This revision application arises out of proceedings instituted under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereafter called the said Act). According to the applicants, in January 1962, they were working in a coal mine owned or managed by a business known as S. M. Rahman & Company. One Syed Motiur-Rehman was the sole proprietor of this business, but in February 1962, he entered into a partnership with one Syed Muhammad Hassan for the running of this business. I shall refer to this firm as the firm, and as the said Syed Motiur-Rehman has described himself as the Managing Director of the firm. I shall refer to him for convenience as the respondent. No sooner had the firm been set up than it ran into difficulties. The partners fell out with each other, and I was informed that a suit for dissolution of the firm was filed, which is still pending. Perhaps because of these disputes, the firm did not pay the wages of the applicants for several months. However, by mutual consent, these disputes were referred on 15th May 1962, to arbitration, and in the events that happened, by a compromise or award dated the 15th May 1962 (Exh. A/3), the firm undertook to pay Rs. 12,000 to the applicants for their wages. However, it did not honour its commitment to the applicants, and instead resorted to a lock--out, therefore the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) intervened and effected a settlement on 6th June 1962 (Exh. A/1) under which both the firm and the respondent accepted liability for the payment of Rs. 12,000 to the applicants for the wages due to them. As this second commitment was also dishonoured on 9th October 1962, the applicants filed an application against the firm through the respondent under section 15 of the said Act for the recovery of Rs. 12,000 as their wages. The firm contested an application but it admitted in its written statement that the respondent was its Managing Director. It also did not deny the claim of the applicants that wages amounting to Rs. 12,000 wore due to them but submitted that the application was barred by the award Exh. A-3 and by the Settlement Exh. A-1. It took various other legal pleas web as limitation, non-joinder of parties etc. On the other band, Syed Motiur- Rehman, who filer a separate written statement, merely pleaded the as the respon--dent was in sole possession of the business of the firm, the respondent alone was responsible for the payment in dispute. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Quetta, who heard the application as the authority under the said Act, held that the application was within time and decreed it with special costs against the respondent only, who filed an appeal against this judgment in the, District Court, Quetta, and as this appeal was allowed by the District Judge, Quetta by his judgment dated the 4th November 1965, the applicants filed a revision against this judgment more than four years ago, in which they impleaded both the firm end Syed Motiur-Rehman. This revision application has now come-- up for hearing before me.
2. Mr. S. M. Arif and Mr. Jaffery, learned counsel for the respondent, raised a preliminary legal objection that the revision application was not maintainable because, according to learned counsel, the District Court hearing an appeal under the said Act was not a Court subordinate to this Court within the meaning of section 115, C. P. C. In support of this argument, learned counsel referred me to several judgments, including a judgment of Haleem, J., in Sher Ali and others v. P. I. D.
C. Collieries (PLD 1970 Quetta 85). But Sher Ali's case and all the cases cited related to revisions against the orders of the authority under section 15 of the said Act and not revisions against the judgments passed by the District Court under the said Act, therefore they are not relevant," and the question has to be decided by reference to section 17 of the said Act. According to this section, in appeal can be filed against the judgments of the authority' "before the District Court." As the said Act does not define the term "District Court" Mr. Hanifi rightly submitted that the term meant the District Court as defined in the General Clauses Act. As the District Court under the General Clauses Act is clearly a Court subordinate to the High Court, it follow that- a revision would lie under section 115 against judgments of the District Court under section 17 of the said Act.
3. Mr. Jaffery however submitted that as revisions could not be filed against the judgments of the authority under the said Act, it should be presumed that revisions could not be filed against the judgments of the District Court, otherwise the results would be anomalous. Whether the results be anomalous or not, the Courts have to give effect to the plain language of the statute. Although the Legislature was aware that the District Court is a Court subordinate to the High Court and that revisions against the judgments of the District Court lie in the High Court, it has enacted that appeals against the judgments of the authority under the said Act should be filed in "the District Court". In my humble opinion, by not defining the District Court, the Legislature has clearly manifested its intention to preserve the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
4. Mr. S. M. Arif then submitted that not only did revisions not be from the authority to this Court but that the scope of an enquiry before the authority was very limited, therefore the provisions of section 115, C. P. C. were excluded by implication, end in support of this argument he referred me to a judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the Manager, The Spring Mills Ltd. v. G.
