1. HAMQODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-This civil petition, which seeks to challenge the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan Peshawar Bench, in a civil revision which was dismissed on the 24th of November 1969, is barred by time by 164 days.
2. The petition for special leave to appeal was filed on the 6th of July 1970. Condonation of the delay is, however, sought by a petition filed on behalf of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was diligently pursuing an application for a certificate of fitness for an appeal under the Letters Patent. The date of the filing of this application has not been mentioned in the condonation petition nor is the learned counsel in a position to furnish the same, although the order refusing the certificate on the 30th of March 1970, purports to have been made in a civil miscellaneous proceeding numbered as No. 12 of 1970. If this be so, then the application for the certificate was filed out of time.
3. Learned counsel has attempted to make out a case that since the petition for special leave filed on the 6th of July 1970, is within 60 days of the date when the certified copy of the order refusing the certificate was received on the 30th of June 1960, the petition is within time. This contention is not correct. The limitation begins to run from the date of the delivery of the judgment and not from the date of the receipt of the copy of the order refusing the certificate. The making of the applica--tion for a certificate of fitness for appeal under the Letters Patent does not give a fresh start to limitation but as has been pointed out by this Court in the case of Paresh Chandra Biswas v. Tapen Kand Chowdhury (PLD 1963 SC 598), the period spent in pursuing an application for a certificate under the Letters Patent may be condoned if the petitioner is able to satisfactorily explain each day's delay.
4. The same view was reiterated in the case of Mst. Nihal Khatoon v. Mst. Allah Wasai (PLD 1966 SC 261). In this view of the matter we have, in computing the period of limitation, excluded the period spent by him in pursuing the application for the certificate, as also the period spent in obtaining a certified copy of the order refusing the certificate, but even so, the entire period of delay is not explained. A considerable period remains altogether unexplained. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner has satisfactorily explained each day's delay. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed as being hopelessly barred by time.