This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned IIIrd Labour Court , given on 15th January, 1983, dismissing the grievance petition of the appellant, challenging the orders of his dismissal from service.
2. The admitted facts of this case are that on the night, intervening between 31st July, 1981 and 1st August, 1981, at about 005 hours, an accident took place near AI-Azam Square, Karimabad Chowrangi, Karachi, in which a bus of the Karachi Transport Corporation, bearing No. 9826, which was being driven by the appellant, crushed under its wheels a woman and a child, in consequence whereof both were killed on the spot. The appellant perhaps apprehending danger to his life from the gathering people abandoned the bus and ran away to his house. According to him, he was taken from the scene by the driver of a van. The people who had gathered on the scene, not finding the driver of the bus, set the bus, on fire which was completely gutted. No report of the accident was made by the appellant either to his superiors or to the police and the appellant remained absent from his duties for a period of 11 days. However, on the very night of the accident, at 0200 hours, report of the accident was lodged at the Liaquatabad Police Station by the Incharge of that police station, Inspector Muhammad Jameelur Rehman's. The appellant was subsequently charge-sheeted and a domestic enquiry was held in which the statements of the Assistant Yard Master, Imam Naqi, and the appellant were recorded. On .The basis of the report of the enquiry officer. Whose finding was that the charges of negligent driving, in consequence which 2 lives were lost, abandoning the vehicle and failing to report the matter to the authorities had been duly established against him, the appellant was dismissed from service with effect from 20th September, 1981.
3. The learned Labour Court, before which the appellant had preferred a grievance petition against his dismissal from service, has repelled the contention of the appellant that no domestic enquiry was held in the matter and has pointed out that the appellant himself, in his cross-examination before the Labour Court, has admitted that the enquiry officer recorded statements in his presence, that the enquiry officer asked him to put questions in cross-examination to the witness but he did not put any question to him and that the enquiry papers bear his signatures. The learned Labour Court has also referred to the admissions of the appellant himself that it was the bus driven by him which was involved in the accident resulting in the death of a woman and a child, that he had abandoned the bus which was set on fire and that he had reported for duties after 11 days. The learned Labour Court has taken the view that the alleged illness of tire appellant after the accident, in support whereof he had produced a Medical Certificate, did not exonerate the appellant from his primary duty of reporting the matter to the authorities.
4. As already indicated, the appellant himself has admitted all along that it was the bus driven by him which had run-over a woman and a child near Al-Azam Square and killed them, that he had abandoned the bus which was set on fire, that he had not reported the matter to the Police and other authorities and had unauthorizedly remained absent from duties for 11 days. His explanation for the accident is that there was great rush on account of it being the night of the Eid and that further the breaks of the bus bad failed. If there was a great rush, as contended by him, it was the bounden duty of the appellant to proceed with great caution which he did not do. It was further the duty of the appellant to exercise extreme caution specially when he found a woman and a child in front of his bus. As regards his contention that the breaks suddenly failed, there is not an iota of evidence in support of his bare word. No reasons have been given by him why the breaks suddenly failed when they were normally functioning previously. Breaks of a vehicle which is running normally do not ordinarily tail suddenly as is claimed by the appellant. The appellant has also explained that the reason for his abandoning the bus and running away to his house was that the apprehended danger to his life from the public which was rapidly gathering on the spot. If the appellant had immediately stopped the bus and taken steps to take the woman and the child to the police station or to the hospital, it is unlikely that the public would have attacked him or burnt the bus. Evidently the mob was infuriated at finding the driver of the bus absconding and hence vented its anger on the abandoned bus. Unfortunately, cases of drivers of trucks and buses abandoning the vehicles involved in accidents are becoming frequent and this gives a handle to the public to turn its anger on such vehicles by destroying them. If on the other hand, the person incharge of the. Vehicle acts according to law and takes steps to render assistance to the persons involved in the accident, it is unlikely that the public would attack or harm him or the vehicle. Since the drivers of buses and trucks ordinarily do not themselves own them, they have little to lose if the vehicles are damaged or destroyed by. The public. However, even if it be assumed that the appellant apprehended danger to his life from the public, particularly by reason of any such incident having occurred in the past, this did not exonerate the appellant from his primary duty of reporting the accident to the K. T. C. Authorities and the police, as rightly pointed out by the learned Labour Court. The appellant admittedly was picked up by a van driver who according to the appellant himself told the people that he was taking the appellant to the police station. The appellant should, therefore, have firs gone to the Police station to report the matter before going home, which he admittedly failed to do. Section 94 of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, casts a duty on the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident to take all reasonable steps to secure medical attention for any person injured in that accident and to report the circumstances of the occurrence of the accident at the nearest police station immediately anal in any case within 24 hours of the accident. The appellant admittedly failed to comply with this mandatory requirement of law.