D. Ambekar (AIR 1949 Bom. 188). I am not able to understand this argument. The fact that the powers of the authority under the said Act are limited or are not as wide as those of a civil Court would limit the scope of a revision, but I do not see how it would exclude a revision, nor can this Court's jurisdiction be so lightly excluded. On the contrary, the presumption always is in favour of the jurisdiction of the superior Courts and as there is nothing in the said Act to exclude the jurisdiction of this Court, Mr. Arif's argument is without merit. Turning now to the judgment cited, I find that, the Bombay High Court held in that case that revisions could not' be filed in the High Court against the judgments of the authority under the said Act, but it expressly approved of the practice of the Court to entertain revisions against the judgments of the District Court under the said Act, therefore far from supporting Mr. Arif's argument, the judgment cited is fatal to his submission. I agree with the practice of the Bombay High Court and I hold that a revision can be filed against -a judgment of the District Court under section 17 of the said Act.
5. As the revision is maintainable, the question is whether the applicants have made out a case for the exercise of the Court's revisional jurisdiction, and in order to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel I have to repeat here that the authority had held that the claim of the applicants was within time and decreed it only against the respondent, who had there--fore filed an appeal in the District Court on the ground that the in the event of the applicants was time-barred and that in the events chat had happened he was not liable for the amount due to the applicants. The learned District Judge had accepted both these contentions and allowed the, appeal, and it will be convenient first to consider the question of limitation.
6. The said Act itself regulates the period for filing an application under section 15, and the two provisions to sub-section (2) of this section, which are relevant, read as follows: "Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made as the case may be: Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfied the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."
The claim of the applicants was admittedly for wages for the period up to 10-3-1962 and although their application" was filed more than six months thereafter, the authority allowed their claim because they had been negotiating, with their employer in the manner set out in para. 1 herein.
Now, as the period of six months prescribed in the provision quoted above is not an inflexible period, the question is whether the authority acted according to law in thus extending time in favour of the applicants. The said Act does not define sufficient cause for the purpose of making an application under section 15, but bearing in mind the beneficial object of the statute it is obvious that the time spent in negotiations between an employer and his workmen with regard to any wage dispute would amount to sufficient cause. As in the instant case, it is not even argued before me. that the applicants had acted unreasonably in negotiating with the firm and with the respondent, I have no doubt that the authority exercised its discretion according to law in entertaining the application before it. It is therefore difficult to understand how the learned District.
Judge held that the application was time-barred and as his reasons are very brief, I may quote them here. In rejecting the claim before him the learned District Judge has observed: "It is quite manifest that no move was made at the time of presentation of the application to satisfy the Commissioner that there was good cause for coming late before him. It is quite clear that the delay was not condoned when the petition was made. Consequently the learned Commissioner was not competent to proceed with the matter. In acting he had only flogged a dead horse. The whip, however, cannot revive life. This is yet another circumstance, which establishes the invalidity of the impugned order."
Thus it will be seen that the learned District Judge has not applied his mind to the question whether in the situation in which they were placed the applicants were entitled to delay filing an application because of negotiations with their employer, but instead he has held their claim to be time-barred because "the delay was not condoned when the petition was made." The view assumes that, as the authority did not condone the delay at the time when the application was filed, it could not do so subse--quently, and that indeed was the bald submission of Mr. Arif. But the authority is a Tribunal and not a Court. Secondly, it I could have condoned the delay only after hearing the respondent, therefore is it really material whether it passed its order condoning the delay at a preliminary stage of the proceedings or with the main suit, as it has done? To hold that it could not' condone the delay merely because it did not do so at a preliminary stage of the case would be to make a fetish of technicalities. Further, there is nothing in the language of the section compelling me to take so technical a view, the more so as such a construction of section 15, would clearly defeat the beneficial object of the said Act. I therefore do not agree with the view of the learned District Judge that the authority had erred in entertaining the application of the applicants.
