These three revision petitions under section 13 of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 are directed against the order of the Additional Commissioner (Cons.), Lahore dated 11-6-1981, whereby, in exercise of his revisional powers, he made certain amendments in the khatas of the parties.
2. Brief facts are that the consolidation scheme of revenue estate Rakh Bauli, Tehsil Ferozewala, Di strict Sheikhupura was confirmed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer on 30-12-1977 under section 10(3) of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 (hereinafter referred as "the Ordinance"). About three years after the confirmation of the scheme, the respondents Mst. Mumtaz Jahan Begum etc. Moved a complaint before the Punjab Administrative Vigilance Commission (now defunct) (hereinafter referred as "the Commission") alleging that the petitioners Muhammad Anwar etc. Had fraudulently and by collusion with the consolidation staff got their valuable land comprising compact block, confirmed in their own names and in lieu thereof an inferior land scattered at different places, included in their wandas. On investigation the Commission found that the land of the respondents had been exchanged clandestinely, without their consent and knowledge, and accordingly vide its communication No,. 190-Rev/1 E/80, dated 28-10-1980, advised the Board of Revenue to redress the wrong by exercise of its suo motu revisional powers under section 13 of the Ordinance. The Board of Revenue, in turn, sent down the case to the Additional Commissioner (Cons.), Lahore for taking further action under his suo moto revisional jurisdiction, after hearing all concerned. Consequently, the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) after obtaining fresh proposals from the Collector (Cons.), Sheikhupura and hearing the objections thereon of the parties concerned made suitable amendments in their khatas, vide the impugned order dated 11- 6-1981, thereby accommodating them largely on their pre-consolidation lands. Feeling aggrieved by these amendments the petitioners have filed these three separate revision petitions before this Court. Since the parties and the lands involved are same, these revision petitions have been disposed of together by this order.
3. Ch. Muhammad Afzal Wahia, learned counsel for the petitioners in R.O.R. Nos, 1480/1981 and 1499/1981 argued that the scheme of Mst. Mumtaz Jahan Begum, the principal respondent in these revision petitions, having been confirmed as long before as 30-12-1977 with the consent of her own representative, one Taj Din, and neither any appeal .Nor revision filed against it within the prescribed period of limitation, the same had attained finality in law and, therefore, it could not be competently revised by the learned Additional Commissioner (Cons.), after a lapse of for years, under his suo moto revisional powers, exercised in obedience to the direction of the Board of Revenue, issued. At the behest of the defunct Punjab Administrative Vigilance .Commission. Relying upon the authority of this Court's earlier judgment reported as "Muhammad Din and 3 others v. The State, the learned counsel went on to argue that as the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) was absolutely unfettered in the exercise of suo moto revisional jurisdiction vested in him under section 13 of the Ordinance, he could not be bound by any direction of the Board of Revenue calling upon him to decide the case in exercise of that jurisdiction, nor it was competent to the Commission to issue any direction or advice to the Board of Revenue to decide or have the case decided under suo moto revisional jurisdiction. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that as the amendments made in the original scheme had resulted into curtailment of the petitioners' entitlement in class I land, the same should be rescinded and the land withdrawn from the petitioners be restored to them.
4. On similar grounds the learned counsel for Nazir Ahmad, petitioner in ROR No,. 1545/1981, has attacked the amendments and submitted that as they had unduly reduced the petitioner's area in terms of class I land from 43K, 1M to 39K, 4M the same should be set aside and the original scheme dated 30-12-1977 as confirmed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer be restored between the parties.
5. On the other hand, Sheikh Abdul Aziz and Ch. Subhan Khan, the learned counsels for the respondents, submitted that Mst. Mumtaz Jahan Begum respondent resided permanently at Quetta with her daughter; that taking advantage of her absence from the village the petitioners Muhammad Anwar etc. Had fraudulently and by collusion with the consolidation field staff and one Taj Din, a self-styled representative of Mst. Mumtaz Jahan Begum, got her valuable land comprising compact block, confirmed in their own names and in lieu thereof an inferior and mostly class III and IV land in fragments, got allocated to her; that knowledge of the allocation so made was withheld from her through fraudulent concealment, and that when ultimately, in 1980, she came to know of the fraud, the limitation period prescribed for appeal or revision had already expired. It was in view of these circumstances, the learned counsel submitted, that the respondent had to invoke the aid of the Commission and through it that of the Board of Revenue and the Additional Commissioner (Cons.), for the redress of her grievances.
