This writ petition assailing the validity of the order of the learned Rent Controller, Lahore, dated the 23rd June, 1979 accepting respondent 3's application under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, for securing eviction of the petitioners from two rooms of the property bearing No, S. W. 92-R-15, situate at Mela Ram Road, Lahore, and of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, dated the 10th April, 1981, dismissing the petitioners, appeal against the order of the learned Rent Controller arises out of the following .Circumstances and initially the late Ghulam Muhammad, husband of petitioner 1 and father of petitioners 2 to 6, occupied the two rooms of the property in dispute as tenant under one Mst. Nazir Begum from whom Malik Muhammad Aslam, respondent 3, purchased the property on the 27th July, 1971.Respondent 3 claims to have sent on the 7th February, 1972, notice under section 13-A of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, per registered post intimating transfer of the property in his favour to Ghulam Muhammad deceased who is said to have received the same on the 8th February, 1972. In the meantime Ghulam Muhammad expired. On the 27th September, 1974, respondent 3 moved application under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, before the learned Rent Controller, Lahore, for seeking ejectment of the petitioners from the premises in dispute on the grounds that they had defaulted in paying the rent due from the 22nd July, '1971 to 27th September, 1974, that he required the portion in occupation of the petitioners in good faith for personal use and for the use and. Occupation of his family and that the premises were to be renovated and reconstructed.
2. The petitioners contested the application. They gave the lie to respondent 3's assertion of sending notice under section 13-A of the above mentioned Ordinance to their predecessor-in- interest. They objected to the maintainability of the petition for want of service of notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. They did not admit that respondent 3 required the property for bona fide need or for reconstruction.
3. The objections of the petitioners did not find favour with the learned Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge who held them to be defaulters and accepted the bona fide requirement of the building by respondent 3 for personal use and reconstruction. Accordingly the petitioners were directed to vacate possession of the property under their occupation.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners complained that the petitioners' application for adducing additional evidence had not been disposed of by the learned Additional District Judge and, therefore, the petitioners had been deprived of proper hearing. The petitioners actually wanted to produce evidence before the appellate Court to show that respondent 3 had purchased another house in the name of his four sons from his landlady on the 13th May, 1979. And that he had continued to be in its occupation and, therefore, his need to recover possession of the property under occupation of the petitioners was not bona fide. The petitioners had ample opportunity to give evidence in rebuttal of the evidence produced by respondent 3. Their evidence was never shut by the learned Rent Controller. Therefore, normally they were not entitled to produce fresh evidence in appeal. Nevertheless, after hearing arguments I have formed the view that respondent 3's application can very well succeed on the ground that he required the building for reconstruction.
Hence non decision of the petitioners' application by the learned Additional' District Judge is not of any consequence because it is only if all the grounds, other than the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises, taken by respondent 3 for ejecting the petitioners were to fall to the ground that the failure of the learned Additional District Judge to decide the petitioners' application could be adjudged.
4. The requirement of service of notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, had been dispensed with before respondent 3 filed ejectment application. The learned counsel .For the petitioners did not press the issue relating to the said notice. However, he contended that no notice in accordance with section 13-A of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, had been proved to have been served on the late Ghulam Muhammad and, therefore, the petitioners could not be dubbed as defaulters. In support of his argument he mainly relied upon the statement of Muhammad Asghar Malik, R. W. 2, an employee of the Habib Bank Limited, filial Gunj Branch, Lahore, where Ghulam Muhammad had and operated his account, that Ghulam Muhammad used to affix his thumb-impression, instead of appending his signature, to the cheques, to induce this Court to disbelieve the statement of Mian Abdul Latif, postman, R. W. 3, that Ghulam Muhammad had signed the acknowledgement of the receipt of the notice sent by respondent 3. The aspect of notice had been dealt with by the learned Additional District Judge, who has formed the view, on the basis of the petitioners' concession that the rent in favour of respondent 3 had been paid after the month of May, 1972, that the petitioners had notice of the fact that respondent 3 had become owner of the house in question. Be that as it may as respondent 3's petition is to succeed on the basis of requirement of the building for reconstruction the question of default in payment of rent, if any, loses importance.
5. As regards respondent 3's requirement of the building for reconstruction the learned counsel for the petitioners conceded himself to be on a weak wicket? Respondent 3 got the plan of the new building to be constructed sanctioned by the Lahore Municipal Corporation and was not shown to be not possessed of the means to erect new construction. Therefore, there existed sufficient reasons for granting respondent 3's application. Hence the impugned orders cannot be said to be unlawful. The petition cannot but be dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.