5. It was, however, contended by Mr. Choudhry Rasheed Ahmad, the learned counsel for the appellant, that no domestic enquiry was held against the appellant and hence his dismissal from service is in contraven--tion of the provisions of Standing Order 15. I have already referred to the admissions of the appellant himself before the learned Labour Court that an enquiry was in fact held in which statements of the Assistant Yard Master, Imam Naqi, and the appellant were recorded. No doubt, no eye--witness to the accident was examined by the enquiry officer but in view of the admissions of the appellant himself that it was the bus driven by him that knocked down and killed a woman and a child, that he had abandoned e the bus after the accident which was set on fire by the mob and that he had failed to report the occurrence of the accident either at the police station or to the authorities of the K. T. C., it was not necessary for the enquiry officer to record the statements of eye-witnesses who were not the employees of the K. T. C. And whose attendance it was presumably difficult for the K. T. C. Authorities to procure. So far as the appellant himself is concerned, he also did not produce any witness in defence. I have` examined. The enquiry proceedings and found that the same bear the signatures of the appellant in token of participating in the enquiry. As such, the requirements of clause (4) of Standing Order' 15 have been duly complied with.
6. It was next submitted by Mr: Choudhry Rasheed Ahmed that after the accident, as a result of a shock, the appellant fell ill and hence he could not report the matter either to the K. T. C. Authorities or to the police. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the admission of the witness for the respondent Corporation, Abdul Hadi, that the appellant had produced Medical Certificate of his illness from 1st August, to 10th August, 1981, and on the basis of that Medical Certificate, leave was granted to the appellant. It may, however, be pointed out that neither in his grievance petition nor in his evidence before the learned Labour Court, the appellant has asserted that he was so ill that he was unable to report the occurrence of the accident either to the K. T. C. Authorities or to the police, Furthermore, the Medical Certificate itself has not been produced and hence it cannot be said what illness the appellant was suffering from and whether it was of a nature which prevented him from reporting the matter to the police or to the K. T. C. Authorities. Moreover, it is not known whether the appellant himself went to the doctor to obtain the Medical Certificate or the doctor was called to attend the appellant at his house. If the appellant went to see the doctor, he could also have gone to the K. T. C. Authorities or the police to report the occurrence of the accident. On the other hand, the person who called the doctor could have been asked to report the matter to the police or to the K. T. C. Authorities. This admittedly was not done and hence the mere production of the Medical Certificate and the fact that the appellant was granted medical leave did not relieve the appellant from reporting the matter to the police or to the K. T. C. Authorities.
7. It was finally urged by Mr. Choudhry Rasheed Ahmad that criminal proceedings are pending against the appellant and hence the present proceedings be stayed till the decision of the Criminal Court. It has repeatedly been held that the pending of Criminal proceedings against a person is not a bar to the taking of disciplinary proceedings against C him. Moreover, the main charge against the appellant in the domestic enquiry proceedings was gross negligence in the performance of duties which is not a criminal offence.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that I see no merit in this appeal and would dismiss it in limine.