' This order will dispose off C. M. A. 2294/82 and C. M. A 2568/82. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff being the widow of deceased Jawaid Ayub as plaintiff No, 1, and as next friend on behalf of her three minor children, who are plaintiffs Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Deceased Jawaid Ayub was the first cousin of Plaintiff No, 1 and he died on 29-4-1979. There are eight defendants in the suit.
Defendant No, 7 (S. M. Ayub) and Defendant No, 8 (Mst. Shahzada Begum) are the parents of the deceased. Defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (S. M. Arshad, S. M. Akram, and S. M. Amjad are real brothers and nephews of defendant No,
8. Defendant No, 4 (Khalid Masood) is a relation of the parties.
Defendant No, 5 (Mst. Nasreen Amjad) is the daughter of defendants Nos. 7 and 8 and wife of defendant No,
3. Defendant No, 6 (Sheikh Muhammad Asghar) is the brothey of Defendant No, 8.
2. The suit has been filed for the recovery of Rs, 81,12,231. The Plaintiffs have also asked for a decree for accounts. The case of the Plaintiffs is that since 1960 the deceased was carrying on a lucrative business under the name of lavid Impex' at Motan Building, M. A. Jinnah Road, Karachi and also at Ainak Mahal, Shah Alam Market, Lahore, which business, inter alia, was that of importer of plastic moalding compound. According to the plaint, the deceased suddenly fell ill on 22-4-1979, on which date he was hospitalized and he died in the hospital on 29-4-1979. It has been averred that at the time of his death, the deceased was possessed of substantial quantity of valuable imported goods like plastic moulding compound which goods were lying either in bonded Warehouses, over which the defendants exercised complete control, or were under customs clearance. The grievance of the plaintiffs is that the defendants have embezzled and misappropriated the stock of plastic moulding compound and other assets illegally and unauthorizedly and this was done pursuant to a conspiracy of the defendants to deprive the plaintiffs of their legal rights to the assets and properties left by the deceased.
3. Alongwith the suit, C. M. A. 2294/82 was filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. Read with Order XL, rule 1, C. P. C. And section 151, C. P. C. Seeking a temporary injunction from this Court to restrain all the Defendants, except defendant No, 5, from transferring or encumbering or handing over possession of the properties of the said defendants mentioned in the application. It has further been prayed in this application that the Nazir of this Court may be appointed receiver of the said properties of these defendants. In the Schedule of the properties of the Defendants in this application, four properties of defendant No, 1, one property of Defendant No, 2 (in the name of Dawn Corporation), three properties of Defendant No, 3, four properties of Defendant No, 4, one property of defendant No, 6, three properties of Defendant No, 7, and three properties of defendant No, 8 are mentioned. Plaintiff No, 1 had filed an affidavit on 264-1982 in support of C. M A. 2294/82 and paras. 5 to 9 of the said affidavit are reproduced here "(5) I say that while my late husband was in hospital, I was attending to him throughout and in view of his precarious condition I could not leave his bed-side. The said defendants taking advantage of my husband's condition hatched a conspiracy to convert to their advantage and benefit the said goods and other properties which they have subsequently misappropriated and embezzled. I also annex true copy of letter dated 7-11-81 pertaining to my late husband's Lahore office marked P/1 herein, and surrender letter dated 28-12-1980, marked P/2.
(6) I say that the said defendants have affected large scale recoveries of my husband properties including cash and other valuables and the same are being wrongfully retained by them ever since my husband's death which took place on 29-4-1979. The bonded warehouses in which my husband's goods were, stocked at the time were `Khalda & Co. Warehouse' S. I. T. E. And Azmatullah Ltd. Messrs Khalda & Co. Belongs to the wife of defendant No, 2, S. M. Akram.
(7) I say that at the time of my husband's death the said defendants with concerted conspiracy to defraud me and my children of their due share in the estate of my husband collected all the papers, documents and files kept at the office of my husband and have ever since under wild threats and intimidation excluded me from my husband's said office and estate. They have also as stated above disposed off my husband's said office and estate. They have also as stated above disposed off my husband's office in Lahore and have removed therefrom other assets including, record, stocks, fixtures, and fittings. I am informed that even after my husband's death the said defendants are carrying on business of my late husband and are operating bank accounts etc. To my detriment and prejudice. I am informed through trade circle that the said persons have not only retained my assets but in respect of several transactions carried out by my late husband involving lacs of rupees have wrongfully misappropriated the same. I say similarly my sister-in-law, the defendant No, 7, out of avarice and vindictiveness, has retained the cash amounts etc., of my late husband which accrued to the estate and by way of sale proceeds of the goods.
