1. DORAB PATEL, J.-According to Mr. Awan, the first respondent is a welf--are society which represents all the house-holders and owners of land in the Rivaz Garden on Multag Road, Lahore.
2. And, further according to the site plan shown to us by learned counsel, blocks of houses have been built under the scheme on Multan Road, but there is an open space separating the blocks of houses on Multan Road which Mr. Awan described as the gassy plot and we will refer to it in this order as the grassy plot.
3. Turning now to the case of the petitioners, they were running a petrol pump on Multan Road, Lahore, outside the premises of the Rivaz Garden Scheme, but as the Lahore Development Authority widened Multan Road, it directed the petitioners to transfer their petrol pump from Multan Road to the grassy plot. The petitioners complied with this order after obtaining all the requisite sanctions and started operating their petrol pump. However, the residents of the Rivaz Garden Scheme objected to the transfer of the petrol .Pump of the petitioners to the grassy plot, therefore, the 1st respondent filed a suit on their behalf in the Court of the Civil Judge 1st Class Lahore in which it sought a declaration and an injunction. The declaration sought eves that the Lahore Development Authority had acted illegally in leasing the grassy plot to the petitioners and the first respondent also sought a permanent injunction to restrain the petitioners from operating a petrol pump on the grassy plot. Together with the suit, the first respondent also sought an interim injunction, to restrain the petitioners from operating their petrol pump. By his order dated 3f-7-1978, the learned Civil Judge held that first respondent had failed to prove a good prima facie case and had also failed to prove that the balance of convenience was on its side. He, the--refore, dismissed the application for an interim injunction.
4. The first respondent challenged this order in an appeal in the District Court of Lahore. This was allowed by an Additional District Judge, who ordered "that status quo shall continue to operate till decision of the suit. The trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit within shortest possible period.- -- As the petitioners were aggrieved by this order, they challenged it in a vision in the Lahore High Court, and the main grievance stressed by them was that they had commenced operating their petrol pump on the grassy plot before this order for maintaining the status quo. Therefore, the learned Judge, who heard the revision, had no difficulty in dismissing it. This was on the ground that as the petitioners were running a petrol pump, the order for a status quo entitled them to continue operating the petrol pump and, therefore the learned Judge appears to have been of the view that the petitioners had no real grievance. Accordingly, as he dismissed the revision by his order dated 11-2-1979, the petitioners have filed this petition for leave.
5. We have heard learned counsel for both - the parties at length, and it seems to us that the question, whether the Courts below have followed the Principles laid down b this Court for the rant of interlocutory relief requires examination. Therefore, we grant leave. Security in the sum of Rs.
6. 1,000.
7. Mr. Munawar Hussain pressed for interim relief which is sought only for two items. The first item, for which the relief is sought, is the construc--petition of a room on tile grassy plot, but this has become a problem only because of the recent riots in Lahore. Even Mr. Awan admitted that the petitioners had a room which was being used as an office and for storage purposes at the date of the order for status quo passed by the learned Additional District Judge. And, further, this room was burnt out in the recent riots after the order of the learned Judge of the High Court. In these circumstances, after considerable arguments and in deference to our observa--tions, Mr. Awan stated that the first respondent would have no objection to the construction of a room by the petitioner on the grassy plot, pending the final determination of the litigation between the parties.
8. In view of this very fair concession, we would only observe that the petitioners are permitted to build a room on the grassy plot, but under no circumstances should the size of this room exceed that of the original room which was burnt out in the recent riots.
9. The next item for which the petitioners seek relief has reference to the under ground petrol tank in which they store petrol. Mr. Munawar Hussain explained that the petrol tank had been covered with bricks in accordance with the relevant regulations, but a part of it had to be cemented in accord-- ance with these safety regulations, therefore, he had sought the High Court's permission to do so, but the learned Judge had rejected this request because it meant making a departure from the status quo, and be was not inclined to make any departure from the order for the maintenance of the status quo.
10. Unfortunately, it escaped the attention of the learned Judge that the petitioners were running a petrol pump and as they were using their under ground petrol tank, their request, if allowed on terms; would only have protected the interest of the members of the first respondent. In these circumstances, it seems to us that the request of the petitioners must be allowed not merely because. They would otherwise be subject to a prosecution but because this. Is in the interest of the residents 'of the housing scheme. Therefore, the petitioners are permitted, pending the hearing of this appeal, to cement the top of their underground petrol tank. However, we would make it clear that the construction of the room as well as the cementation of the underground petrol tank will be at the cost and risk of the petitioners, and we would also record Mr. Munawar Hussain's undertaking that if the petitioners are ultimately unsuccessful in the suit filed by the first respondent, then the petitioners, will, at their own cost, remove all the changes which they made on the grassy plot. '
11. Learned counsel informed us that the District Court had directed that the suit of the first respondent should be disposed of expeditiously. We agree with this direction but we do not think a mere direction to dispose of the suit expeditiously is sufficient, therefore, we direct that the suit should be disposed of by the trial Court within six months.
12. Finally, Mr. Awan drew our attention to the fact that the first respondent had filed two applications under Order XXXIX, rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code against the petitioner for violating the order of 8-1 i-197.8 of the learned Additional District Judge. Therefore, we would clarify that these applications will be decided according to law and the Court, which has seizin of these applications, will not be influenced by anything in this order.