1. ' By this revision petition, order dated 23-5-1981 passed by the Additional Sub Judge Muzaffarabad is under challenge. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner-defendants that the date i,e, 5-5-1977 on which the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was dismissed in default, would be deemed to have been the date of hearing and so the application for restoration of the suit was made beyond the period of limitation prescribed. If this contention of the learned counsel could have found favour with this Court then, of course, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. But this is not the case. The date on which the suit of the pre-emptor was dismissed in default was certainly not the date of hearing. This was a date on which if there had been a deposit of the process fee, one of the defendants, who is a vendor-defendant, was to be summoned for a future date to be fixed by the trial Court. Moreover, this date was fixed in absence of both the plaintiff and his counsel. No doubt, the clerk of the counsel was present on 13-3-1977, the date which was fixed by the clerk of the Sub-Judge during his absence on 13-1-1977. On 13-1-1977 no order for summoning of the defendant could be passed by any other person than the presiding officer of the Court. And on 13-3-1977, the Sub-Judge did not make an order for summoning of the vendor- defendant. It was simply ordered that process fee should be deposited as was ordered somewhere earlier and no summoning of the aforesaid defendant was ordered. The process fee was deposited on behalf of the plaintiff for summoning of the vendor-defendant.
2. ' It may be noted here that the defendant to be summoned, who was a vendor, is not a necessary party so as to make it difficult for the Court to proceed further even if she was not impleaded as a party. The vendor may be a proper party to be impleaded in a suit of pre-emption, but not a necessary party in any case. The date fixed by the clerk and the interlocutory order signed over by a Revenue Magistrate thereof, does not mean that the date for 13-3-1977 was validly fixed by a competent authority so as to be taken as a date on which the presence of the parties would be deemed to have been bound by the Court. The presence of a `Munshi' of the counsel even on that date would not suffice constituting a legal knowledge on the part of the plaintiff or his counsel to be bound by the Court to have made an attendance compulsorily on 5-5-1977 when the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed in default. This date could not, at all, be the date of hearing as the Court was to issue a summons for the attendance of a defendant on 5-5-1977 and there was no other act to be done by the Court amounting to the hearing of the case. In these circumstances, it can safely be opined that date viz. 5-5-1977 when the suit was dismissed in default, was not the date fixed for hearing of the suit in any manner whatsoever.
3. ' That being so, the trial Court was wrong in dismissing the suit in default on this date under Order IX, rule 8, C. P. C. This order when read with rule 8 had no application to the order dated 5-5-1977 so as to warrant the dismissal of the suit in default. In the result there being no force in this revision petition, it is hereby dismissed with costs. The case has grown very old for this or that, therefore, the Additional Sub-Judge is directed to give priority to this case so as to dispose it of expeditiously without any further delay to be caused in its disposal. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 16-3-1982,