(8) That the plaintiffs have a very good prima facie case and the balance of convenience also lies in their favour.
(9) That with a view to protect the interest of the minor plaintiffs, it would be just and convenient and in the interest of justice to appoint a Receiver as prayed for. I further submit that the clearing agent Messrs Iqbal Ebrahim & Co. Have submitted to Martial Law Authorities that they have cleared the goods under customs documents on the directions of the defendants."
4. All the defendants filed their counter-affidavits in reply to the temporary injunction application denying the various allegations made against them. Each of the defendants denied that they had intermeddled with the estate of the deceased or that they had misappropriated or embezzeled any property belonging to the deceased. Affidavit-in-rejoinder was filed by the plaintiff No, 1.
5. It may be observed here that the present suit was filed in this Court on 26-4-1982 but certain objections were raised by the office on 29-4-1982. These objections were complied with on behalf of the Plaintiffs on 26-5-1982, on which date the suit was admitted by the Additional Registrar of this Court. An urgent application (C. M. A. 2293/82) dated 20-5-1982 under rule 110 of the Original Side of this Court was filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs supported by the affidavit of Plaintiff No, 1 praying that the temporary injunction/receivership application may be placed in Chambers. The case was fixed before a learned Single Judge of this Court for orders on the said urgent application and C. M. A. 2294/82. Both Mr. Naseem A. Faruqui and Mr. Khalilur-Rehman, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, appeared before the learned Single Judge on 26-5-1982 and by an order passed on the same day, the urgent application was granted and notice of the interim application was ordered to be issued for 2-6-1982 and the following ad interim injunction was passed:- "Ad interim injunction granted restraining the defendants from disposing off their immovable properties mentioned in the application without permission of the Court.
' The above order shall not be construed as to restrain the said defendants from using their properties or carrying on business dealings in the normal course."
6. C. M. A. 2568/82 is an application under. Order XXXIX, rule 4 read with section 151, C. P. C. Filed on behalf of the Defendant No, 8 praying for vacation of the ad interim order of injunction, dated 26-5- 1982 issued by this Court on plaintiffs' applications, C. M. A. 2294/82. This order will dispose off the two applications, namely, C. M. A. 2294/82 filed on behalf of the plaintiffs and C. M. A. 2568/82 filed on behalf of the defendant No, 8.
7. I had heard at length the arguments of learned counsel for the parties. Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan, learned counsel for the Defendant Nos. I to 6, had raised the point that there was an earlier Suit No, 630/81 filed by Mst. Shahzada Begum. Defendant No, 8 in the present suit, and in the plaint, in the present suit no reference at all was made to the earlier suit which was necessary and as this was not done, the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the equitable relief of temporary injunction sought by them in the present suit. In fact in the counter-affidavits filed in the present suit on behalf of the defendants, specific allegations have been made that by not referring to the earlier snit and the orders passed therein, the plaintiffs had practised a fraud upon this. Court in obtaining an ad interim injunction which has caused and is causing serious prejudice to the defendants. In the arguments before me also this point was very vehemently urged on behalf of the defendants. I consider it proper to give certain facts about the earlier suit.
8. The earlier suit (Suit No, 630/81) was filed in this Court on 12-10-1981 by Mst. Shahzada Begum (defendant No, 8 in the present suit) for administration of the estate of deceased Jawaid Ayub.
Defendanis Nos. 5 to 8 in the earlier suit are the plaintiffs in the present suit, and defendant No, 9 in the earlier suit is S. M. Ayub (Defendant No, 7 in the present suit). It is an admitted position that only the widow, the three minor children and the parents of the deceased Jawaid Ayub are his legal representatives and entitled to inherit the estate left by the deceased. Defendant No, 1 in the earlier suit is S. M. Yaqoob, father of Mst. Salma Jawaid (Plaintiff No, 1 in the present suit) and defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in the earlier suit are the sons of S. M Yaqoob. The earlier suit was filed in this Court on 12-10-1981. Apart from impleading the other legal heirs of the deceased, S. M. Yaqoob, S. M.
Sarfaraz, Iftikhar Yaqub and Zulfiqar Yaqub, who were not legal heirs of the deceased, were joined as defendants in Suit No, 630/81 on the allegation that they had intermeddled with the estate of the deceased. Mst. Salma Jawaid (Defendant No, 5 in the earlier suit) filed four miscellaneous applications, all dated 3-11-1981, in the earlier suit and two of these applications were C. M. A.
