritance was decided by a civil Court. It thus happened that Mst. Hijab Khatun did not prosecute her suit to its conclusion and withdrew it on 24-4-1958.
In the meantime Martial Law Regulation No, 64 (West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation) came into force in February 1959 and according to its requirements declarations in Forms LC-I and LC-II were to be submitted in regard to the entire land left by late Sardar Ghaus Bakhsh Mazari. The record shows that the Deputy Land Commissioner also allowed respondent Umar Bakhsh to file the required declaration, subject to the determination of his entitlement by a civil Court, and further that until then he would not be given the possession of his share in the land. He further observed that in case he failed to obtain a decree from the civil Court then his share would be resumed and its compensation paid to the other heirs of the deceased. Being aggrieved with this order respondent Umar Bakhsh went in appeal before the Land Commissioner but it was dismissed as time-barred. He then challenged this order in revision before the Chief Land Commissioner, without impleading therein the petitioner or the Court of Wards, who by the impugned order set aside the orders of the Land Commissioner and the Deputy Land Commissioner holding that they had no jurisdiction to impose conditions on respondent Umar Bakhsh and further that if the other heirs of late Sardar Ghaus Bakhsh Mazari disputed his claim they should obtain a decree from the civil Court.
2. We have heard Mr. Hafeez-ur-Rahman, Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. M. B. Zaman, Advocate- General, assisted by Messrs Saeed-ur-Rahman, Mumtaz Husain and Ch. Mehrajud-Din, Advocates for respondent No, 1 and Mr. Maqbool Ahmad, Advocate for respondent No,
2. The learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of this Court, contending that the impugned order having been passed on 21-5-1960 (i. e. before the coming into force of the abrogated Constitution of 1962) was immune from any attack in view of section 7 of the President's Order No, 26 of 1962 read with Martial Law Regulations Nos, 88, 93 and Paragraphs Nos, 3 and 27 of Martial Law Regulation No, 64. [he objection appears to have force not only because it is supported by the language of these provisions, but also because identical objections were upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in quite a few cases in which the facts were analogous. In this respect reference may be made to two judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of R. S. Jhamandas and others v. The Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan and others and Hajiani and others v.
West Pakistan Land Commission and others . In the first-mentioned case the impugned order was passed by the Chief Land Commissioner on 31-5-1960 and in the second case on 1-5-1961. Both these orders were impugned at the Bar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan but the attack was repelled by their Lordships in view of the unambiguous language of the above provisions. In this respect the following passage from the judgment of Cornelius, C. J. (as his Lordship then was), which deals with the effect of section 7 of the President's Order No, 26 of 1962, may be reproduced with advantage:-- "Such an objection can clearly also be construed by reference to the provision in the President's Order No, 26 of 1962 in paragraph 7, which provides protection against challenge in Court for all things done or proceedings taken 'in connection with the administration of Martial Law by any Martial Law Authority or by any person on behalf of a Martial Law Authority during the Martial Law period'. The land reforms carried out under the Land Reforms Regula-tion were undoubtedly a part of the administration of Martial Law, and in that view, the Land Commission, which was carrying out the reforms under the Regulation was to be deemed the Martial Law Authority, at the highest level within the complex of Land Reforms Regulation so that the Chief Land Commissioner would fall within the description of a person acting on behalf of Martial Law Authority, and his order of the 31st May 1960, being made during the Martial Law period, would be immune to any form of treatment1 2 by the Courts. The terms in which this bar of jurisdiction is couched are even more stringent than those of the Land Reforms Regulation, in paragraphs 3 and 27. It has to be accepted that the aforesaid order of the 31st May 1960, is provided with defence against every judicial remedy in a highly effective manner."
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not dispute this legal position. He, however, contended that in this case the impugned order had been passed by the Chief Land Com-missioner in violation of the express provisions of rule 12 (3) of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Rules, 1959 (hereinafter called the Rules) and consequently it is not immune from attack in the present proceedings. Rule 12 (3) of the Rules expressly debars the Chief Land Commissioner or a Land Commissioner from passing any order, revising or modifying an order affecting any person, without affording him an opportunity of being heard. The admitted position is that in the revision application before the Chief Land Commissioner the petitioner, who was an interested person, was not only not heard but she and the Court of Wards both were not impleaded in the proceedings. It is, therefore, obvious that the Chief Land Commissioner had passed the impugned order in violation of the express mandate of the said rule and the question arises whether this Court would have jurisdiction to examine its legality in view of the above judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
It is now well established that the observance of the principles of natural justice have to be read in every statute unless the statute itself provides to the contrary. In other words, if a person has been condemned unheard by any Court or Authority whatsoever then the order by which he was condemned would be a nullity in law and of no legal effect. Seen in this context, the impugned order of the Chief Land Commissioner, which was passed on the back of the petitioner, who was an interested party, and in violation of the express requirement of rule 12 (3) of the Rules, was completely without jurisdiction and a nullity in law In this view the order in question was not the type of order which could have been passed within the framework of Martial Law Regulation No, 64 and the Rules made thereunder and consequently this Court would not be debarred from examining its legality. If any Authority is needed for this conclusion reference may be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Zafar-ul-Ahsan v. The Republic of Pakistan in which the following observations are instructive :- "If a statute provides that an order made by an authority acting under it shall not be called in question in any Court, all that is necessary to oust the jurisdiction of the Court is that the authority should have been constituted as required by the statute, the person proceeded against should be subject to the jurisdiction of the authority, the ground on which action is taken should be within the grounds stated by the statute, and the order made should be such as could have been made under the statute. These conditions being satisfied, the ouster is complete even though in following the statutory procedure some omission or irregularity might have been committed by the authority. If an appellate authority is provided by the statute the omission or irregularity alleged will be a matter for that authority, and not for a Court of law."
The learned Advocate-General also conceded that so far as the merits of the case are concerned he could not support the impugned order. He further conceded that since the order in question was completely without jurisdiction and a nullity in law, there was ample jurisdiction in this Court to set it aside and remand the case to the learned Chief Land Commissioner for the disposal of the revision petition of the respondent according to law.
After having examined the facts of this case and the above legal provisions by which the jurisdiction of this Court to question the legality of any order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner before the coming into force of the abrogated Constitution of 1962 ; we are of the view that the impugned order being a nullity in law would be open to the scrutiny of this Court in line with the observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Zafar-ul-Ahsan's case. The fact that3 we have already come to the conclusion that the said order was passed In violation of the express mandate of rule 12 (3) of the Rules and consequently a nullity in law, the same is hereby quashed with costs which respondent Umar Bakhsh would bear. The result would be that the case would go back to the learned Chief Land Commissioner for disposal according to law before whom the revision application of respondent Umar Bakhsh would be deemed to be pending. It is needless to say that before proceeding with the matter the learned Chief Land Commissioner would issue notices to all concerned parties with a view to affording them an opportunity of being heard. PLD 1966 SC 229 PLD 1966 SC 114 PLD 1960 SC 113