6. With regard to the direction/advice issued by the Commission to the Board of Revenue and consequently by the Board to the Additional Commissioner (Cons.), the learned counsels submitted that it was not authoritative but persuasive and having neither intended to offend against the judicial dicta of this Court in Muhammad Din and 3 others v. The State etc. Nor to interfere with the discretion of the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) in the matter of exercise of his suo moto revisional jurisdiction, was indisputable, Lastly, it was submitted that since a fraud had been committed in this case . No length of time would operate as a bar to seeking relief unless some laches have been shown on the part of the respondents.1
7. From the arguments addressed by the learned counsels of the parties, the main questions for or consideration are
(a) Whether it was competent to the Commission to issue direction or advice to the Board of Revenue to decide or have the matter decided by exercise of suo moto jurisdiction. If so, then ho.v to avoid collision with this court's earlier decision in "Muhammad Din and 3 others v. The State etc. PLD 1982, Rev. 2", holding that the Board was absolutely unfettered in exercise of its suo moto jurisdiction and not bound by any extraneous direction or advice calling upon it to exercise that jurisdiction;
(b) Whether the Board of Revenue was empowered to direct the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) to correct any irregularities pointed out in a consolidation scheme, by exercise of his revisional powers under section 13(2)(4) of the Ordinance; and
(c) Whether the amendments made by the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) have really led to reduction in the entitlements of the petitioners.
8. Adverting to question (a) above we find that pre-consolidation Ian of respondent Mst. Mumtaz Jahan Begum was exchanged clandestinely through A. C. Os.' confirmation order dated 30-12-1977 of which she was kept in dark through fraudulent concealment. When ultimately she came to know of the fraud the time for appeal or revision had already run out and, therefore, instead of seeking redress through a regular a or revision as provided by law she had a recourse to an alternate remedy by applying to the defunct Commission to intercede on her behalf. The Commission after having verified the complaint by its Hearing Officer, advised the Board of Revenue to redress the wrong by exercise of suo moto revisional powers vested in it under section 13(1) (a) of the Ordinance. I think there was nothing irregular about it. The advisory function of the defunct Commission was not just assumed. It was statutory and provided in section 23 of the Repealed Punjab Administrative Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1979, which empowered it to advise any agencies, public servants, or any other functionaries under the administrative control of the Provincial Government to take steps, inter alia, for correction of administrative excesses. As for the decision of this court in "Muhammad Din and others v. The State" denying the Commission of a right to fetter the discretion of the Board of Revenue in the matter of exercise of its suo moto jurisdiction, it was given in a distinct set of circumstances which do not exist in the case in hand and has therefore no relevance in it. In the aforesaid case, for instance, the revision petition of Muhammad Din etc: had already been decided finally, vide the order dated 5-6-1976 passed by the Board of Revenue in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under clause (b) of section 13(1) of the Ordinance and no remedy of review having been availed of against that order within the prescribed period of limitation, the same had attained finality in law, in terms of section 7 of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957 and, therefore, it was held that the case could not be competently reopened and decided afresh in compliance of direction of the Commission issued on a complaint made to it after 5 years of passing of that order, either by way of a review under section 8 of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957 or by invoking suo moto jurisdiction under clause (a) of section 13(1). It was further held that direction or advice of the Commission issued in that behalf to the Board, who in the matters of exercise of its appellate and revisional jurisdiction being, in view of section 4(2) of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957, not subject to the administrative control of the Provincial Government and thus excluded from the purview of Punjab Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1979, was without lawful authority and had thus no claim to recognition. In the instant case, however, as no such revision petition had been previously adjudicated upon by the Board by exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under clause (b) of section 13(1), there was no legal bar to taking up the case by it under its suo mow jurisdiction vested under clause (a) of that section, on the basis of information coming to its knowledge from any source, which might include any direction or advice of the Commission provided that the same had not bound it (the Board) in exercise of its discretion to invoke or not to invoke that jurisdiction.