3502/81 and C. M. A. 3504/81. C. M. A. 3504/81 was an application filed under Order I, rule 10, C. P. C.
Praying for joining the following five persons as defendants in Suit No, 630/81 on the ground that they had intermeddled with the estate of the deceased and had missappropriated to their own use large amounts of money and goods belonging to the deceased :-
(i) S. M. Arshad.
(ii) S. M. Amjad I These persons are Defendants
(iii) S. M. Akram. } Nos. 1 to 5 in the present
(iv) Khalid Masud. I suit.
(v) Mrs. Nasreen Amjad.
' C. M. A. 3502/81 was moved by Mst. Salma Jawaid in Suit No, 630/81 under Order XXXIX, rules 1 & 2, C. P. C. Read with Order XL, rule 1, C. P. C. And section 151, C. P. C. Praying for preparation of inventory of the movable and immovable properties of the proposed defendants. The properties in respect whereof prayer was made for preparation of the inventory were listed in the Schedule to C. M. A.
3502/81. It was further prayed in that application that pending the disposal of the suit, the proposed defendants be restrained from transferring or disposing of the said properties.
9. The aforesaid two applications were filed in the earlier suit in November, 1981 and the same were fixed for orders from time to time before the Court, but it was only by order dated 28-4-1982 that notice of these applications was waived by the other counsel appearing in Suit No, 630/81 and it was ordered that notice of these two applications be issued to the proposed defendants for 10-5- 1982. No ad interim order was granted on C. M. A. 3502/81. On 10-5-1982, Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan Advocate appeared on behalf of the proposed defendants and as counter-affidavits had been filed on behalf of the defendants contesting the applications, -Mr. K halil-urRehman was granted time to file- rejoinders as requested by him and the case was then adjourned to 20-5-1982. On 20- 5-1982 the case was adjourned to 31-5-1982 and copy of the rejoinder was supplied to Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan. On 31-5-1982, the case was adjourned on the application for adjournment filed by Mr. Wajibuddin Advocate who appeared for Mst. Shahzada Begum, Plaintiff in Suit No, 630/81. These two applications were then fixed after the summer vacations on 15-'R-1982 but the case was adjourned and it again came up for hearing on 29-8-1982 when the following order was passed :- "Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman states that defendants Nos. 5 to 8 have filed a separate Suit No, 210 of 1982 in this Court and the relief that he was claiming through C. M. A. 3504/81 is now being claimed by him in the new Suit No, 210/82. In the circumstances, Mr. Khalil-urRehman withdraws C. M. A. 3504/81, which is dismissed as such. Both Messrs Khalil-ur-Rehman and N. A. Faruqui state that C. M. A.
3502/81 is an application, which is consequential to the application, which is C. M. A. 3504/81 and as C. M. A. 3504/81 has been withdrawn, this application is also being withdrawn by them. C. M. A.
3502/81 is also dismissed as withdrawn."
10. It may here by mentioned again that the present suit had been filed on 26-4-1982 and as there were certain objections which were only completed after some time, the suit was registered on 26- 5-1982 on which date an ad interim order was passed, as observed earlier. It has already been noted that in Suit No, 630/81 the two applications C. M. A. 3502/81 and 3504/81 were fixed for orders on 28-4-1982. On that date the Court should have been informed that Suit No, 210/82 had already been filed two days earlier i,e, on 26-44 (-`82. This was not done and then the two applications in Suit No, 630/81 were fixed for hearing on 10-5-1982. On 10-5-1982 also the Court was not informed in Suit No, 630/81 that the present suit had been filed and the same position continued on 20-5-1982, 31-5-1982, and 15-8-82, when these applications were fixed for hearing. It is only on 29-8-1982 that in Suit No, 630/81 the Court was informed of the filing of the present suit, and then order reproduced in the previous paragraph was passed.
11. In the facts and circumstances of these cases, in my view, the dictates of justice, fairplay and good conscience, and principles of law as well, required the plaintiff in the present suit to refer specifically and in sufficient detail in their original pleadings to the filing of the earlier suit and the fact that the court had not granted any ad interim relief in the earlier suit to the plaintiff on C. M. A.
