' This is an appeal under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 from the order of learned Senior 'Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi dated 11th December, 1980 whereby he had dismissed the ejectment application of the appellant against the respondent in respect of a building bearing No, 0. T. 2/67-68 situated in Crooked Lane, Old Town, Mithadar, Karachi. This building originally belonged to one Abdul Sattar Ebrahim Sahighara. He had rented out this building to the K. M. C. At Rs, 47. 50 per month for running a school in the same. The K. M. C. Used to pay rent to the said Abdul Sattar for the said building.
2. On 7-12-1977 the premises were purchased by the appellant from the said Abdul Sattar by a registered sale-deed. The appellant sent notices on 12-5-1979 and 2-2-1980 to the respondent that the premises have been purchased by the appellant, therefore, the rent for the same should be paid to the appellant in future. These notices were received by the respondent, but they did not care to make any reply. The appellant, therefore, filed the ejectment application on 18-2-1980.
3. The appellant has taken two grounds in her ejectment application for possession of the premises in question. First, that the respondent is a habitual defaulter having failed to pay rent from 7-12- 1977 to February, 1980 and second, that the appellant is a widow and is in dire need of the said rented premises as she has got a large family and that she requires the premises in good faith for her own use and occupation. Although in the title of the application the appellant has described the provision of law as 15(2)(ii) and (vii) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance of 1979) under which ejectment is sought, but in para. 8 of her application the appellant has stated that she reserves her right to file ejectment application under section 14 of the Ordinance of 1979.
4. In the written statement, the respondent has pleaded that the ejectment application is not maintainable, that the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is barred under M. L. R.-118 of 1972 because the school for which this building is being used, has been nationalised and that the appellant is not entitled to claim any rent because the alleged sale-deed in favour of the appellant, said to have been executed by the original landlord Abdul Sattar, is void under M. L. R.-118 of 1972.
5. It is further alleged that the school being run in the premises in question was nationalised under M. L. R.-118 by the Government of Sind on 25-10-1972 and its charge was handed over to the K. M. C.
And that the name of the landlord was mentioned as Abdul Sattar son of Ebrahim Sahighara. It was, therefore, alleged that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the respondent and the appellant. It is further alleged that 50 per cent. Of the original rent is being paid by the respondent to the original landlord Abdul Sattar. Receipt of notice dated 2-2-1980 is admitted.
There is no specific denial of the appellant's notice dated 12-5-1979 as alleged in para. 4 of the ejectment application. It is further alleged that under paragraph. 3(1) of M. L. R.-1 18 the original owner i,e, Abdul Sattar was not entitled to sell this property to any one and as such the alleged sale-deed in favour of the appellant is null and void.
6. During the pendency of the proceedings respondent's counsel made an application under section 3(2) of the Ordinance of 1979 praying that the ejectment application should be dismissed in view of the notification dated 29th July, 1960 of the Gcvernment of Sind whereby educational institutions nationalised under M. L. R.-118 of 1972, have been excluded from the operation of the Ordinance of 1979. In reply to this application it was stated on behalf of the appellant that the school premises was a private property and did not belong to the nationalised school. Therefore, it was not affected by M. L. R.-118 nor the original owner was debarred from alienating it by sale to the appellant.
7. However, the learned Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application of the appellant on the ground that the appellant was not the owner of the building because the sale was void in view of the provisions of M. L. R.-118 of 1972 and secondly that the school premises nationalised under M. L.
R.-118 were exempted from the operation of the Ordinance of 1979 in view of the notification of the Government of Sind dated 29th July, 1980.
8. The two main questions which fall for determination in this case are whether the building in which the school is being run by the respondent, could not have been sold by the original owner to the appellant and secondly whether the notification under section 3(2) of the Ordinance of 1979 dated 29th July, 1980 shall operate retrospectively so as to affect the pending proceedings.
9. So far as the first question is concerned, the view of the learned Rent Controller was that the school building 'is a property attached with a nationalised school and as such its sale was null and void under the provisions of paragraphs 3(2) and 5 of of M. L. R.-118 of 1972.
10. A perusal of these provisions would show that only the nationalised school/colleges and the property belonging to such institutions only shall vest in the Government under M. L. R.-118 of 1972.