7. Mr. Arif then submitted that even if the view of the learned District Judge was erroneous, this Court could not interfere with it in revision. The argument overlooks the consequences of the view of the learned District Judge. Not only has the learned District Judge 'misconstrued the question of limitation, but by doing so, he has refused to entertain the claim of the applicants. He has thus illegally refused to exercise his jurisdiction and such an error is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
8. I now turn to another technical objection advanced by Mr. Arif, but it is not irrelevant to point out here that this objection was raised for the first the in this Court, three years after the admission of this revision application. According to Mr. Arif, the mines in which the applicants were employed were situated in Sibi District, and according to the Notifications issued by the West Pakistan Government under section 15, of the said Act claims arising in the Sibi District had to be filed in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Sibi whilst claims arising in Quetta District only could be filed in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Quetta, therefore the contention was that as the claim in the instant case had been filed in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Quetta, the order of the authority decreeing the claim of the applicants against, the respondent was without jurisdiction. This objection is based on the assumption that the mines where the applicants were employed are situated in the Sibi District. But the question of the location of these mines is a question of fact which had to be proved by evidence, and as the respondent has not produced any such evidence, on this ground alone, the objection about jurisdiction cannot be entertained at this stage. In order to overcome this difficulty, Mr. Arif submitted that I bad to take judicial notice of the location of the mines. Learned counsel was not able to refer me to any principle or provision of law in support of this extraordinary proposition, and I may observe here that the only provision under which the Court, can take judicial notice of facts is section 57 of the Evidence Act. Under this section the Court has to take judicial notice of the geographical divisions of the world and of the territories of Pakistan. But these provisions do not permit me to take notice of the location of an obscure village where the mines in question may be located. As observed by Munir in his Commentary on Evidence (4th Edition, page 384) " . . . . the Court will not take judicial notice- of the precise extent or limits of the various counties and divisions of the country nor where particular places are or are not situated . . . . ."
Additionally, although learned counsel took time for arguments on this very objection; he did not care to supply even a map to show the location of the mines, therefore on the plain language of section 57 I refuse to take notice of their location.
9. However, even if I assume for the sake of argument that the mines in question are situated in the Sibi District, this assumption will not help the respondent's case. This is because, according to the Notifications, claims in the Sibi District have to be filed in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Sibi and claims in the Quetta District have to be filed is the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Quetta. Naturally, the Notifications do not define the meaning of a china under the said Act, and that question has to be decided with reference to the provisions of the said Act. The only provision which is relevant is section 15, according to which the Provincial Government may appoint a Person "to be the party to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of . . . . . delay in payment of the wages of persons employed or paid in that area." As the claim of the applicants arises out of delay in the payment of their wages they were entitled to file their application in Quetta if they received their wages in Quetta. That is their contention, and although the respondent now seeks to deny it, he dad not raise any objection in this respect in his written statement nor is there any evidence in support of this objection, because, as I have observed, this objection was raised for the first time long after the revision I had been admitted in this Court. According to the settled law, the objection cannot be considered at this stage, and it appears to have been raised only in order to delay' proceedings.
10. I now turn-to the merits of the claim of the applicants and I have to point out here that Mr. Arif did not dispute the contention of the applicants that they were entitled to Rs. 12,000 as wages, which was the amount decreed in their favour by the authority. However learned counsel submitted that Syed Motiur Rehman alone was liable for this amount or most of this amount because the claim was for the period before the respondent had joined the firm. In support of this plea learned counsel relied not on the provisions of the said Act, under which the respondent was sued, but solely op those of the Partnership Act. Strange though this be, I shall first consider Mr. Arif's arguments before I turn to the said Act.
11. Mr. Arif's first submission was that the respondent could not be liable for the wages due to the applicants before the Constitution of the firm on account of the provisions of section 31 of the Partnership Act. It is not necessary for me to consider the provisions of this section because there is nothing in it or in the. Partnership Act to prevent of a firm or a firm from accepting liabilities for claims anterior to the constriction of the firm, and that is precisely what the respondent appears to have done in the instant case by referring the claims of the applicants to arbitration after the formation of the firm. In the award (Exh. A-3), as Mr. Arif called it, the respondent has clearly stated that the dispute with the applicants had been mutually decided through arbitration and that he had accepted liability, on behalf of the firm, for the applicants' claim of Rs. 12,000. In view of the respondent's own representation in this award, he cannot now rely on section 30 of the Partnership Act. Faced with this difficulty, Mr. Arif submitted that even though the award imposed liability on the respondent it was not valid or binding on him because he had no power under section 19 of the Partnership Act, read with the partnership deed of the firm, to refer any disputes to arbitration, and this argument was accepted by the learned District Judge. As the partnership deed of the firm does not confer authority on the partners to refer disputes to Arbitration, Syed Motiur Rehman might have den able to repudiate the award on the basis of section 19 of the Partnership Act. But ho has not done so, and as the respondent had himself referred the claim of the applicants to arbitration, he cannot be allowed to repudiate his own representations in the award. The argument is without merit and it is unfortunate that the learned District Judge failed to realise, that the respondent was estopped from challenging the award.