3502/81 and that the said application was pending. This was required to place the complete picture of the litigation before the Court. The contents of the plaint in the present suit are more or less the same as that of C. M. A. 3504/81 in the earlier suit, the only significant difference being that Shaikh Muhammad Asghar (defendant No, 6) is a new party in the present suit. However, the addition or presence of Sheikh Muhammad Asghar in the present suit did not discharge the plaintiff in this suit of their responsibility of making reference in sufficient detail about the earlier suit in the original pleadings of the present suit. The fact that the relief that was being claimed through C. M. A. 3504/81 in Suit 630/81 is practically the same as has been claimed by the plaintiff in this suit is also established from the statement made by Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, Advocate and recorded in the order dated 29-8-1982 passed in Suit No, 630/81 (reproduced in para. 9 of this order).
' Both Mr. Nasim Faruqui and Mr.'Khalil-ur-Rehman, Advocates for the Plaintiffs, conceded that in the present suit, filing of the earlier suit and other necessary facts ought to have been disclosed and that there was no explanation or justification for not having done so except that it was a case of "Sheer inadvertence". According to learned counsel for the plaintiffs, there was no mala fides on the part of the plantiffs and no advantage was sought to be taken or in fact obtained by such non- disclosure. It was further contended that even otherwise both the suits were filed in the same Court and it was expected, in the normal course of things that the suits would be placed for orders/hearing before the same Judge of this Court and as such the Judge would be aware of the pendency of the earlier suit and no possible advantage could have been gained by the non- disclosure of the earlier suit in the present suit. It was also contended that if the earlier suit had been disclosed even then this Court might have granted the ad interim injunction that has been granted in this suit by order dated 26-5-1982.
I am not impressed by the contentions of learned counsel for the plaintiffs. As observed earlier, it was necessary for the plaintiff to make disclosure in the present suit about the earlier suit so as to place the entire picture before the Court. If this had been done and it had been disclosed in the present suit that ad interim order had not been granted on C. M. A. 3502/81 in Suit No, 630/81 and that counter-affidavits had been filed contesting the said application and denying the factual allegations and that rejoinder had been filed on 20-5-1982 and the said application was in fact fixed for hearing on 31-5-1982, this Court might not have passed the ad interim order dated 26-5- 1982 in this suit. The contention that the two suits had been filed in one Court i. e. This High, Court and it was expected that the Judge who was to pass orders in this suit would be aware of the institution and pendency of the earlier suit has no force. Firstly, this High Court is not comprised of one Judge. Then one suit can be fixed before one Judge and another suit before another of this Court. Further when a second connected suit comes up before the same Judge of this Court, he is not always expected to remember the facts of and the orders passed in an earlier suit. It is the responsibility of the concerned party to bring the necessary facts about any previous litigation to the Court. It may be observed that complete disclosure about previous connected, related or relevant proceedings and orders is essential when a litigant approaches a Court and unless such nondisclosure can be satisfactorily explained, the claimant should not, as a matter of general principle, be granted interim relief. There may, however, be exceptional cases where, in the interest of justice and for very compelling reasons, the Court might be persuaded to grant interim relief in such a situation. In the later part of this order it is proposed to consider whether the present is one of such exceptional cases.
12. Plaintiff's application, C. M. A, 2294/82, has been filed, as observed earlier, under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Read with Order XL, rule 1, C. P. C. And section 151, C. P. C. Properties in respect whereof injunction has been sought and prayer has been made that a receiver be appointed, are alleged by the plaintiffs themselves to be the properties of the defendants. In reply to a question from the Court, as to the precise provisions of Order XXXIX, C.P.C. Under which this application had been filed by the plaintiffs, Mr. Khalil--urRehman, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, referred to rule 1(a) of Order XXXIX, C. P. C. Now this provision refers to "any property in dispute in a suit" which is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated. Prima facie I am of the view that the properties in respect whereof temporary injunction is sought are not "properties in suit." Further I do not find any allegation that the said properties are "in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated" by the defendants. To bring their case under Order XXXIX, rule 1(a), the plaintiff has to prove these two facts. I am of the view that the case as attempted to be made out by the plaintiff does not fall within Order XXXIX, yule 1 (a), C. P. C.
13. The second provision of C. P. C. Relied upon by the plaintiffs is Order XL, rule 1, under this provision of the Code of Civil Procedure a receiver can be appointed only of a property which is the subject- matter of the suit, As observed in the previous paragraph of this order, it is not even the case of the plaintiff that the properties in question are subject-matter of the suit. c In fact there is no averment on behalf of the plaintiffs that any such property was acquired by any of the defendants after the death of Jawaid Ayub. In the circumstances I am of the view that Order XL, rule 1, C. P. C. Cannot be pressed into service or brought to their assistance by the Plaintiffs on the averments made by them in their pleadings in this suit.