Rented buildings not belonging to the Government, in which such institutions are accommodated, do not become the property of the Government nor vest in the Government by any provision of the said M. L. R. Paragraph 3(2) of the said M. L. R. Bars alienation, sale or transfer of the educational institutions and their property only. It does not refer to the building belonging to a private owner who has rented out the same to such educational institution. The learned Rent Controller has taken the view that even the building in which the respondent is running the school also vested in the Government by virtue of M. L. R.-118 of 1972. This view is not supported by any provisions of the said M. L. R. He was of the view that the disputed premises is a property attached with the nationalised school of the respondent and as such it is affected by the mischief of paragraphs 3(2) and I of the said M. L. R. The view at the face of it is erroneous. It is not the premises which is attached with the nationalised school of the respondent. On the contrary it is the nationalised school which is attached with the rented premises. The rented premises continue to belong to the landlord. The original landlord was thus not precluded from transferring the ownership of the premises to any other person. His right of ownership was in no way curtailed due to the fact that the educational institution accommodated in the premises has been taken over by the Government under M. L.
R.-118. Paragraphs 3(2) and 5 of the said M. L. R. Entitle the Government to take over educational institutions alongwith all the property belonging to such institution. The rented premises was not a property belonging to the educational institution, therefore, the ownership of the landlord in respect of such premises was in no way affected by the said M. L. R. In view of this legal position the learned Rent Controller fell in error in holding that the original landlord Abdul Sattar was not entitled to sell the premises to the present appellant. The ownership of Abdul Sattar in the rented premises remained intact in spite of the provision of M. L. R.-118 and, therefore, the sale-deed executed by him in favour of the appellant on 7-12-1979 was a valid transfer of ownership in favour of the appellant who became landlord of the respondent. It may be observed that even the respondent did not claim that they have become owners of the rented premises. They still consider the original owner Abdul Sattar as the landlord and have admitted that he was entitled to receive rent from the respondent. The respondent has further admitted that the rent was being paid to the original landlord @ 50 per cent. Of the original rent. Hence M. L. R.-118 did not in any way affect the transfer of ownership of the premises in question by the original landlord to the present appellant.
11. The next question is whether the notification dated 29th July, 1980 under section 3(2) of Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which was issued during the pendency of the present rent proceedings before the learned Rent 'Controller, will have retrospective effect so as to bar the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. There can be no manner of doubt that the notification relates to a procedural law inasmuch as it bars a remedy. No party has any vested right in a particular remedy conferred by Statute. In this connection learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the case of Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in the above case are as under:- "The general principle with regard to the interpretation of statutes as laid down in the well-known case of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited V. Irving is that 'if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only', the provisions would be retrospective. 'On the dther hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act', then 'in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day', the legislation would not operate retrospectively, unless the Legislature had either `by express enactment or by necessary intendment' given the legislation retroactive effect. To the same effect are the observations of Jessel, Master of the Rolls, in the case of In re : Joseph Such & Co. Limited where it was observed that as a "general rule when the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. It is said that there is one exception to that rule, namely, that, these enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action, they have been held to apply to existing rights'. The next question, therefore, that arises for consideration is as to what are matters of procedure. It is obvious that matters relating to the remedy, the mode of trial, the manner of taking evidence and forms of action are all matters relating to procedure. Crawford too takes the view that question relating to jurisdiction over a cause of action, venue, parties, pleadings and rules of evidence also pertain to procedure, provided the burden of proof is not shifted. Thus, a statute purporting to transfer jurisdiction over certain causes of action may operate retroactively. This is what is meant by saying that a change of forum by a law is retrospective being a matter of procedure only. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that if in this process any existing rights are affected or the giving of retroactive operation cause inconvenience or injustice, then the Courts will not even in the case of a procedural statute, favour an interpretation giving1 retrospective effect to the statute. On the other hand, if the new procedural statute is of such a character that its retroactive application will tend to promote justice without any consequential embarrassm ent or detriment to any of the parties concerned, the Courts would favourably incline towards giving effect to such procedural statutes retroactively."
' From the above observations it would appear that a law relating to remedy is merely procedural.
The Ordinance of 1979 confers special remedy upon landlords to invoke jurisdiction of Rent Controller in certain circumstances. The notification in question has taken away this remedy from the landlords whose premises are used by educational institution. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in this behalf, the notification in question shall be deemed to affect the pending proceedings also, and therefore, the learned Rent Controller was justified in holding that the ejectment proceedings in respect of the premises in question were barred by virtue of the said notification. The appellant shall, however, be entitled to seek remedy under the normal law i,e, Transfer of Property Act, if so desired.
' With the above observations this appeal is dismissed but with no order as to costs. PLD 1969 SC 187