9. In this case as would appear from the communication dated 28-10-1980, the direction/advice given by the Commission was not authoritative but persuasive. The Board had no obligation to follow it but simply to take it into consideration and to attach such weight as it seemed to it to deserve. In fact the direction/advice of the Commission depended for its influence upon its own merits, nor upon any legal claim which it had to recognition. The Board was thus absolutely at liberty to accept or not to accept such direction/advice in the exercise of its suo mot jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the direction/advice of the Commission, notwithstanding its being merely persuasive and not authoritative, could not be the basis for exercise of suo moto jurisdiction of the Board, cannot be supported.
10. As for the powers of the Board of Revenue to issue direction to any subordinate revenue/consolidation officer, it has never been called in question. The Board constituted under the Board of Revenue Act, 1957 is vested with the powers of superintendence and control over all revenue/ consolidation officers as regards "administration of land, collection of land revenue, preparation of revenue record and other matters relating thereto". Besides, being the highest Court of appeal and revision in revenue cases in the province, it is the function of the Board to keep all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority to correct irregularities were found in their proceedings. For that purpose it can give any direction to the subordinate courts as respects their judicial functions and command them to do what their duty requires in every case where the is no other specific remedy available. So, in the present case where the respondents had been deprived of their valuable land by means of frau and their remedy through any regular appeal or revision had become barred by limitation, there was nothing to debar the Board from invoking it superior jurisdiction and giving direction to the Additional Commissioner (Cons.), being its subordinate court, to rectify the wrong by exercise of hi suo moto revisional jurisdiction under section 13(2) (4) of the Ordinance.
11. Furthermore, it will be seen that suo moto revisional jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) as envisaged in subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance cannot stand on even plane with suo moto jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue vested in it under clause (a) of subsection (1) of that section. The very fact that the words "at any time on its own motion" used in clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 13 as respects the Board of Revenue, have not found their way in subsection (2) of that section dealing with the jurisdiction of Additional Commissioner (Cons.) will show that whereas the Board was absolutely unfettered in its discretion to invoke or not to invoke its suo now revisional jurisdiction in compliance of the direction of any other authority or tribunal calling upon it to exercise that jurisdiction, the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) could not claim immunity from any direction given to him by the Board as a superior Court to take up and decide any matter by exercise of his revisional jurisdiction vested under subsection (2) ibid. In such view of the matter the direction issued by the Board calling upon the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) to rectify the irregularities pointed out in the schemes of the parties, by exercise of his revisional jurisdiction was unexceptionable.
12. Finally, coming to the merits of the case we find that pre-consolidation land of respondent Mst.
Mumtaz Jahan Begum had been obtained by the petitioners by fraud and in collusion with the consolidation field staff and one Taj Din who had masqueraded as representative of Mst. Mumtaz Jahan Begum and signed the register of schemes on her behalf. Therefore, the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) had rightly withdrawn this land from the petitioners and restored it to the respondent and petitioners in turn had been shifted to the lands owned and possessed by them before consolidation. The contention that in the process of making amendments, the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) had unduly reduced the entitlements of the petitioners in terms of class I land does not find any support from the record. The sub-joined statement will indicate the pre- consolidation entitlements of the petitioners in terms of class I land and the area given to them by the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) through amendments in the scheme :-{{TABLE TEXT}} Scheme Names of Area pre- Area given Decrease/ No,. The right- consolidation by amendments increase. Holders in terms of in terms of class I land class I land K M nnnnnn K M 114 Muhammad Anwar etc. 134 6 134 2 - 4 marlas 42 Mst. Fazal Bibi etc: 286 5 286 15 + 10 marlas 112 Nazir Ahmad 38 12 39 4 + 12 marlas This will show that while Mst. Fazal Bibi and Nazir Ahmad petitioners have gained by 10 and 12 marlas each the loss sustained by Muhammad Anwa petitioner has not been more than 4 marlas, which being within t permissible limit of 10 marlas, calls for no interference in revision.
13. In view of what has been discussed above, all these three revision petitions fail and are dismissed hereby.
14. The order was reserved in this case for further scrutiny of record and has been announced today in the presence of the parties and their counsel. PLD 1982 Rev. 2