14. It was argued in the alternative both by Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman and Mr. Nasim Faruqui, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs, that if Order XXXIX, rule 1 (a) and Order XL, rule 1, C. P. C. Were not applicable, in the present case, this Court may exercise jurisdiction under sections 94 and 151, C. P.
C. And grant interim relief to the Plaintiffs. It may be observed that the application filed on behalf of the plaintiffs is also under section 151, C. P. C. It was contended that the Courts are vested with inherent powers to grant temporary injunction or appoint receiver even though a given case may not fulfil the conditions of Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 or Order XL, rule 1, C.P.C. Reliance was placed on the following Judgments :- Mohuddin v. Province of East Pakistan (PLD 1962 SC 119). Zafarullah Khan v. Pakistan (PLD 1975 SC 15).
Muhammad Usman Khan v. Miraj Din (PLD 1978 Lah. 790). Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal (AIR 1962 SC 527).
Akhtar Nasimi v. Martial Law Administrator (PLD 1982 Kar. 130).
' In reply it was contended by Mr. Wajihuddin, learned counsel for defendant No, 8, that as there exist in the Code of Civil Procedure specific provisions for grant of temporary injunctions and appointment of receivers, inherent powers of the Court are not available to grant a temporary injunction unless the case is covered by Order XXXIX, rules 1 & 2, or appoint a receiver where Order XL, rule 1, C. P. C. Is not applicable. Following case law was cited in support of this proposition :- Gammon-Layton v. Secretary of State U. S. A. (PLD 1965 Kar. 425). Najam Ali v. Lal Khan (PLD 1968 Kar. 59).
Messrs Meher Sultan Jung v. Qurban Hussain (1972 SCMR 73). Conforce Ltd. v. Syed Ali Shah (PLD 1977 SC 599).
Humira Ansar Kizilbash v. Shujat Shishmahal (PLD 1980 Kar. 436). WAP DA v. M. Yaqoob (PLD 1973 Note 12 at p. 20).
Pan American Trading Co. v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1979 Note 48 at p. 33).
Anant Potdar v. Mangal Potdar (AIR 1926 Patna 27). Radhomal v. Abdul Rahim (AIR 1948 Sind 33).
Pabam Sen v. State of U. P. (AIR 1961 SC 218).
' Mr. S. Haidar Ali Pirzada, learned counsel for defendant No, 7, supporting the proposition advanced by Mr. Wajihuddin argued that in the instant suit no case has been made out for grant of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver of the properties in question. Mr. Pirzada relied upon the following reported judgments :- Virasatullah v. United Bank Limited (PLD 1975 Lah. f7).
Muhammad Javaid lqbal v. Govt. Of Pakistan (1974 SCMR 481). Ataur Rehman v. Inamur Rehman (1974 SCMR 54).
Arts Council of Pakistan v. Riazuddin Pirzada (PLD 1969 Kar. 349). Butchamma v. Punnamma (AIR 1925 Mad. 896).
' Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan, learned counsel for defendants Nos. 1 to 6, had argued that no case for grant of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver had been made out by the Plaintiffs. It was contended that the conduct of the plaintiffs was such as to disentitle them from claiming any interim relief. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel that no allegation had been made that the defendants had disposed off or were disposing of any of their properties. Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan referred to the following judgments in support of his arguments :- ' Yusuf Hussain Shirazi v. Muhammad Alam Shaikh (PLD 1966 Kar. 472). Zair Hussain v. Kaniz Fatima (AIR 1917 All 137). Karim Hussain v. Ram Sarup (AIR 1929 All 877).
' It is not considered necessary to comment separately upon each judgment cited before me.
Suffice it is to observe that in some judgments the Superior Courts have exercised powers under section 94 or 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant relief to a claimant or applicant although the case did not fall within the four corners of specific provision of the Code. In other cases the Courts declined to exercise their inherent powers under section 151, C. P. C. Where they reached the conclusion that the case made out by the claimant or applicant was not covered by a provision of the Code. I have, howerver, no hesitation in rejecting the proposition advanced by Mr. Wajihuddin that inherent powers of the Court are not available to grant a temporary injunction or appoint a receiver and such relief can only be granted under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 or Order XL, rule 1, C. P.