12. Further, apart from the award, there is ample other evidence to prove the claim of the applicants. Thus, as I have pointed out, neither the respondent nor the firm honoured the award, therefore disputes between the parties went on with the result: that there was a lock out and the Assistant Labour Com--missioner was compelled to intervene and effect a settlement under section 5(3) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. This settlement (Exh. A-1) was signed by the respondent and by the attorney of the applicants in June 1962, four months after the constitution of the firm, and under it, the respondent has expressly accepted liability for the claim of the applicants both personally and en behalf of the firm. Yet the learned District Judge hap held that this settlement did not support the claim of the applicants. According to the learned District Judge, the applicants could not claim any benefit under it because they had not signed it and because it was illegal and he also observed that the respondent had not accepted any personal liability under it. The settlement itself states that it was effected under section 5 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, and I regret to say that the view of the learned District Judge is based on a patent misreading of the settlement. Mr. Arif therefore did not support the observations of the learned District Judge but instead he advanced two other arguments to show that the respondent was of bound by the settlement. The first argument was that the applicants were barred from enforcing the settlement through an application under the said Act. Learned counsel was not able to refer me to any provision in, the said Ordinance in support of this argument nor is there any such provision. On the other hand, both this Ordinance and the said Act have been enacted to protect workmen and they should be construed liberally so as to supplement each other. Therefore once a settlement is effected under the said Ordinance, it means that an industrial dispute has been averted and it also means that the liability of wages claimed by workmen has been ascertained beyond doubt. The liability having thus been ascertained, not only is there no bar to enforcing it through an application under the said Act, but this appears to be the most appropriate method of enforcing the effect of the settlement. Mr. Arif's second argument was that the respondent was not bound by the Settlement (Exh. A-1), in view of sections 19 and 31 of the Partnership Act. This argument was merely a repetition of the earlier argument advanced to show that the respondent was not liable under the award (Exh. A-3) on account of sections 19 and 31 of the Partnership Act.
Once again the argument is fallacious, and for the same reasons. As the respondent has deliberately accepted liability personally and on behalf of the firm for the claim of the applicants, he is estopped from relying on the provisions of the Partnership Act.
13. There is also another aspect of the case to which I have referred, an aspect so obvious that I cannot understand how it escaped the attention of the learned District Judge. As the respondent is being sued under the said Act, the question of his liability has to be determined primarily by reference to its provisions and I repeatedly invited learned counsel to refer me to some provisions of the said Act in support of his argument, but he failed to do so. I have therefore to point out here that, in view of section 3 read with section 19 of the said Act, an application under section 15 can be filed by workmen, at their option, either against their employer or against the person "responsible to the employer for the-supervision and control of the industrial establishment" (clause (b) of the proviso to section 3) or both. Thus the said Act envisages two types of liability. The liability of the employer is based on his ownership of an industrial establishment (which includes a mine) and is a contractual liability, and section 15 only provides an additional remedy for enforcing this liability.
But a person "responsible for supervision and control" under clause (b) of the proviso to section 3 may have no financial interest whatsoever in an industrial establishment, and similarly he would not be liable on a contractual basis because even a contract executed by him would be on behalf of his employer, therefore his liability is a purely statutory liability. The object of creating this special liability appears to be to prevent delays in the payment of wages which might be caused by disputes about the ownership of an industrial establishment, and it is not irrelevant to point out here that when the person under this statutory liability is not able to meet the claim decreed against him, the authority and the District Court are directed to recover the amount from "the employer of the employed person concerned." Further, the Legislature has dealt with exhaustively in sections 7 to 12 with the deductions that may be set off against a claim for wages; there--fore in my humble opinion, if an application under section is within time, it can be resisted only on the grounds specified in the said Act.
14. In the light of this discussion I shall now examine the claim of the applicants against the respondent. They can succeed either by proving that he was their employer or by proving that lie was under the statutory liability which I have discussed. At the highest, Mr. Arif's reliance on the Partnership Act is relevant to the respondent's 'contractual liability as employer, but it has no relevance---s to his statutory liability. However, the burden of proving that he is under this statutory liability is heavily on the applicants. Fortunately for them, by describing himself as the Managing Director of the firm, respon--dent has proved this claim for them. The term "Managing Director" is obviously incorrect with regard to the management of a firm but the respondent's own description of himself proves that he was the person supervising, and controlling the mines in which the applicants are employed. Therefore as I have held that the claim is within time and as the respondent does not rely on any of the provisions of the said Act, it follows that the claim was rightly decreed against him by the authority, and it taking a contrary view the learned District Judge has misread both the said Act and the evidence on the record. The revision is therefore allowed with costs and I restore the order o-- the authority dated the 31st May 1965.