' This writ petition calls in question the validity of the judgment, dated 25th April, 1982, of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, in an ejectment matter.
2. The facts relevant for the disposal of the writ petition may be briefly stated. Muhammad Younus, respondent No, 1, through his mother/general attorney, Mst. Khurshid Begum, filed an application against the petitioner before the Rent Controller at Lahore under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) for his eviction from a shop located in the portion of house No, 1, Chiragh Street No, 66, McLeod Road, Lahore. He alleged that he was the owner of the shop, in dispute, and the petitioner was a tenant under him for the last many years at a monthly rent of Rs, 300. He prayed for his ejectment on the grounds that he required the shop for his personal bona fide use to run the business of cars, scooters, the activities of the petitioner were nuisance to the Mohallandars, the petitioner had caused damage to the disputed shop and impaired the value of the shop (Annexure A). The petitioner denied these allegations in his reply (Annexure B). He raised preliminary objection to the effect that his landlady was Mst. Khurshid Begum and not Muhammad Younus, respondent No,
1. He further took up the plea that he executed a rent note in favour of Mst. Khurshid Begum and she had been receiving the rent and not the respondent, Muhammad Younas. On the pleadings of the parties, a preliminary issue was framed by the learned Rent Controller as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. The learned Rent Controller, after appraisal of the evidence produced by the parties in support of their respective contentions arrived at a finding by his order, dated 20th January, 1980 (Annexure D), that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. Accordingly, the ejectment application was dismissed. Being aggrieved with this order, respondent No, 2 filed an appeal through his general attorney Mst. Khurshid Begum, before the learned'District Judge, Lahore. The appeal was accepted by Mehr Muhammad Nawaz Khan, the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, vide his judgment dated 25th April, 1982 (Annexure F).
Consequently. The case was remanded to the learned Rent Controller for further proceedings in accordance with law and the parties were directed to appear before him on 4th May, 1982 as the case was very old and the Rent Controller was directed to expedite the disposal of the case within a maximum period of four months. The learned Rent Controller after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and examining the record with reference to the provisions of landlord as defined in section 2 (c) of the Ordinance, gave a finding of fact that the respondent was the landlord as he was entitled to receive the rent and the petitioner was his tenant. He also took note of the fact that the application for ejectment had been filed by respondent No, 1 through her mother Mst. Khurshid Begum, as general attorney.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Additional District Judge has passed the impugned order without reference to evidence on record on the question of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. He further submitted that the statement of respondent No, 1 before the learned Rent Controller sufficiently proved that there existed no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge is based on erroneous assumption of law that the respondent was entitled to receive the rent from the petitioner merely because he was the owner of the property, in dispute. He has relied upon Mst. Kalsoom Akhtar and 8 others v. Muhammad Yaqoob, where it was held that in terms of section 2 (6) of the Ordinance, a landlord is a person who, for the time being, is entitled to receive rent and the ownership of the building is not a condition precedent for claiming the status of landlord. He has also relied on Muhammad Sharif v. Sh. Muhammad Amin, where it was held that the definition of the term "landlord" as defined in section 2 (c) of the Ordinance is of wide import and the entitlement of any person to receive rent on behalf of another person is not dependent upon the execution of a formal written authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on Hakam Din v. Muhammad Irshad, in support of his contention that a person entitled to receive the rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person was relegated to the position of the landlord to file an ejectment petition in his own name irrespective of the fact whether or not he was proved to be the sole owner of the shop. The precise submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Mst. Khurshid Begum alone was entitled to file the ejectment. Petition and in terms of section 116 of the Evidence Act, the petitioner was bound to admit her status as his landlady. It is submitted that Mst. Khurshid Begum delivered the possession of the disputed shop to the petitioner by getting the rent deed executed in her favour and also received the rent due. She never directed the petitioner to attorney as tenant of Muhammad Younas, respondent No, 1 and, therefore, no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties.
5. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent submitted that the petitioner was inducted into the disputed premises as a tenant by respondent No,
2. The application for ejectment has also been filed by respondent No, 2 through her attorney and therefore, the mere fact that the later was deputed to receive or collect the rent from the petitioner would not affect the status of the respondent as landlord.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the evidence on record with their assistance. Respondent No, 2 has categorically stated a P. W. 3 in his examination-in-chief before the learned Rent Controller that the petitioner was inducted into the disputed shop as a tenant by the respondent himself. This1 2 3 assertion has not been challenged by the petitioner either in the cross-examination or in his own statement as R. W.
3. This being so, the mere fact that the rent deed was executed between the petitioner and the attorney of the respondent would not ipso facto affect the status of respondent No, 2 as a landlord as defined in section (2) (c) of the Ordinance. According to this definition it is not necessary that the landlord should personally receive rent in respect of any building or rented land but the criterion is that such person should be entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land either on his own account or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. The ownership of the property in dispute by respondent No, 2 is not denied. It is true that in an ejectment application under the Ordinance, it is only the question of relationship of landlord and tenant that is relevant and not the question of title to the property which may arise indirectly only to ascertain the issue bearing on this relationship. In the instant case, however, the petitioner was inducted into the disputed shop as a tenant by respondent No,
2. The ejectment application as well as the appeal before the District Judge was also filed by respondent No, 2 and, therefore, the defect if any, in not filing the ejectment petition by Mst. Khurshid Begum in her own name was of no consequence and no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the petitioner by filing the ejectment petition by Muhammad Younas, respondent, through her attorney/mother Mst. Khurshid Begum. The precedents cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable and do not support the case of the petitioner. The petitioner has neither placed on record a copy of the power of attorney executed by respondent No, 2 in favour of Mst. Khurshid Begum nor the rent deed and hence it is not even otherwise possible to sustain his pleas in the exercise Of constitutional jurisdiction. The impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect.
7. In view of the above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. PLD 1976 Kar. 992 PLD 1977 Lah. 516 PLD 1978 Lab. 333