C. I may with respect refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in PLD 1962 SC 119 to the effect that generally speaking the Code of Civil Procedure does not create new powers but regulates the exercise of power already possessed by the Court and even before the Civil Procedure Code was enacted, the Civil Court possessed powers of the kind mentioned in the Code and that the Civil Court possessed these powers because it has jurisdiction to determine and protect civil rights and for the protection of those rights the exercise of such powers is essential.
Supreme Court of Pakistan, elucidating the principle further, observed in H. M. Saya & Co. v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. (1) that the Court ought not to act on the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for and to give such a meaning to the omission would result in grave injustice. It was further observed that the Court should proceed on the principle that every procedure which furthers administration of justice is permissible even if there is no express provision permitting the same. In AIR 1962 SC 527, the majority view of the Supreme Court of India was that there being no such expression in section 94, C. P. C. Which
(1) PLD 1969 SC 65 expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code, the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order XXXIX, C.
P. C. If the Court is of the opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interim injunction. Reference has also to be made to section 151, C. P. C. Itself which is no uncertain terms lays down that nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. On the first page of Aamer Raza's commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure (1981 Edition) the well-known dictum of our Supreme Court appears. 1 may also with advantage quote here the said passage from PLD 1963 SC 382 (Imtiaz Ahtnad v. Ghulam Ali) : .. The proper place of procedure in any system of administration of justice is to help and not to thwart the grant to the people of their rights. All technicalities have to be avoided unless it be essential to comply with them on grounds of public policy. .Any system which by giving effect to the form and not the substance defects substantive rights
(and) is defective to that extent."
15. In my view it may be taken as a general rule that in a suit a temporary injunction will not be granted to an applicant if the fact and circumstances of the case are not covered by Order XXXIX and receiver will not be appointed if the case does not fall within Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, where there are compelling reasons, and the interests of justice require or damand, the Courts are neither helples nor are they fettered by the specific provisions of Order XXXIX or Order XL, C. P. C. And in exercise of their inherent jurisdiction will certainly grant relief by way of temporary injunction or through appointment of a receiver to protect the rights of citizens. It is not possible and I also do not consider it prudent to specify or identify the various situations or reasons, where or E when the Courts will exercise their inherent powers under section 94 or section 151, C. P. C. For granting a temporary injunction or appointing a receiver. In each case the Court evaluates the overall situation considering the peculiar facts and circumstances on record and then the decision is taken whether in the interests of justice inherent powers are to be exercised or not. Each case has its own different set of facts and again and again new situations come before the Courts and, therefore, I may repeat, it is not possible to lay down specific principles restricting the power of Courts to exercise their inherent, jurisdiction in certain specified situations or for certain reasons only. If this were done, it would only impede the administration of justice and restrict the development of law.
16. In the instant case it was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that as plaintiffs Nos.
2, 3 and 4 are minors, the Court should exercise its inherent powers to grant temporary injunction or appoint a receiver although the plaintiffs may not have made out a case under Order XXXIX or Order XL, C. P. C. In my view this by itself is not sufficient, in the' facts and circumstances of this suit, to make out a case for exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In this case, the deceased died on 29-4- 1979 and the present suit was filed nearly three years later i. e. 26-4-1982; there is no allegation that any of their properties has been sold or disposed off by any of the defendants since the death of Jawaid Ayub; there is no averment that any of the defendantsl intend to dispose off any property; in suit No, 630/81 for administration of the estate of the deceased, which had been filed more than six months prior to the present suit i. e. On 12-10-1981, by consent of all the partie including the plaintiffs in the present suit, a preliminary decree has already been passed on 12-9-1982 and an advocate of this Court has been appointed administrator who has been directed to submit his report within six months and if any of the defendants have misappropriated any amount from the estate of the deceased, he will be required to render accounts to the administrato appointed in suit No, 630/81; no case was even attempted to be mad out that irreparable loss will be caused to the Plaintiffs if a temporary injunction was not granted or receiver was not appointed the mere contention that in case an interim order is not granted the defendants will be free to dispose off their properties is not sufficient to hold that irreparable loss will be caused as there is no allegation of any property having been disposed off by the defendants in the last over 3 yars nor is there any averment that any of the defendants even intend to dispose off any of their properties.
17. As observed earlier, no case has been made out by the plaintiff for interim relief under Order XXX1X or Order XL, C. P. C. On the facts and record of this suit, I find no compelling reasons for exercising inherent jurisdiction under section 94 or 151, C. P. C. For grant of interim relief to the plaintiffs. As a result C. M. A. 2294/82 is dismi3sed and C. M. A. 2568/82 is granted. Ad interim order dated 26-5-1982 is recalled.